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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this thesis has been to engage in a hermeneutic dialogue with 
Patrick White's novel The solid mandala, to provide an explication of the 
dual nature of narcissistic wounding. To this end a brief review of 
Patrick White's novels is given, which traces a thematic development of the 
hero's strivings to attain wholeness and merger with an idealized image. 
This struggle is understood to reflect man's strivings to return to a state 
of omnipotent fusion with the maternal image, be it God, nature, the 
idealized other, or the self. 
Literature which reflects the dual nature of narcissistic wounding is 
reviewed, and the concept of narcissism is traced from the historical roots 
of Freud, to current understandi ngs of the funct i on and experience of 
narcissism. Emphasis is given to understanding the experiential nature of 
narcissistic wounding. As such it is implied that narcissism is a normal 
developmental component which requires the the facilitation of containment 
and reflection for its transformation into appropriate adult functioning. 
The importance of the maternal environment is discussed, together with the 
vari ous theoret i ca 1 conceptua 1 izat ions of the consequences of fa i 1 ure of 
the environment. 
The hermeneutic dialogue with the novel ' s description of the experiences of 
the twins, Waldo and Arthur provides the basis for an amplification of the 
experience of narcissistic wounding. This amplification is used as 
( i v) 
clinical material from which a number of psychoanalytic formulations are 
drawn. These formulations are supported by a number of clinical examples 
from the researcher's own practice. 
There appears to be evidence for the value of focusing on the dual nature of 
the experience of narcissistic wounding. This focus reveals two aspects of 
experience, a damaged, positive, libidinal aspect and a defensive, 
patho logi ca 1 destruct ive aspect. Amp 1 ificat ion of these two aspects of 
experience contribute to further the understanding of the conflictual 
experience of narcissistic wounding, and suggest the necessity for such an 
understanding for effective therapeutic intervention. 
(v) 
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION.:: The manda la svmbo 1. 
"My throat knew thirst before the structure 
of skin and vein around the well 
Where words and water make a mixture 
Unfailing till the blood runs foul; 
My heart knew love, my belly hunger; 
1 sme 1 t the maggot in my stoo 1 . " 
Dylan Thomas, Before 1 knocked, 
Collected Poems. 
The focus of the thesis is an investigation of the dual nature of 
narcissism. It is to this focus that The Solid Mandala offers itself for 
exploration. The novel is concerned with the lives of the twins, Waldo 
and Arthur. Their life experience forms what White has termed the solid 
mandala . Walsh (1977) suggests that the twins form the divided parts of 
one person, 
"the tensions which divide and unite them 
dramat i ze the disturbances with inman and 
within the single person. They act out 
that impure mixture of love and hate which 
is both a condition of the relationship of 
every human being to another and the 
condition of the attitude of the individual 
within himself to himself" (p.86). 
Mythologically, the mandala may be taken as the symbol of the Uroboros, or 
the t' ai chi Tao symbol, the principal of the One in the many, the symbol 
of the collective unconscious, before '1, you, and it' emerge. The circle 
contains the division of the light and the dark, the Yin and the Yang - the 
world of opposites. Yang is the urge to become something, and Yin the urge 
to return to nothing. What is fundamental to this conceptual ization is 
that the symbol, in its association with the Great Goddess of Life and 
Death, depi cts, not the end resu It of who leness, but the cont i nuous 
striving towards it, a perpetua 1 renewa 1 through the interact i on between 
the forces of Yin and Yang. The "1 Ching" attaches the following meanings 
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to the male, Yang process and the female, Yin process; 
Yang. 
The dry 
What the earth brings forth 
The creative principle 
Head 
Cold and ice 
Energy 
(cf. O'Brien, 1988.) 
Yin . 
The moist 
That which nourishes what is brought forth 
The receptive principle 
Abdominal cavity 
Warming and nourishing 
Form 
The novel is concerned with the struggle of divided man to find integrity. 
White's creation of Waldo and Arthur dialogues with these above 
characteristics and suggests that their struggle is a universal struggle 
recognized by ancient philosophers. The experi ences of Wa 1 do and Arthur 
dramatize this particular polarized spit of human existence .. 
Informed by this understanding of the richness of the symbolic image with 
which White has chosen to title his book, it is postulated that White's use 
of the term so7id is intended to evoke an understanding, not of striving 
and renewa 1, but rather a rigid, static, and impermeable symbol, a 
protective shield of defensively superimposed order upon psychic chaos. It 
is a circle dense with confusion and pain, unable to strive for an 
interaction between the two forces which would liberate the two aspects from 
their limitations into a wholeness. From this understanding it is further 
postu 1 ated that the twi ns, Wa 1 do and Arthur, offer greatest understand i ng 
of the experience of narcissistic wounding if they are viewed as the 
metaphorical representations of the experience of one individual life. An 
individual life which becomes progressively more split and confused in its 
efforts to cope wi th the experi ence of narc i ss i st i c wound i ng. Wa 1 do 1 i ves 
out the conscious pole of existence, carrying the unintegrated 'wounding' 
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of his twisted innards (the Yin life of Arthur, the abdominal cavity), 
while Arthur lives the receptive, unconscious pole, carrying the 'wounding' 
in his intellect (the Yang life of Waldo, the head). (The principle of 
the t 'ai chi, that in the heart of the Yin is the spot of the Yang and in 
the heart of the Yang is the spot of the Yin.) White offers a detailed 
description of the struggle of both poles, and the struggle to both avoid 
and to come to a wholeness, an integration of the mandala, the self. 
This struggle is postulated to be the struggle of the narcissist attempting 
to cope with his wound, and forms the focus of this thesis. 
The thesis has presented a review of the thoughts of various theorists who 
have contributed to a developing understanding of the experience of 
narcissistic wounding. It is postulated that such wounding is the 
inevitable outcome of the frustrations of libidinal strivings. However the 
severity of such wounding is seen to be dependent upon the quality of 
materna 1 ho 1 ding and i ntrapsych i c conf 1 i ct. Research of th i s nature 
cannot make definitive statements about the genesis of this conflict. That 
is whether the intrapsych i c conf 1 i ct is dependent upon the fa i1 ure of the 
maternal environment, as postulated by theorists such as Fairbairn (1952), 
Balint (1960), Khan (1974). Kohut (1977) and followers of Hartmann's 
(1939) Ego psychology, or whether there is an inherent disposition toward 
conflictual internal object relations as postulated by theorists influenced 
by Kleinian thought, such as Bion (1967), Rosenfeld (1971), Grotstein 
(1981), Kernberg (1966) and Robbins (19882). 
Within this context, the focus of the thesis has been toward explicating 
the experience of narcissistic wounding . The writings of the latter 
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theorists have proved to provide the greatest theoretical articulation of 
this experience. Their understanding of the conflictual relations between 
two poles of experience address the cl inical experience of the researcher 
which has suggested to her that that narcissistic wounding finds its 
expression in a duality of experience. 
understanding of these poles of experience, 
mandala provides the foundational material 
Patrick White's astonishing 
descr i bed in the The so lid 
for an explication of the 
experience of narcissistic wounding. Clinical material from four clients 
is used in the discussion chapter to amplify the explication. 
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CHAPTER TWO. PATRICK WHITE. 
2. The quest. 
"There was something formless yet complete 
That existed before heaven and earth 
without sound, without substance 
Dependent on nothing, unchanging 
all pervading, unfailing. 
One may think of it as the mother of 
all things under heaven." 
(Tao Teh Ching No. XXV trans. Arther Waley in 
The way and it's power. 
2.1. Biography. 
Patrick White is one of the great novelist of the twentieth century. His 
contribution to Australian literature and his insight into the experience of 
alienated man i s well documented by literary critics such as Argyle 1967, 
Blake 1968, Mcloed 1970, Kiernan 1980, Ramson 1974, Walsh 1973, 1977) . 
In 1973 he was awarded the Nobe l Prize for literature (which he appears not 
to value too highly). 
This research is not an attempt to analyse the life of Patrick White, or to 
make interpretations concerning his psychological life. It is instructive, 
however, to highlight the connections which White (1981) himself has made 
between his sense of himself and the evolution of his novels. 
"Sexual ambivalence helped drive me in on 
myself. lacking flamboyance, cursed with 
reserve, I choose fiction, or more likely it 
was chosen for me, as the means of introducing 
to a disbelieving audience the cast of 
contradictory characters of which I am 
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composed" (p . 20) . 
His novels explore the alienation of contemporary man. This exploration is 
not on 1y an ali enat i on between man and man, but an a 1 ienat ion with in man. 
Wh i te speaks of a sense of h imse 1f as "eyes, hyperact i ve emot ions, and an 
unconscious apt to take over from me" (ibid , p. 34). What speaks to the 
researcher is White's integrity to the question of identity and how man can, 
or cannot, surv i ve the burden of his "di fference" / separateness . What 
appears significant to the development of the novels is White's own sense 
of difference in being chosen by homosexuality, whereby he experienced a 
"freedom being conferred on me to range through 
every variation of the human mind, to play so 
many roles in so many contradictory envelopes 
of flesh. I settled into the situation . I did 
not question the darkness of my dichotomy, 
though a 1ready I had begun the inevitab 1y 
painful search for the twin who might bring a 
softer light to bear on my bleakly illuminated 
dar kness " (ibid,p.35). 
White did not see himself so much a homosexual, than as "a mind possessed 
by the spirit of man or woman according to actual situations or characters I 
become in my writing" (ibid,p.81) . 
White was born of Australian parents in London in 1912 . At the age of six 
months the family moved back to Australia. His mother appears to have been 
a r ather domineer ing, disengaged mother, who 1 eft the care of her two 
children to nannies. One of these became an important and much loved 
mother substitute. His mother was a powerful figure in the family. White 
saw his father accommodating to his mother whom he felt he did not love but 
on 1y adm i red, for certa i n of her tra its. Par adox i ca 11y, Wh ite fe 1t he 
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"could not admire Dick (his father) enough to love him; innocent goodness, 
generosity , kindness, were not enough . ..... 1 had never seen my father in 
the context of reality" (ibid,p.49) . The enduring relationship between his 
parents was one Wh ite on ly I ater rea I i zed he coveted . His own re I at ions 
towards his parents, particularly hi s mother, appear to have been complex 
and ambi valent. White has retorted , to the criticism that his novels 
almost exclusively portray weak men, that this may be because Australia is 
a country where women tend to dominate the men and that women are certainly 
more interesting. 
White appears to have been left with a sense that he disappointed his 
mother. He was not the kind of son she would have wanted. Even the circle 
of his parents' friends appeared to regard him as "a changeling" (ibid,p.5) 
Feelings of being different were intensified by his mother sending him to 
Che ltenham where he was most unhappy, fee ling his 'Austra Ii aness' as a 
"deformity". After his traditional English education, also attending 
Kings Co 11 ege, Cambri dge, he found h imse I f equa lly a stranger back in 
Australia . 
Returning to England, attempts to become a playwr i ght did not meet with much 
success . During this t ime, however, his first two novels were published 
and he enl i sted in the Second Wor ld War. The war exper ience seems to have 
given hi m a new sense of his connection with others and he became attached 
to the men with whom he served . He also met Manoly who has remained, what 
might be termed, the anchor of his relations, both to himself and t o 
others. 
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White's return to Australia with Manoly saw the beginnings of his real 
talent and the prol iferation of great novels, starting with The Aunt's 
Story. White has the following to say about The Solid Mandala ; 
"Jung's Psychology and Alchemy, (which) had a 
great influence on me. It projected me into 
my Solid Mandala. 
I see the Brown brothers as my two halves. 
Arthur might have been a portrait of my cousin 
Philip Garland if Philip's childish wisdom had 
matured; instead he was admitted to an asylum 
in his teens, and remains to this day. Waldo 
is myself at my coldest and worst" (ibid, 
p.146) .. 
Perhaps this rather long quote from White's autobiography captures the 
essence of a man ranging through i dent i ties, attempt ing to fi nd a ba 1 ance 
and integration of his femininity and masculinity. 
"I sometimes wonder how I would hav.e turned out 
had I been a normal heterosexual male. If an 
artist, probably a pompous one, preening 
myself in the psychic mirror for being a 
success, as did the intolerable Goethe, 
inferior to his self abnegating disciple 
Eckermann. My unequ i voca 1 ma 1 e genes wou 1 d 
have allowed me to exploit sexuality to the 
full. As a father I would have been intolerant 
of my children, who would have hated and 
desp i sed me, see i ng through the great man I 
wasn't . I would have accepted titles, orders, 
and expected a state funeral in accordance with 
a deep-seated hypocrisy I had refused to let 
myself recognize. 
As a woman, I mi ght have been an earth-
mother, churn i ng out the ch i 1 dren of my 
husband, pass ionate, jea lous, resentful of 
the cause and the resu It, always swa 11 owi ng 
the bile of some insoluble frustration. Or I 
might have chosen a whore's 1 ife for its 
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greater range in role playing, greater than 
that offered an actress, deluding my male 
audience of one into thinking I was at his 
service, then flinging back at him the shreds 
of his self-importance as he buttoned up. Or 
else a nun, of milky complexion and sliced-
bread smile, dedicated to her quasi-spiritual 
marriage with the most demanding spouse of all. 
Instead, ambivalence has given me insights 
into human nature, denied, I believe, to those 
who are unequivocally male or female and 
• • ••• 1 would not trade my halfway house, frail 
though it be, for any of the entrenchments of 
those who like to think themselves unequivocal. 
In fact sexuality refreshes and strengthens 
throug~ its ambivalence, if unconsciously -
even 1n Australia - and defines a nation's 
temperament. As I see it, the little that is 
subtle in the Australian character comes from 
the masculine principle in its women, the 
feminine in its men. Hence the reason 
Australian women generally appear stronger than 
their men. Alas, the feminine element in the 
men is not strong enough to make them more 
interesting" (ibid, p. 154 -155) . 
2. 2. The novels . 
In line with the proposal of this thesis the researcher will focus on a 
central concern, traceable throughout White's novels, namely the pre-
occupation with the dilemma presented by man's infantile wish to return to 
symbiotic union with the mother image, and his attempts to free himself, 
i .e. individuate, from her influence. The inability of White's heroes to 
~eparate is conceptualized as a result of a 'wound' to the totality of his 
being, a narcissistic wound from which he suffers greatly. The thes i s 
shall attempt to explicate the experiential nature of this suffering. A 
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brief background shall be presented, looking principally at the novels 
leading up to The So lid Manda la (1966). 
Understanding of White's work is stimulated by formulations concerning 
fixations or hindrances to development, as conceptualized by Mahler (1972, 
1975a,a,b,c) Kohut (1977) and object relation theorists, such as Bion 
(1962), Fairbairn (1952) and Winnicott (1978) and the analytic wr itings 
of Neumann (1954). The theoretical conceptual izations of each of these 
writers focus in various ways upon the move from the 'autistic/uroboric' 
state of the infantile ego, to its eventual task of separation and 
individuation from the mother. The emergence of the infant's ego is seen 
as dependent upon the holding capacity of the mother. 'Fixations' or 
disorders to the self conceptualized as the result of an unempathetic 
maternal environment, resulting in a wounding of the child's sense of 
unique specialness. Neumann focuses upon conscious-unconscious relations 
. 
and considers mythology to expl icate these stages. He discusses the 
uroboros or the Great Mother as the matrix of the unconscious, the vast, 
enveloping state of non-differentiation out of which the son/lover must 
struggle to attain consciousness. The struggle involves the progressive 
development of strength to distance himself from her fatal attraction. 
In the earliest novels, Happy Valley (1939) and, The Living and the Dead 
(1941), considered by Walsh (1973, 1977) to be apprentice novels, Wh ite 
gives evidence of the feeling state of the 'hero'; an intolerable sense 
of solitariness and despair at the impossibility of connections between one 
life and another. Suffering and intuition become the leit-motiv by which 
Wh i te' s characters attempt to escape thei r i so 1 ated, so 1 itary ex i stence. 
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Here one sees White proposing the germinal idea that through suffering the 
hero can feel connected to 'another' and be placed under the dominance of 
the ' other', under whom, or for whom, the suffering is experienced . 
Intuition invites the self to lose its sense of self and to merge into the 
1 ife of the other. I n both these ways of bei ng, a bri dge is forged by 
which the character can evade the pervasive alienation of solitariness. 
It is in The Aunt's Story (1948), that White offers a more sophisticated 
solution. In Theodora, the ecstasy of dissolution of the ego is 
experienced as a heightened feeling of integration and spiritual endeavour . 
While Theodora feels she is surrendering to an encompassing state of merger, 
she is actually being seized by the mother-image and pulled into symbiosis. 
Th i sis that state of unconscious merger with the mother- image where the 
self is not differentiated and able to stand alone . It is a state where the 
infantile ego feeds the mother-image, seeking refuge in the womb. Theodora 
sees her salvation in destroying "the great monster Self". She is unable 
to apprehend that the evil does not lie in the self seeking selfhood but in 
her inability to give up her longing for a symbiotic state. Evil is 
externalized in the image of the mother, yet the destruction lies within, 
wi th in her wi sh to surrender to the unconsc ious state of merger. Her 
dilemma lies in the belief that to slay the self, she would be free from 
the terrible burden of isolation and able to be whole and connected . Yet 
the be 1 i ef is mi sgui ded for in destroying the se lf , in surrender i ng to 
dissolution of the ego, she gives into the demands of the mother-image, 
which leads to madness i.e. psychic death. 
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In The Tree of Man (1955), Stan attempts to find identity in the activities 
of the ordinary world. He attempts to place himself in the world but is 
pulled by the image he does not understand; the image of the dead man 
hanging upside down in a tree. Stan's attempts to give ordinary living a 
transcendent quality merely lead him further down into the pull of the earth 
mother. Stan is left finally imprisoned, and reclaimed by her at his death. 
White writes as if the longing for a return to the mother is seen within the 
context of a unity with God. This is the dilemma of the hero, to be able 
to see the nihilistic and regressive quality of this pull, as opposed to 
the ecstasy of the dissolution. Tacey (1983) states that" White chooses 
to ignore completely the nihilistic and regressive character of uroboric 
regression" (p.157). He acknowledges the autonomous manifestations of the 
archetypes, but misses the significance of this understanding in following 
the progression in White's novels. White only gives the cons cious 
narration, the conscious needs of the hero without insight and 
understanding. This is the conscious level of narration while the 
struggle of the hero remains an unconscious struggle, extrication from the 
mother, from the unconscious, an unconscious process in itself. Each 
novel searches for a new attempt at individuation. With each attempt, the 
defeat of the hero to the mother-image reveals the strength of the mother-
image and the desperation of the struggle. 
In Voss (1957) White seeks a solution in emphasis on the self. The self is 
valued in an ascendancy over the human condition. Dissolution of the self 
is resisted throughout by Voss in an exploration of the pre-eminence of the 
will and the self sufficiency of the self. Yet finally Voss must succumb 
12 
to the pull of the mother-image . His craving for omnipotence is a craving 
for the anni hi lation of the self and a return to the omnipotence of the 
merged state. His quest and eventual destruction are seen as sacrificial 
and redemptive, which indeed they are - sacrificial and redemptive to the 
mother-image. Aga in White i s led to destroy the self in the quest to 
liberate the self . The self is destroyed in the service of a 'fulfilment' 
beyond the self. 
Riders in the Chariot (1961) continues the thematic exploration of retreat 
f rom the self to something beyond the self. Each of the characters 
withdraws but fails to see the 'flaw within' and falls prey to the image. 
Wh i te has taken the metaphor of subservience to God in the belief and hope 
of finding peace from the hold of the mother-image . What becomes clearer 
is that 'God' is the misguided quest of the hero who deludes himself about 
his yearnings. He has not the strength to resist the mother. 
A pattern has emerged in the novels. White's characters speak from within 
a fatal attraction to the mother. The hero is not able to differentiate 
from the mother and remains psychologically tied to an ambivalent need to 
escape and a final surrender to her in death . In Theodora and Stan, 
White explores the ego's attempt to merge with the mother, in metaphors of 
'nature' and 'madness . Dissolution of the self results in triumph for the 
mother and death for the hero. 
Identity in the practical life of every day, in spiritual endeavour, in 
essence, in connection, do not save the hero. White then explores the 
ego's attempt to glor ify the self in isolation, as seen in Voss. Vo ss 
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resists what is beyond the self yet in the end he must submit too . 
In The Solid Mandala White attempts to split the self. He a llows the 
'se lf ' of Wa 1 do to speak hi s need for separat ion and the death of the 
mother- image, wh il e Arthur seeks uni on and who 1 eness in merger. How 
successful this attempt was, shall be more fully discussed in the 
Discussion chapter . Suffice to say here that the novels which followed The 
Solid Mandala ceased to struggle with the mother-image . All the male 
figures have succumb to the image and are, in essence, in an incestuous 
marriage of mother and son. White moves his exploration to the process of 
integration and self-discovery of the mother-image . It is as if the life 
which the son could not assume, and which he sacrificed, is used to feed 
her development. This theme can be traced in The Vivisector {1970} The Eye 
of the Storm (1974) A Fringe of Leaves (1977) and The Twyborn Affair {1980}. 
Wolfe (1983) conceptualizes White's work as the courting of the ineffable. 
"Committing oneself to the mystery of unity 
causes madness; Sophocles's sphinx, 
Shakespeare's Fool, and Melville's Pip all 
spoke in riddles because they dared not express 
their visions directly. White's Doll Quigley 
and Arthur Brown come to grief, having 
neglected the di vi s ion between human and the 
divine, that no man's land that entices Eddie 
Twyborn. One must stand close enough to the 
fire to be warmed , but not so close as to be 
burned - especially if one is only wearing a 
band aid. On the other hand, the hearts of 
those who withdraw from the flames remain 
frozen; the shallow and the complacent can 
never perceive the truth" (p.232). 
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CHAPTER THREE. REVIEW OF LITERATURE. 
"As I bent to look, just opposite, 
A shape within the watry gleam appeerd 
Bending to look on me, I started back, 
It started back, but pleasd I soon returnd, 
Pleas'd it returnd as soon with answering looks 
Of sympathie and love, there I had fixt 
Mine eyes till now, and pin'd with vain desire ... 
(Milton, Paradise Lost). 
3.1. Introduction. 
Freud's famous dictum, "where id was, ego shall be", has been revealed to 
be less than the ideal he postulated. Steele (1982) in discussing Freud's 
view of man, points to Freud's belief that the Weltanschauung is an 
external, social set of beliefs; an intellectual construct which solves 
a 11 the prob 1 ems of ex i stence on the bas i s of an overri ding hypothes is. 
Within this context Freud (1927) states, "religious ideas are teachings and 
assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) real ity 
which tell one ~omething one has not discovered for oneself and which lay 
claim to one's belief" (p.25.) Freud saw religion as a societal neurosis, 
with man fashioning, in wish-fulfilment, his explicit images of God after 
his own parents. Steele (ibid) maintains that for Freud, religion was 
illusion and the foe of science. Science was his safeguard against 
illusion and his ideal was for the unconscious to be made conscious. 
The thrust of th i s thes i sis that the demi se of 'i 11 us i on', that sphere of 
the unconscious, omnipotent being, in fact the demise of 'god', has left 
unfulfilled an irreducible human need to find a reflection, and containment 
of man's omn i potence and narci ss i sm . One cannot fi nd who 1 eness (i . e. a 
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spiritual dimension) unless one acknowledges and transcends the security of 
the rational external world. This is a technological, rational age and 
man has, in striving for these ideals, lost his 'soul'. The emphas i s of 
external reality and the ascendancy of rationality speaks of a mistrust and 
fear of the spiritual, the irrational, the internal, the instinctual and 
their power to disempower . 
Satinover (1987) discusses how the traditional solution to the dilemma of 
the self lay in religion. With the breakdown of religion, it can no longer 
act as the container of man's' projections of his omnipotent, narcissistic 
self. As a result "the Self is elevated to replace the absent God-image, 
cu lture dec 1 i nes into a mere advert i sement for that i nf 1 ated and frag i 1 e 
Self" (p.109). 
This age has been termed the culture of narcissism, with man involved in a 
frantic search for self-fulfilment (Lasch, 1980). This thesis is concerned 
with mans' search for reflection, his search for identity and how this quest 
is doomed when man looks to the self, to see the totality of his self. 
Man, like the infant, cannot gaze in the mirror without fear of 
fragmentation, unless he has had the holding experience of the mother 
(following Winnicott 1956, 1960) - the Great Mother, the omnipotent being, 
who reflects his grandness and out of whom he emerges (Neumann 1954) . 
Andreas-Salome (1962) captures the significance of this experience with a 
personal vignette from her childhood. 
" . .. an impression I 
reflection in the mirror. 
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had of my own 
With a sudden 
unheralded awareness, I saw my own 
existence separate from that of all others. 
the fact of standing forth as a bounded 
individual that left me homeless and 
impoverished, - as if hitherto I had found a 
welcome place for myself as part of everyone 
and everything" (p. 7). 
The psychiatric (DSM III) descriptive nosology which reifies the human 
condition and fails to conceptualize the multifacited nature of man's 
being, and psychotherapists who articulate increasingly the need to 
understand the so called 'narcissistic/borderline condition', miss that 
the 'cond it i on' is not an ent i ty encapsu 1 ated with in, but is emergent and 
interactive with the life of modern society. It may even reflect aspects 
of society's consumerism and its lack of 'holding' structures. 
The issue cannot, however, be resolved by merely returning to the breast 
of re 1 i gi on or the great mother. Modern man strives to return yet, as 
civi 1 ized man, he has attained a degree of consciousness which precludes 
his return to merger, however painful the longing. Man could be conceived 
of as the "Puer Aeternus" (Neumann 1954) who is not yet able to 'slay' the 
mother and yet not able to know himself without her . Neumann's discussion 
of the early stages of conscious-unconscious relations as reflected in the 
mythology of the Mother Goddess and her connection wi,th the developing son-
lover detail the predicament of modern man. Of interest to this thesis is 
the stage of ego differentiation which Neumann has termed the phase of the 
"strugglers". For the strugglers who begin to have a personal fate the 
Great Mother becomes a deadly and unfaithful mother. 
"The stage of the strugglers marks the 
separation of the conscious ego from the 
unconscious, but the ego is not yet stable 
enough to push onto separation of the First 
Parent and the victorious struggle of the 
hero . As we have emphasized, 
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centroversion manifests itself negatively at 
first, in the guise of fear, flight, 
defiance, and resistance . This negative 
att itude of the ego, however, is not yet 
directed aga i nst the object of the Great 
Mother, as it is with the hero, but terns 
against itself in self-destruction, self-
mutilation and suicide" (p.95). 
Significantly, the motif of the hostile twin brothers belongs to the 
symbolism of this phase of differentiation. Here the ma le attempts to 
attain self consciousness by dividing himself into two opposing elements, 
one destructive and the other creative. Neumann maintains that the 
emergence of the conflict of the twin brothers marks an important stage of 
dissolution of the uroboros, separation and consolidation of ego 
consciousness. 
Psychoanalytically Greenson (1968) suggests a similar task, specific to the 
emergence of a secure identity, This involves the struggle of the boy to 
free himself from the early symbiotic fusion with the mother, a process of 
dis-identification . 
Following Mahler (1975c) man has reached the stage of separation -
individuation, where his narcissism, his feelings of specialness, 
grandeur, omniscience and omnipotence are heightened and he lacks the 
containment of societal structures. His self-esteem and sense of identity 
are at risk and his narcissistic strivings become intensified. 
Various theorists discussed in this thesis e .g. Andreas-Salome (1962), 
Grunberger (1971) and Kohut (1977) suggests that it is possible to identify 
the same narcissistic phenomena in clinical pictures with disparate 
phenomenology . Grunberger maintains that there is an inevitable antagonism 
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between narcissism and object choice, and that the narcissistic aims of the 
ind i vi dua 1 wi 11 be atta i ned or frustrated at each 1 eve 1 of deve 1 opment. 
Thus narcissistic vulnerability is within each individual. It is within 
the theoretical understanding of the narcissistic and borderline phenomena, 
however, that narcissistic wounding attains its most clear articulation. 
Stolorow et al (1980) have postulated a functional definition of narcissism, 
defining it according to its structural function of preserving the integrity 
and stability of the self-representation, across dissimilar nosologies. 
In thei r funct i ona 1 understand i ng, most psychopathology reflects a 
narcissistic wounding. Influenced by these conceptualizations and wishing 
to explicate the experience of narcissistic wounding, the line of thought 
of this thesis will focus on developing theoretical understandings of 
narcissistic phenomena per se, rather than on narcissistic personalities. 
The myth of Narcissus articulates the possibilities of a dialectic between 
the instinctual and narcissistic lines of development. Narcissus fell in 
love with his mirror image in the pond. Freud postulated two separate 
lines of primary and secondary narcissism reflecting libidinal cathexis of 
the ego. Andreas-Salome (1962) suggests that emphasis merely on the 
erotism of self-enjoyment (the instincts) fai ls to apprehend the richer 
insights of the myth. The 'mirror' is, in fact, Nature. What Narcissus 
beholds is not just himself, but himself as if he were still All i.e . 
his narcissistic need. (Grunberger (1971) suggests a symbolic return to 
his amniotic universe). The instinctual and the narcissistic life are 
postulated to co-exist in a dialectic of relation which must allow the 
development of new avenues of narcissistic gratification for wholeness and 
integrity to be attained. There is a developing understanding of a single 
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line of development which encompasses a motivation of relational focus which 
is intimately connected to narcissistic phenomena. 
An elaboration of this concept is discussed by Lichtenstein (1964). He 
cites a number of examples from psychoanalytic literature to suggest that 
the concept of narcissism transcends the issues of ego-cathexis versus 
object-cathexis. The mirror and the act of mirroring introduce problems of 
the emergence of a primary identity, of i dent ity confus i on, of loss of 
identity, and of identity maintenance. It is bel ieved that these problems 
can be understood as the issues of narcissistic integrity. 
These thoughts provide the matrix for the discussions of this research. 
3.2. The Concept of Narcissism. 
Pulver (1970) has written, 
"In the voluminous literature on narcissism, 
there are probably only two facts upon which 
everyone agrees; first, that the concept of 
narcissism is one of the most important 
contributions of psychoanalysis; second, 
that it is one of the most confusing" (p.319). 
Pulver suggests that narcissistic phenomena could be categorized into four 
areas . These inc 1 ude sexua 1 pervers i on whereby one's own body became the 
loved object. Second ly, a deve 1 opmenta 1 stage characteri zed by 1 ack of 
object cathexes and primitive modes of thought, such as magical thinking, 
belief in animism, omnipotence of thought, and some feeling states, such 
as 'oceanic feelings', 'nirvana'. etc. The th ird, a mode of object 
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re 1 at ions, either a type of object cho i ce, where aspects of the se If are 
aggrandized or relationships to others, where they are used as gratifiers. 
As a final category, Pulver suggests the whole range of phenomena related 
to the regulation of self esteem. 
Lichtenstein (1954) writes of the pivotal importance of the concept of 
narcissism. It is the conceptual support for both a new development in 
libido theory and object relations thought (as originated by Kleinian 
thought). It is also the anchor of ego psychology (originated by 
Hartmann's conceptualizations). The concept has also influenced the 
structural reformulation of metapsychology. (The concept is also central to 
the Self psychology of Kohut). 
(The bracketed ideas are superimposed by the researcher.) 
3.3. Freud's theory of narcissism. 
Freud's thinking about the role of narcissism in infantile development 
evolved through three distinct stages. In the first stage the first 
published use of the term, narzissmus, 
sexuality (1905). During this phase, 
occurred in his essays of infantile 
Freud (1911b) described a sequence of 
three stages, within a purely libidinal model : auto-erotism, narcissism, 
and object-love. Following Smith (1985) it is postulated that one may 
understand Freud's auto-el'otic stage as there being, for the infant, no 
transcendent source of gratification or frustration. The transition 
towards narcissism is marked by the unification of the drives i n a 
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convergence on the first object. This first object is postulated, by Freud, 
to be the 'ego' or se If representat ion wh i ch has come into ex i stence. In 
the notes to the Schreber case Freud (191lb) discusses the taking of the 
self as the "love-object" . Although Freud abandoned the idea of a normal 
homosexual stage, he continued to see homosexuality as a behavioural 
manifestation of a narcissistic object-choice i.e . the choosing of a sexual 
object on the basis of their resemblance to oneself (1914). 
In the second stage, Freud (1915) abandoned the concept of auto-erotism, 
and described the stage of narcissism as comprising two sub-stages. The 
first of these sub-stages is conceived of as a primary narcissism, which 
begins with the formation of ego nuclei and represents an overwhelming 
cathexis of the ego nuclei with libido. These nuclei represent the 
original real ity ego. The ego, das Ich, is postulated to be present from 
birth . This concept denotes an experiencing subject rather than a self-
representation. The infant has no need to recognize an external source of 
gratification, thus Freud provides a definition of love as the relationship 
of the ego to its source of pleasure. Hence the development of the 
purified pleasure ego. This development entails a gradual transition from 
primary narcissism to the state of object love, where libido becomes 
divested from the ego (used interchangeably as the self by Freud) to become 
cathected to objects or object representations. 
In pointing forward to the dialectical theory of Grunberger (1971) one may 
draw attention to the implication of Freud's new formulation. Previously 
narcissism was seen as a state in which the drives cathected the ego without 
mediation (1914). In this, Freud's second formulation, narcissism is 
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seen as a relationship of the ego to itself. Grunberger has noted this 
subtle sh i ft and suggests" that the l i bido comes to the ego, thanks to 
narcissism" (p.24) . This emphasis posits the germinal idea for the 
postulated single line of narcissistic development elaborated by the self 
psychologies . 
Freud (1914) saw secondary narcissism as a defensive withdrawal of libido 
from objects back to cathex is of the ego or se lf . He suggested that the 
ego could use libido for its own narcissistic aims and as such had a 
structuring role in the formation of the ego ideal, becoming the instigator 
of repression. 
In Freud's third model, he was concerned with integrating the theory of 
narcissism with the structural model. He now made a clear differentiation 
of the i d from the ego . In primary narcissism all libido was seen as 
contained by the id . Secondary narcissism was seen to occur as the result 
of loss of the object and a perceived ego loss - loss of self - esteem. 
Libido is withdrawn from the object following its loss and taken into the 
ego r esu It ing in an i dent if i cat ion of the ego with the abandoned object 
(1917a), being thus strengthened 1923a). 
Freud's thoughts on the relationship between narcissism and zonal sexual 
development was also expanded upon. Freud had discussed the relationship of 
orality and narcissism in his paper on Da Vinci (191Db) 
The pur ified ego was alternatively described as the 'incorporative-devouring 
stage' (1915) . In the so-called second model, Freud postulated that 
narciss i sm preceded the oral organizat i on . 
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The anal stage was also seen as possessing narcissistic components and was 
described as the border between narcissism and object-love. This stage 
presents the chi ld with the first opportunity to decide between a 
narcissistic or an object-libidinal attitude (1917b). 
In the phall ic phase, Freud (1923b) writes of castration as being the 
typical phantasied narcissistic injury. 
any experience of narcissistic injury. 
'Castration' came to be used for 
This brief review demonstrates the complexity and denseness of Freud's 
conception of narcissism. This complexity is embraced by a number of 
European analysts (Andreas-Salome 1962. Grunberger 1971. Green 1986a) as 
speak i ng to the comp 1 ex i ty of human experi ence and c 1 in i ca 1 observat i on. 
Andreas-Salome discusses what she terms the dual nature of narcissism, by 
which narcissists seek individuality at all costs and yet cannot live 
outside a continuing state of fusion. Green, though far more comp lex, 
articulates a similar concept, with his postulation that there is a special 
mode of real i ty choice for the borderline patient. This is the object as 
being "neither yes nor no" (p.82). This position leaves the individual in 
a transition between intrusion and loss. Grunberger's 
theory of narcissism postulates an object cathexis and narcissism which are 
not conceptualized as seeking equilibrium but rather as a dialectic relation 
between inst i nctual and narcissistic components. 
"Whether the subject loves himself more or 
loves himself less will depend, then, not on 
the amount of object libido available to him, 
but on the relation between his narcissism and 
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his instinctual libido. His narcissism may 
(or may not) permit him, so to speak, to 
accept from his id a certain quantity of 
libido, which can be measured, but narcissism 
per se cannot be evaluated quantitatively" 
(p.6). 
(These theories will be developed later in the review.) 
This complexity has not been embraced by all analysts. A number of 
theorists, generally outside of classical psychoanalysis, have drawn 
attention to the inherent contradictions and deficiencies in Freud's 
theories ( To name but a few of the many who have approached these issues, 
Balint 1960, Hartmann 1956a, 1956b, Hartmann, Kris and Lowenstein 1946, 
Kris 1952, Jacobson 1964, Mahler et. a1. 1975, Kohut 1977). Although 
from various schools of thought, some of these theorists point to the 
essent i a 1 contrad i ct ions of chrono logy surround i ng the deve 1 opment of the 
ego and the id. They also point to the prob 1 ems of def i n i ng 
topographically the part of the mental apparatus cathected by the primary 
libido. There is also debate as to the status of the concept of secondary 
narcissism. Balint (1960) maintains that all narcissism is secondary, 
serving a defensive function. He views development as progressing along a 
single line of object relations, from primary to mature object love. 
Mah ler et . a 1. (l975b) postu 1 ates a norma 1 deve lopmenta 1 1 ine of secondary 
narcissistic functioning, while Kohut (1977) argues for an independent line 
of narcissistic development, discard i ng the concept of secondary 
narcissism, describing rather the transformations of narcissism from 
primitive to mature forms of narcissism. 
These difficulties have, in various ways, contributed to the new theories 
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of narcissism and the modifications around Freud's original thoughts . What 
has transpired in the English speaking world is the development of two major 
theor i es of narci ss i sm, those of Kernberg and Kohut. These theor ies 
appear to have irreconcilable differences and depart, in some respect, 
fundamentally from Freud's conceptualizations yet they currently provide 
the most influential matrix of understanding of narcissistic phenomena. 
The following sections wi 11 detai 1 the thoughts of the theorists who have 
elaborated upon the foundation of Freud's thought. An attempt will be made 
to examine the developments in conceptualizing the phenomena of narcissistic 
experience, to present day understand ings of the concept . Spec if i ca lly 
this attempt will be within the context of its clinical application to an 
understanding of the existential dilemma of the so called 'narcissist' or 
from a Jungian perspective, 'puer aeternus'. 
3.4. The dual nature of narcissism. 
What becomes apparent in writings about narcissism is what may be termed its 
dual nature. By this it is implied that narcissism appears to be always 
experienced in terms of the other . Most formulations of narcissistic 
organization discuss an inherent dual ity between the self and the object. 
This duality is conceptualized as both an internally and externally 
experienced relationship which is fundamental for both the identity and 
defense of the narcissistic personality. 
Referring again to the myth of Narcissus, it is instructive to note that 
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Narcissus did not fall in love with himself but with the image of himself. 
It is an image of himself at a distance, seen symbolically in the other. 
This is, in essence, what the narcissistic personality attempts to do, to 
have the other to mirror and reflect aspects of the self and without whom, 
existence is threatened. 
Balint (1960) gives a phenomenological description of narcissistic people in 
which he describes their inability to live alone, despite appearances to 
the contrary. He postulates that they live with 
"their split-off doublets on the pattern of 
such famous couples as Faust and 
Mephistopheles, Don Quixote and Sancho 
Panza ... 
the unglamorous and unnarcissistic partner, 
who is capable of object love, is the one 
who is really independent from the hazards 
of everyday 1 ife and can cope with them -
the partner without whose help and 
ministration the glamorous and seemingly 
independent narcissistic partner would 
perish miserably" (p.27). 
Lichtenstein (1964) in discussing the emergence and maintenance of identity, 
makes the proposition that "it is impossible to rid narcissism of the mirror 
hidden in the concept" (p.51) and suggests the usefulness of viewing 
narcissism as "a kind of ideogram" (p.49). He draws attention to Freud's 
use of visual images in discussing narcissism, particularly the mirror and 
the amoeba, with its pseudopodia. It is here suggested that both these 
images imply the fundamentally essential presence of the other, both for 
reflection and incorporation by the subject. The other, clearly, may 
refer to both i ntrapsych i c and i nterpersona 1 re 1 at ions of mi rror ing and 
incorporation with the object. 
What is proposed by Lichtenstein is that prior to a sense of self, there 
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must be a framework, an organizing principle which precedes psychological 
development . The concept of mirroring (as in Mahler 1968, Winnicott 1965) 
is seen to be the start, not of object love but rather the outlines of the 
child's image of himself, reflected by the unconscious needs of the mother . 
The child's existence is reflected in the particular libidinal cathexis of 
the mother, who reflects back a particular configuration of the child's 
presence, which forms an identity theme. The reflect ions actualize specifi c 
potentials depending upon the libidinal cathexis of the mother. 
Lichtenstein proposes that this state is not yet a sense of identity, but 
rather an organizing principle. It is the experience of archaic mirroring 
which is postulated to constitute an essential and healthy narcissism and 
which requires the presence of the other for development. 
Pr imary i dent ity is thus thought to be based upon mi rror i ng, where the 
object is needed and used to reflect the outlines of the individual's 
identity. As the primary identity originates in a state of 
undifferentiation between object and subject, narcissistic lib i dinous 
mirroring reinforces identity delineation through magnification and 
reduplication, which Lichtenstein terms 'echo' . 
A sense of i dent ity can on ly be spoken about when a pattern of act i ng and 
reacting to the other emerges in development . There is thus a move from 
narc i ssisti c mirroring of one ' s own identity in the object, to rediscovery 
of the other as a partner i n a mutua l interaction . In situations where 
one ' s individuality is not responded to (Lichtenstein speaks of widening 
social groups, but the concept could as well apply to ear ly and later 
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stages of development) then there is the danger of a depersonalized social 
role which may act to empty the sense of identity and lead to alienation . 
There may then be a need to return to the mi rror i ng stage, and the 
poss i b il i ty of temporary object loss. One may argue that L i chtenste in's 
formulations do not address the uniqueness of the individual, which cannot 
be equated to merely the reflections of the mother. Lichtenstein does, 
however, draw attention to the fundamental role of the other in the 
emergence of identity, and the need for, and return to, the other when 
the felt sense of identity is tenuous. 
Lichtenstein's formulations are concerned with external relations, 
Natterson (1976) discusses how use may be made of internal relations with 
the self as a transitional object. Natterson presents clinical material 
demonstrating the tendency, in men with severe narcissistic and homosexual 
funct i on i ng, to experi ence a part of themse 1 ves as trans it i ona 1 objects. 
In his clinical cases, they experienced themselves as dolls. This fantasy 
afforded the patients considerable relief from conflicts . From a 
Winnicottian understanding, the mother is the transitional object - in 
transition. In functioning as their own transitional objects, these men 
experi enced pronounced re i nforcement of thei r sense of femi n i n i ty, 
resulting in consequent issues with their sexual identity . The pathology 
is maintained to be due to fixation at a period of identification with the 
mother, where the transitional object, instead of being "relegated to 
limbo" (Winnicott 1951) becomes instead, a significant part of the 
individual's self esteem. In such cases there is an inability to move out 
of symbiosis with the mother. 
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Jacobson (1965) writes of the daub Ie face of the ego idea 1. Within her 
theorizing she postulates that at the deepest core of the ego ideal there is 
a fusion of the images of the love object and the self . The double faced 
nature of the ego-ideal gratifies, 
"the infantile longings of which we said 
that it is never fully relinquished: the 
desire to be one with the love object. 
Even our never-ending struggle for oneness 
between ego and ego ideal reflects the 
enduring persistence of this desire" (p.96). 
Sohn (1985) suggests an interesting addition to theory. It is postulated 
that in narcissistic organization, an identification through projective 
identification takes place which starts the narcissistic organization i.e . 
by becoming the object, it is then one's possession. Sohn proposes that in 
narcissistic organization there is a minimum of introjection, with the 
split in the ego maintaining projection. The term identificate is used to 
de 1 i neate that part of the ego, ca lled into be i ng by envy and omn i potent 
denial, which becomes differentiated and plastic in quality . The 
identificate acts as if it were the whole ego, assuming omnipotent control 
over the split off ego remnants i.e. the dependent, libidinalized aspect of 
the ego. The identificate is postulated to be able to become 'anything', 
and can act as if it were the prevai 1 ing ego. What is characteristic is 
its plastic quality, that it is mere mimicry which is deprived of 
enri chment and concern. Sohn's concept is essentially similar to 
Winnicott's (1960) formulations of the True and False Self, whereby an 
internal relationship is implied between the two experiential ways of being. 
The False Self acts to protect the True Self against the impingements of the 
environment, but is not itself able to be alive and enriched. Both the 
'identificate' and the False Self act as the other, in a power relation 
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which splits the ego, in efforts to maintain the ego. 
These conceptualizations highlight the inherent duality of narcissism, 
which it is hoped will be explicated in the review of relevant narcissistic 
literature, in both its covert and overt forms. 
3.5 . Object relations: Conceptual issues. 
With in the history of psychoana lyt i c thought, the major object re 1 at ions 
theorists demonstrate a complex and discontinuous line of development. It 
is possible to trace a radical shift from Freud's energic model, to an 
increasing emphasis on interactional and relational motivation. This 
latter emphasis has become evident even in the thinking of classical 
psychoanalysts (Langs 1978, Greenson 1972, Searles 1975). While able to 
trace the move away from the energic model, it is difficult to find 
theoret i ca 1 consensus in the so ca 11 ed object re lations trad i t ion. Th i s 
is due to a number of factors . 
Confusion over the use and designation of the conceptual terms is a 
contributing factor. Freud's use of the term 'object', within his drive 
reduction model, was used to refer to a 'libidinal' object (1905), and 
later as the object of the aggressive drive (1911a). Later theorists 
(Fairbairn 1940, 1952. Guntrip 1969) completely reject the drive concept, 
while still retaining the terms 'object' and 'object relation'. Others 
have stressed the role of the object and object relations, while still 
considering themselves within the drive model tradition (Klein 1975a, 1975b, 
Hartmann, 1950), while others, who stress interrelational issues, are 
drive t heorists (Jacobson 1964, Kernberg 1976). 
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The term, object relations has also been used to denote exclusively the very 
different theories of Klein (ibid), those of Fairbairn (ibid) and even the 
theories of Kernberg (ibid). 
For the Brit i sh and the Ameri can schoo 1 s, there is not a common set of 
theoretical beliefs, neither between them nor within the schools. Rather, 
what binds the theorists, is a shared set of problems and orientation. 
The fundamental problem is the transformation of the instinctual drive 
motivation of Freud's metapsychology, into a framework where relations with 
others, real or fantasized, constitute the centre of the conceptual and 
interpretative base. 
The common orientation is a set of assumptions which focus on the importance · 
of the individual in interaction with significant others again real or 
fantasised. 
interaction. 
The personality is assumed to be formed within this 
The interaction is also assumed to constitute the 
motivational context within wh ich other physiological needs are subsumed. 
This orientation speaks to a dialectic between instinctual needs and a 
relational perspective. 
Gi ven the above commona 1t i es, there is vast di vergence in the degree to 
which leading theorists acknowledge divergence from Freud . Greenberg et al 
(1983) show how this ranges from, for example, the modified drive theorists 
such as Hartmann (1956a) who attempts to accommodate the motivational aspect 
of the reality principle to Freud's drive model and Klein's (1957) 
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unacknowledged break from instinctual theory, yet radical shift of emphasis 
to phantasy; to Fairbairn (1952) who totally rejects the basic assumptions 
of drive theory and instinctual conflict, (perhaps the first pure object 
relations theorist), to Winnicott's (1965, 1978) indifference to, and even 
distortion of, drive theory. 
The concepts of the ego, the body, and the self have attained prominence 
in theoretical formulations, yet the relations between these concepts are 
complex and show little consensus. The following suggest some of the 
complexity; Freud (1923a) introduced the concept of the body-ego, Federn 
(1926), ego experiences and ego feelings. Hartmann (1950, 1955) wrote of 
the self' and self-representations. Winnicott (1960b) proposes a theory of 
the False Self, while Khan (1974) discusses trauma to the body-ego. 
Understanding is further compounded by the lack of consensus as to what is 
denoted by narcissism, as pointed out by Pulver (1970). What is denoted 
as narcissism varies due to the underlying distinction between drive or 
object relations theorists. Rosenfeld (1964) and Kleinian thinkers see 
narcissism as referring to a defensive mode of object relating, which is 
pathological and found in a range of pathologies. Jacobson (1954). 
following Hartmann, defines narcissism as an individuals relationship with 
his 'self', referring to the discrepancies between the actual state of the 
self and the 'ideal self-representation', which determines the sense of 
self-esteem. Kernberg (1974,1975) and Kohut (1971) suggests the 
importance, to self representation, of the cohesiveness and continuity of 
narcissism, while Winnicott (1960a) points to the quality of experiences 
which can preclude psychic development and has implications for narcissistic 
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phenomena . (These conceptua 1 i zat ions demonstrate a dua 1 ity of narc i ss i sm 
which is intimately bound to an object relational framework, the degree of 
health being the degree to which narcissistic aims are appropriately 
attained and frustrated by the other, 
interpersonally. 
both intrapsychically and 
Given this basic introduction to the difficulties inherent upon a discussion 
of object re 1 at ions theory, an attempt sha 11 be made, in the fo 110wi ng 
sections, to review how theorists, broadly grouped within a relational 
framework and notwithstanding their differences, 
understanding of narcissistic phenomena . 
3.6. Historical development. 
have contribute to an 
As already mentioned, it is within the narcissistic and borderline 
functioning that theorists have given the clearest articulation of 
narcissistic wounding. Within this section an historical tracing of the 
conceptual developments surrounding a progressively sophisticated 
understanding of the phenomena of narcissism is given. 
Clinical practice has seen an increase in concern with the so-called 
borderline' patients, who appear to have replaced the 'hysterics' of 
Victorian times. Fenichel (1945) wrote that the trend was due to the 
embrac i ng of new orders of mora 1 ity and va 1 ues. 
observation that neuroses have changed, 
II in the classical neurosis a continuous 
personality was suddenly disturbed at 
certain points by inappropriate actions, 
impu 1 ses or thoughts. In modern neuros i s 
that is no longer the case. Here the 
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He a 1 so made the 
persona 1 ity does not appear to be uniform 
but open, torn, or deformed, and in any 
case so involved in the illness that one 
cannot say at what point the 'personality' 
ends and the 'symptom' beg i ns. There is a 
very gradual transition from neurotics to .. 
persons with characterological anomalies who 
themselves feel their need for treatment 
less than do the people around them" (1955, 
p.201). 
Capponi (1979) however, in tracing the origin of the concept of the 
borderline, suggests that there is evidence of 'borderline' symtomatology 
as early as 1873 and that it has been the increasing conceptual ability of 
psychoanalysis which has allowed an articulation of so called borderline 
phenomena and the 'subgroups' i dent ifi ab le there in. A similar point is 
made by Laplanche et al (1973) who maintain that the borderline prominence 
is due to the spread of psychoana lys is. Th i s thes i s suggests that it is 
within the structures of present day society that 'borderline' phenomena are 
'invited' to be, as it were. Man's crisis of identity is accentuated by a 
world of mass media, space travel, and continuous war, and narcissism is 
man's experiential response to an alienated existence. 
Freud 
The theory of the death inst inct has become an integra 1 aspect of the 
thinking of some of the object relational theorists (Klein (1946, 1952, 
1957, 1958) Segal (1983) and Rosenfeld (1964, 1971). Freud did not 
himself make expl icit any relation between narcissism and the death 
instinct, and his own (1920) theory of the life and death instincts has 
rema i ned a po 1 emi ca 1 issue in psychoana lys i s and has not been accepted by 
all (Reich 1933, Fairbairn 1952, Robbins 1982). Robbins states that Freud 
laid the foundation 
"for the extreme, almost solipsistic 
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example of intrapsychic bias in the theory 
of Melanie Klein, elaborated in the early 
writing of Otto Kernberg; a preoccupation 
with aggress ion, fantasy, conf 1 i ct and 
defense in neonates and infants, to the 
exclus ion of actual object experience" 
(p.459). 
Freud maintained that the death instinct silently drove one towards death. 
It is through the activity of the life instinct that this force is projected 
outwards, and then appears as a destructive impulse directed against 
external objects. He saw these two instincts as generally fused. What is 
considered by Freud to be a 'pure form' of the death instinct, the wish to 
die or withdraw into a state of nothingness, is seen by Rosenfeld (1971) as 
a manifestation of a destructive process directed against objects and the 
se 1 f , ,wh i ch he c 1 a ims operates in its most v iru lent form in severe 
narcissistic conditions. 
Freud (1915, 1920) tentatively pointed to a connection between a pleasurable 
narcissistic stage and hatred or destructiveness towards the external object 
when the object begins to impinge on the individual. Hartmann et a 1. 
(1949) suggests that Freud compared the re 1 at i on between narc i ss i sm and 
object love to that between self destruction and destruction of the object, 
and that this connection may have led Freud to assume that self-destruction 
is the primary form of aggression to be compared with primary narcissism. 
Freud (1937) was pessimistic about the ability to analyse the resistances of 
the silent opposition of the death instinct, claiming that interpretations 
cou 1 d not act i vate the emergence of an open negat i ve transference, hence 
work with narcissistic functioning was not encouraged. 
Abraham. 
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Abraham (1919) focused on the issue of the hidden negative transference and 
described patients, with pronounced narcissism, who displayed an hostility 
and defiance towards the psychoanalytic method, which was hidden beneath an 
apparent eagerness to co-operate . Abraham ascr i bed th i s behaviour to an 
unmistakable element of envy which linked the narcissism to aggression . 
This aggression found expression in what Abraham (1924) termed 'limitless 
narcissism' where the relation to the object is incorporative, yet the 
individual pays no attention to the interests of the object but destroys it 
without the least hesitation. 
Besserman Vianna (1974) illustrates a clinical example where her patient 
experienced envy in his desires to destroy the analyst for having something 
good to offer him, by denying that he had any need for love , dependence, 
or interest in external objects. 
Reich. 
Reich (1925, 1933) made some fundamental contributions to an understanding 
of narcissism and the latent negative transference. His formulations are 
similar to those of Abraham, yet his emphasis was some what different. In 
breaking away from Freud, he moved towards studying the character armour of 
the patient were he felt the narcissistic defence found its most concrete 
expression. Thus he was concerned to study the formation of character and 
its pathological development, principally in the acquisition and operation 
of defence mechan isms. Character is seen as a defens i ve structure, an 
automatic mark of reaction resulting in rigidity and loss of psychic and 
physical elasticity. Character is postulated as a chronic change of the 
ego. Confl i cts between genital incestual desires and their frustrations 
resu lts ina harden i ng of the ego i. e. a chron; ca lly operat ive, automat i c 
character . This chronic, protective formation Reich designated armoring. 
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Noncharacterological i.e. typical relations to the world, were seen as 
breaches in the armor. This formulation is more restrictive than the 
psychoanalytic concept of character. The latter postulates that the 
dynamic and economic organization of the ego's positive actions and the 
attempts to combine its various tasks to find satisfaction, are all 
constitutive of character (Fenichel, 1954, 1955). 
In his work with what Reich (1925) termed 'impulsive characters', he was 
one of the first to emphasize the role of pregenital experiences and the 
crucialness of their influence on the attitudes the child would take to the 
Oedipal complex. He observed that the overcathexes of this early period 
led to prominence of narcissism . He maintained that there are neurotics 
"who show a narcissistic position matching in intensity that of the 
schizophrenic" (p.46). Reich further noted that in these instances 
repression was not a rel iable mechanism of defence and that there was a 
pathological ambivalence between intense hate and fear, and intense 
unsatisfied longings for love. 
Stern 
Stern (1938) was the first to write about 'borderline' patients as such . He 
noted that the central clinical feature was the prominence of narcissism, 
from which all other symptoms derived. He maintained that the aetiological 
factor was sustained affective deprivation, which he termed, 'affect 
hunger', or 'affective (narcissistic) malnutrition' . The experiential 
situation accords with Khan's (1963) paper on 'cumulative trauma', where he 
traces the significant influence of continuous low grade trauma, as opposed 
to the traditional view of trauma as s traumatic event. For Stern the most 
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malignant clinical feature is masochism, which tends to perpetuate itself. 
Deutsch 
Deutsch (1942, 1965) had written the first 'clinical' stud i es of 
individuals suffering from what she termed 'as if' personalities. Her 
descriptions showed what appeared to be impoverished or absent emotional 
relationships to the outside world and to their own egos . There was, 
however, in her cases, an initial impression of complete normality. This 
appeared to overlay a 'staged' quality to their experience together with a 
passive attitude towards the world. These patients were alert to signals 
from the outer world to which they then moulded themselves. Deutsch fe 1 t 
that aggressive tendencies were masked by passivity, but that also early 
def i c iency in the deve 1 opment of affects reduced inner conf 1 i cts . These 
then rema i ned externa 1. Common to a 11 her cases was a disturbance to the 
process of sublimation resulting both in a failure to synthesize the various 
infantile identifications into a single, integrated personality and in an 
one-sided, purely intellectual sublimation of the instinctual strivings. 
Weiss (1966), quoted in Capponi (1979), gives a summary of the 'as if' 
character wh i ch demonstrates the simi 1 ar i ty with present concept ions of 
borderline patients . 
"a) the primitive stage of object relations 
without object constancy; b) the poor 
deve 1 opment of superego wi th object i ve 
anxiety still predominant; c) the 
prevalence of the primary identification 
process; d) the lack of sense of identity; 
e) the emotional superficiality and general 
poverty of affect, of wh ich the pat i ents 
are unaware; and f) the 1 ack of ins i ght. 
The lack of insight . .. is one aspect of the 
narcissistic state of these patients" (p.96) 
In summary, the initial pessimism of Freud over work with narcissism has 
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been superseded by the add it ion of cruc i a 1 conceptua 1 understand ings of 
later theorists. Abraham (1919) linked the concept of envy to the 
aggression of narcissism, while Reich (1925) was one of the first to 
emphasize the importance of pregenital experiences and the implications of 
over cathexis of this period for the development of narcissism. Stern 
(1938) pointed to the aetiological significance of "affective (narcissistic) 
malnutrition", while Deutsch (1942) provided masterful clinical 
understanding of the world of the "as if" personalities which is 
characterized by passivity, adaptation, lack of conflict and intellectual 
subl imation. These conceptualizations provided the foundations for further 
understanding of the problems of narcissistic functioning. 
3.7. Object relational theorists. 
Klein 
While Klein did not refer specifically to borderline or narcissistic 
phenomena, her formulations have contributed vastly to the thinking of 
theorists such as Rosenfeld (1965), Bion (1967), 
Grotstein (1981) and Kernberg (1966, 1976), among others. 
"Her conceptions of early psychic 
development offer the possibility of 
understand i ng many phenomena of border 1 i ne 
pathology as the operation of anachronistic 
menta 1 processes whose pers i stence and 
misapplication in adult mental functioning 
underlies the activation of the clinical 
manifestations" (Capponi 1979, p.108). 
Searles (1965), 
Klein's theory of early object relations has important implications for an 
understand ing of narc i ss i st i c phenomena in the 'border 1 i ne' patho 1 ogies. 
According to Segal (1983) and Bott Spillius (1983) Klein's major 
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contribution to narcissism has arisen from her conceptual formulation of the 
death instinct. Rosenfeld (1971) states that Klein saw narcissism as a 
withdrawal from external relationships, driven by the death instinct, to 
an ident ification with an idealized internal object. Klein ' s observation 
had been that children struggle with their urge to destroy their objects and 
a desire to preserve them. She maintained that the theory of the life and 
death instinct advanced understanding of this struggle. 
Klein (quoted in Segal 1964) asserts that there is experience of the death 
instinct from the beginning. There is assumed to be sufficient ego at birth 
to experi en"ce anxiety, to use defense mechan isms, and to form object 
relations in phantasy and reality . The death instinct is experienced as a 
threat of annihilation from within, and it is the primitive ego rather than 
the 'organism' which deflects the death instinct outwards. Like Freud, 
Klein postulates a concept of primitive destructiveness. While Freud saw a 
fusion of the life and death instincts projected out as aggression , Klein 
used this concept but saw the projection of the death instinct into external 
objects as an additional process . 
Klein (1958) postulates that anxiety arises from the operation of the death 
instinct within the organism, which is subjectively experienced as a fear 
of annihilation. Her formulation was that to defend against this fear, 
t he ego used t wo processes. 
The first process is concerned with differentiation. Part of the death 
instinct is projected outwards into externa l objects. These then become 
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persecutors. A part of the death i nst i nct is, however, ret a i ned in the 
ego, which turns its aggression against the perceived persecutors. A 
similar split is postulated to occur with the life instinct . During 
development it is appropriate for the projections to be characterized by the 
splitting of the good from the bad object, as well as the good from the bad 
parts of the self. These splitting processes keep the instincts in a state 
of defusion. 
The second process to occur at this time is introjection, which is seen as 
binding the death instinct and leading to a fusion of the life and death 
instincts. 
Klein (1957) postulated primitive envy as the most intractable, destructive 
direct derivative of the death instinct. It attacks the good object and 
therefore spo i 1 sand dep 1 etes the ego's i nterna 1 and extern a 1 resources. 
As differentiation and integration are based upon early splitting processes, 
envy interferes with these processes. Klein holds that envy represents 
almost completely defused destructive energy and is particularly unbearable 
to the early ego. It thus becomes split off from the rest of the ego and 
remains an unconscious factor in the internal world of the individual. The 
function of envy while central to the theories of analysts such as Rosenfeld 
and Segal, is also a polemical concept. Joffe (1969) critiques Klein's 
concept which he claims is based on her assumption of a primary inborn 
instinctual drive, her conceptualizations of self-object differentiation in 
early infancy and the implicit intentionality of envy. Joffe argues for 
envy as a derivative, a secondary motivating force which has an intimate 
relation to the individual's narcissism and self-esteem. Disturbance is 
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seen to lie in the area of development of the relation between narcissism 
and self-esteem. 
Klein (1957) writes of the role of hidden or silent envy in the formation of 
the negative therapeutic reaction. She maintains there are efficient 
defenses against the knowledge of envy. These include omnipotence, 
denial, splitting, idealization, confusion, flight from the primary 
object resulting in splitting of feelings, devaluation of the object, 
voracity, awakening envy in others by various behavioural means. 
Klein (1946) first introduced the concept of projective identification and 
in 1957 she traced its deployment in the implementation of envious attacks, 
as well as a defense against envy. Klein herself does not make an explicit 
connection between envy and narcissism, yet Segal (1983) suggests that it 
is implicitly stated that narcissism is a defense against envy. Segal 
comes to this conclusion by arguing that narcissism is a defense against the 
death instinct as well as an expression of it . 
"(in Freud's description)--"discovery of the 
object gives rise to hate. One could 
describe envy in a similar way. The way 
primary envy is described by Melanie Klein 
is as a spoiling hostility at the 
realization that the source of life and 
goodness lies outside. To me envy and 
narcissism are like two sides of a coin. 
Narcissism defends us against envy (as was 
descri bed by Rosenfe 1 d and others). The 
difference would lie in this . If one 
believes in a prolonged narcissistic stage, 
envy would be secondary to disillusionment. 
If, with Melanie Klein, one contends that 
awareness of an object relation, and 
therefore, envy, exist from the beginning, 
narcissism could be seen as a defence 
against envy and therefore must be related 
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to the operation of the death instinct" 
(p.271) . 
A further significant Kleinian contribution (1948, 1975a, 1975b) is the 
e 1 aborat i on of the large ly unconsc i ous, subject i ve experi ence of an inner 
world, This inner world is built up through continual operations of 
splitting, projection, and introjection. These operat ions are 
experientially coloured by the postulated positions of the paranoid/schizoid 
and the depress ive pos i t ions (1946). The idea of pos i t i on rather than 
stage is used to imply a set of anxieties and associated defenses that 
dominate the early phases of development . These anx i et i es and defenses 
later recede but never completely. The particular combinations remain as 
potentialities, and may gain ascendancy due to reactivation in adult life. 
Klein has postulated that the persistence of the paranoid/schizoid position, 
in varying degrees, interferes with the working through of the depressive 
position and underlies pathology. 
Klein (1946) elaborated the concept of the 'part object' characteristic of 
the paranoid/schizoid position. Capponi (1979) maintains that it explains 
the immature forms of object relations seen in borderline patients for whom 
the object is merely a need-gratifying object, existing in a fused relation 
with the self, and without entitlement to a separate existence. With the 
development of the depressive position and the perception of the 'whole 
objects' , separateness and ambivalence between love and hate is 
experienced, as is the effort to regain the lost object in order to make 
reparation. Klein (1958) maintained that the lost object is internalized, 
through a process of i nternal restoration. This assimilated object is said 
to be the first symbol . 
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Within this framework Klein has made two direct references to narcissism. 
She (1952) refutes the idea of a primary narcissism, claiming that there is 
no justification for speaking of a narcissistic stage, for object relations 
exist from the beginning. Auto-erotism and narcissism include the love 
for, and the relation to, the internalized good object, which in 
phantasy, forms part of the loved body and self. Klein saw the instinctual 
forces as operat ing on ly in attachment to objects from the beg i nn ing, her 
theory being characterized by a focus on intrapsychic relational phenomena. 
Secondly Klein (1946) differentiates between narcissistic states and 
narcissistic object relations, 'narcissistic structure'. Narcissistic 
states relate to withdrawal to an idealized internal object (her 1952 
conceptualization). The narcissistic structure is a more long lasting 
organization, which emphasizes elements of control, implicit in the 
concept of projective identification. Either through constitutional 
factors or when the experiences of anxiety exceed the limits of the 
defense's incipient capacity for reality testing, then 'omnipotent 
phantasy' occurs. Anxiety is postulated to be due to aggression which is 
seen as a derivative of the death instinct. Th i s produces excess i ve 
projective identification wh ich operates with disregard for reality and 
leads to irrational expectations from the object, the split-off part of the 
death instinct being project ed into the external object (the mother), who 
is then experienced as an external persecutor. 
Wh i 1 e the concept of the death i nst i nct rema i ns a theoret i ca 1 postu 1 ate, 
the significance of the role of envy makes an important contribution to a 
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dynamic understanding of narcissism, as do the organizing conceptual 
frameworks of the parano id/sch izo id and depress ive pos it ions. The 
primitive defences of narcissistic functioning are addressed by Klein's 
understanding of schizoid functioning and the function of projective 
identification, characteristic of the relational style of narciss ists . 
(Critiques of the Kleinian perspective are given by, among others, Glover 
1945, Zetzel 1956, Joffe 1969, Kernberg 1969, Yorke 1971, Robbins 1980, 
Greenberg et a 1. 1983.) 
Bion. 
Bion elabo rates upon the experiential duality of narcissism in his 
formulations of the interaction between the psychotic and nonpsychotic 
personality which offers a definitive understanding of the intrapsychic 
conflicts inherent upon the mother's inability for reverie. 
Fundamental to this understanding is Bion's theory of thinking. Bion 
(1967, 1962) has elaborated the concept of projective identification to 
develop a theory of thinking wh ich brings the emotional and the cognitive 
into dialogue. He postulates that the ability to think is enhanced and 
developed through the dynamic interaction between the paranoid-schizoid and 
the depressive positions. There is an oscillation between disintegration 
and integration leading towards a synthesis from which the 'selected fact', 
an emotional experience of meaningfulness, may occur. 
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Similarly to Freud, Bion (1962) proposes a distinction between pleasure and 
unpleasure . When unpleasure is dominant the infant projects 'beta 
part i c 1 es ' into the object, the breast. De-toxifi cat i on of the ' bad 
breast' occurs through the mother's abi 1 ity for reverie . She conta ins, 
identifies, transforms and gives it back in more bearable form, as an alpha 
element. The introjection of this function, termed the 'alpha function', 
assists the infant to cohere his own 'alpha elements' and thus to tolerate 
frustration and develop the process of thinking . 
Bion maintains that there is an intimate connection between the mother's 
ability for reverie, 'good enough' mothering, to act as a container for the 
projective identifications of the infant, the contained, and the 
development of K. K is the predisposition for learning /knowing, while 
minus K is its evasion. For appropriate development to occur a 
commensurate relationship between mother and infant must develop, from 
which both mother and infant extract benefit . "The activity ... as shared 
by two individuals becomes introjected by the infant so that the (contained 
-container) apparatus becomes installed in the infant as part of the 
apparatus of alpha-function" (p.91)and hence the development of K. 
In exploring why minus K should exist, Bion (1959) explores the function of 
envy. The infant projects his fear of dying into the breast, together 
wi th his envy and hate of the breast. Because of the projected envy , the 
breast is felt to enviously remove the good elements from the fear of dying 
and to force t he worthless residue back into the infant. The env ious breast 
takes away the infant ' s wi ll to l ive. When the object is re i ntrojected, 
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it becomes an extremely destructive internal object, bent on destroying the 
infant, enviously asserting moral superiority, with the aim of arousing 
gu ilt. This is the psychotic part of the personality, the menta 1 
mechanisms of the paranoid-schizoid position which persist, in various 
degrees, in every individual. Bion (1957) terms this mental functioning the 
psychotic persona lity, wh i ch ex i sts side by side wi th the nonpsychotic 
persona I ity. Bott Spillius (1983) maintains that the ego may become 
completely identified with the envious internal object. This is a 
situation theori sts have various ly termed the bad se If, the destructive 
self, or the narcissistic self which attempts to rule the internal world. 
Bion (1957) provides a description of the conditions which promote growth of 
the 'psychotic personality'. 
"There is the environment, ---- and the 
personality, wh ich must display four 
essential features. These are: a 
preponderance of destructive impulses so 
great that even the impulse to love is 
suffused by them and turned to sadism; a 
hatred of reality, internal and external, 
which is extended to all that makes for 
awarenes s of it; a dread of i mm i nent 
annihilation and finally, a premature and 
precipitate formation of object relations, -
---whose th i nness is in marked contrast to 
the tenacity with which they are maintained" 
(p.266). 
Bion (1957) sees projective identification, in the psychotic part of the 
persona 1 ity, as a subst itute for regress ion in the neurot i c part of the 
personality. The process appears to involve the experience of the 
projected beta particles as having the quality of things, with the sense of 
there being obstacles to their re-entry. The objects 
"wh i ch are fe It to have been expe 11 ed by 
projective identification become infinitely 
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worse after expulsion than they were when 
originally expelled, the (patient) feels 
intruded upon, assau lted, and tortured by 
this re- entry even if willed by himself" 
(p.275) . 
What is characteristic of the psychotic part is the destructive attacks made 
on anything which is felt to have the function of linking one object to 
another (1959). The psyche contains an internal object which is opposed 
to, and destructive of all links whatsoever from the most primitive (which 
is seen to be a norma 1 degree) to the most soph i st i cated forms of verba 1 
communication and the arts. The prototype of all the links i s proposed to be 
the primitive breast or penis. Informed by Klein's (1934) description of 
phantas ied sad i st i c attacks on the breast, and her formu lat ions around 
splitting and projective -identification, Bion (1959) proposes that the 
phantas i ed attacks on the breast form the prototype of a 11 attacks on 
objects which serve as links. Projective identification is seen as the 
mechanism employed by the psyche to dispose of the ego fragments produced by 
its destructiveness . 
"In this state of mind emotion is hated; it 
is felt to be too powerful to be contained 
by the immature psyche, it is felt to link 
objects and it gives reality to objects 
which are not self and therefore inimical to 
primary narcissism" (p . 315). 
Emotions link a subjective experience of relation to others which underlines 
an awareness of the separateness and dependence of the se If. The 1 i nk i ng 
function of emotions are therefore attacked for they are too threatening to 
t he immature psyche. 
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Rosenfe'd. 
Rosenfeld (1964) postulates the notion that Freud's clinical examples are 
not examp 1 es of primary narci ss ism as c 1 a imed by Freud, but that they are 
rather examples of primitive object relations. In these states omnipotent 
incorporat ion, or project ion, of the object is promi nent, as is the 
identification which occurs with these processes. In incorporation, the 
self is said to become so identified with the incorporated object that the 
sense of separate identity or boundary is denied. In projective 
identification parts of the self omnipotently enter the object and take over 
the desirable qualities. Rosenfeld maintains that introjection and 
projection usually occur simultaneously. 
Rosenfeld stresses that in narcissistic states, these processes, 
introject i ve and project ive i dent if i cat i on of the se lf, act as defenses 
against any recognition of separateness between self and object. Awareness 
of separateness leads to feelings of dependence and therefor anxiety due to 
the i nev i tab 1 e frustrat ions. Dependence a 1 so st imu 1 ates envy of the 
goodness of the object. Omn ipotent object re 1 at ions imp ly omn i potent 
possession and therefor obviates anxiety due to aggression. Envy is seen 
to playa crucial role as it increases the difficulty in admitting 
dependence and frustration. Envy itself has omnipotent qualities and 
contributes to the omnipotence of the narcissistic object relations . The 
envy itself may be split off and denied. Rosenfeld observes that 
narcissistic patients project their undesirable qualities into the object, 
which implies that any disturbing feelings can immediately be evacuated into 
the object wi thout concern for it, wh i le s imu ltaneous ly deva 1 u i ng the 
object. 
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"In severe narcissistic disturbances we can 
invariably see the maintenance of a rigid 
defense against any awareness of psychic 
reality, since any anxiety which is aroused 
between parts of the self or self and 
reality is immediately evacuated. The 
anxiety which is thus defended against is 
mainly of a paranoid nature, since 
narcissistic object relations date from the 
earliest infancy when anxiety is 
predominantly paranoid" (1964, p,332) . 
Rosenfeld observes that clinically, narcissistic object relations are felt 
to be idea 1. The patient feels relieved of anything unpleasant and because 
of omnipotent possession, the patient experiences himself as contain i ng all 
the goodness and as lovable. There is usually "simultaneously a highly 
ideal ized self image, which dominates the analytic situation, and is 
rigorously defended against and omnipotently denied" (p,333) . The ideal 
self-image is thought of as a highly pathologica l structure which is based 
on the patient's omnipotence and denial of reality. I n the powerfu 1 
resistance, the intelligent patient may use his intellectual insight to 
deprive interpretations of any life or · meaning. Only meaningless words, 
felt to be the possession of the patient, 
idealized, giving a sense of superiority. 
are left, wh i ch are then 
Rosenfeld (1971) made an important distinction between libidinal and 
destructive aspects of narcissism. Libidinal narcissism is characterized 
by idealization of the self, maintained by the processes discussed in his 
1964 paper. However in the destruct i ve aspect, there is idea 1 i zat i on of 
the omn i potent idea 1 i zed se lf , which is directed against any positive 
libidinal relationship. The destructive, omnipotent parts of the self may 
remain disguised or split off, yet they exe)'t a powerfu 1 .effect in 
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preventing dependent object relations and in keeping external objects 
devalued . Hence the impression of apparent indifference to the world. 
In line with thoughts over the duality of narcissism, Rosenfeld maintains 
that these two aspects exist side by side. When the libidinal aspects 
predomi nate, destruct i veness appears as soon as the omn ipotent idea 1 ized 
self is threatened by perceived separateness. The individual experiences 
humiliation and defeat at being 'robbed' of his omnipotence and experiences 
envy of the object. 
When the destructiveness is dominant, i.e. when separateness is perceived, 
envy is experienced as a wish to destroy the object, as well as a wish to 
destroy the self. Destructive narcissism is highly organized, which 
serves to increase its strength as a defense in keeping its power and 
maintaining the status quo. The narcissistic organization appears to be 
directed, not primarily against guilt and anxiety, but rather toward 
ma i ntaining the idealization and superior power of the destructive 
narcissism. These formulations suggest a paranoid-schizoid position of 
functioning, where guilt and anxiety over destructive impulses are not yet 
operative, supporting Rosenfeld's postulation that the narcissistic object 
relation dates from the earl iest paranoid anxieties. Spotnitz (1976) has 
discussed the phenomena of aggression being turned towards the self instead 
of the object. He terms this the narcissistic defense, the most damaging 
and self-destructive way in which the ego deals with frustration . 
In a formulation similar to Sion's (1957), Rosenfeld (1971) proposes that 
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the destructive narcissistic parts of the self, in narcissistic patients, 
is linked to a psychotic structure which is split off from the rest of the 
personality. This structure is a delusional world promising self-
suffi c i ency and pa i n 1 essness . Frequent ly these destruct i ve impu 1 ses are 
disguised as benevolent, providing ideal solution to problems . More 
frequently they threaten the rest of the self with death, to assert their 
power. However the ' destructive impulses are designed to make the sane part 
of the self dependent upon, or even addicted, 
structure. 
"In this narcissistic withdrawal state the 
sane dependent part of the pat i ent enters 
the delusional object and a projective 
identification takes place in which the sane 
self loses its identity and becomes 
dominated by the omnipotent destructive 
process; it has no power to oppose or 
mitigate the latter while this pathological 
fusion lasts" (p,17S). 
Grotstein 
to this delusional 
Bion (19S0) discussed the differentiation of the psychotic from the non-
psychotic parts of the personality in schizophrenics and presented a 
clinical examination of the concept in "The Imaginary Twin. Grotstein 
(1979) elaborates Bion's formulations with borderline functioning. He 
maintains that in each individual there exists or once existed a spl it, 
wh i ch is seen in the psychot i c and norma 1 persona 1 ity. I n the norma 1 
individual, the psychotic twin is well maintained, where as in the 
psychot i c, the norma 1 twi n is he 1 d hostage by the psychot i c twi n. In 
borderline functioning, the normal twin has been damaged in various 
degrees, in ear ly deve 1 opment by the need for excess i ve use of sch i zo i d 
and manic defenses . The distinguishing characteristic of the borderline 
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personality organization is, according to Grotstein, the particular nature 
of splitting. It is not the splitting as characterized by Kernberg, where 
the genesis of the splitting is seen to be between good and bad self -object 
representations. Grotstein claims these splits occur in all personalities. 
In the borderline the splits are between 
"the psychotic portion(s) and the normal 
portion, but, because of the partial 
compromise of the normal portion of the 
personality (effected by inroads of the 
psychotic portions) in eschewing it from 
achieving cohesion, the veneer of 
cohesiveness of the container (normal 
personality) reveals the chaotic 
disorganization of the psychotic personality 
as a series of disconnected, desultory 
selves and objects in a chaotic nether 
world" (p,162) . 
Grotstein (1981) discusses how the imaginary twin of Bion's work, while 
either representing the omnipotently perfect self or the psychotic self does 
have some connection with the normal aspects of the personality, "that is, 
they are on speak ing terms" (p, 97) . He suggests however, that the 
mysterious twi n may be cut off, without any connect ion to the norma 1 part 
of the personal ity. Grotstein appears to be suggesting that spl itting 
occurs on a continuum. "To the degree that the normal personality frontier 
is felt to be compromised, then the bizarre splitting which comprise the 
abnormal unconscious make their appearance" (1979, p,163). Grotstein sees 
hi s concept reflected in the work of Green (1977) who art i cu lates the 
compromise of the borders in borderline disorders as reflective of a 
defective function of negation. 
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Green 
Green (1977, 1986a, 1986b) suggests that absence is the most characteristic 
differentiating psychic function of borderline phenomena . Th i s concept is 
elaborated in his model of reality testing. The traditional concept of 
reality testing involves that the object either is !lL is not there. 
Winnicott contributes the idea that there is a third alternative, the third 
area of potential ity. The object is and is not there. Green forwards 
the hypothesis that for borderline functioning there is a fourth alternative 
- the fourth space. This is the negative refusal of choice . The object 
is neither there nor not there. This concept captures the mental dilemma 
which effectively keeps the individual absent from his life, immobilized by 
ambivalence . Absence is seen as an intermediate state and as such a 
'halfway' between the presence of life and the loss of life. Presence is 
experienced as an intrusion, while excessive absence becomes loss. Green 
discusses the great difficulty experienced in tolerating the absence of the 
object and in differentiating this absence from loss and annihilation. 
Separateness is experienced as non-existence and the possibilities of 
persona 1 space are exper i enced as a negat i ve suspens ion, an absence from 
choice . Hence there is the desire for merger with the object, which is 
experienced as death. Green (1986c) further discusses that in the need for 
an object there is a 1 so the need to· rna i nta ina bad object at a 11 costs. 
This internal object is formulated as the internal object which is so 
profoundly internal that it is seen as a narcissistic object, shaped on the 
subject's wounded narcissism. Gr een also discusses projective 
identification with the object, whereby 'emptiness' is the phenomenological 
experience of what Green terms narcissistic amputation. In such situations 
the other i s thus needed because of the projective identificat ion yet with a 
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resultan t sense of loss. 
"psychic reality - the only true one for 
them - formed by objects which only exist 
through the disappointment or displeasure 
they create. The empt i ness of the ego is 
more consistent than its achievements . All 
the self-hatred ------ reflects a compromise 
between the desire to carry out an 
unquenchab 1 e revenge and, co-exi st ing with 
this, the desire to protect the object from 
these hostile wishes directed towards him . 
This revenge is born from a wound which hit 
--- in their very being, which disabled 
their narcissism. Their failure to realize 
this stems in great part from the fact that 
their thoughts do not know how to 
d i st i ngu i sh between the harm they want to 
impose upon themselves - and of which they 
are often unconscious - and the harm they 
want to inflict upon their object. ---------
The logic of despair has one constant goal: 
to produce ev i dence that the object is 
really bad ----When they attain their goal 
they have proof - ----- love is always 
uncertain, hatred is always sure" (1986c 
p.22). 
Green (1986d) maintains that moral narcissism is used as a crutch in order 
for the individual to free himself from the vicissitudes involved in a tie 
to an object. The aim is thus to liberate himself from the servitude 
wh i ch is attached to object re lat ions in order for the i d and ego to be 
loved by the superego and a tyrannical ego-ideal . 
Green (1986d) postulates that development can be looked at from two angles. 
The development of the object-libido from oral to gen i tal, and that of the 
narcissistic libido which moves from absolute dependence to genital 
interdependence . Security with the parent can only be gained through 
instinctual renunciation, which permits the acquisition of self-esteem. 
Precoc i ous conf 1 i ct brought on by the mother, resu lts in the crush i ng of 
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desire and a narcissistic wound . This wound, because of the impossibility 
of experiencing omnipotence and therefor surmounting it, results in 
excessive dependence upon an idealized, omnipotent mother, The omnipotence 
of the maternal object 
"is more easily created because it 
corresponds to the mother's desire to bear a 
chi ld without the contribution of the 
father's penis. In short, it is as though 
the child, because of his conception with 
the he 1 p of th i s pen is, were a debased, 
damaged product" (p,129). 
It is the maternal object which assures security, thus the ego-ideal 
preserves a 11 the characteri st i cs of the aggrand i zed mother. This ego-
ideal is built upon the vestiges of the ideal ego . E 1 abo rat i ng upon 
Green's (1986e) concept of the dead mother, the ego which fails to 
experience individuating separation, cannot constitute a receptacle for the 
cathexes of later development. Rather, it endeavours to retain the 
primary object and relive, repetitively, its 'loss' i.e. what may be 
construed as the non presence of the maternal object. The i dent i fica t i on 
of the primary ego to this object results in a feeling of narcissistic 
depletion, a result of the narcissistic wound. 
Problematic narcissism is seen by Green (1986d) as contemporaneous with 
orality, which increases the dependence upon the breast, thus frustrating 
the necessary surmounting of narcissistic omnipotence . 
"During the anal phase------the demands of 
renunciation become imperatives and reaction 
formations predominate; at best one will 
end up with an obsessive and rigid 
character, at worst with a camouflaged 
psychopathic paranoid form bearing fantasies 
of incorporation or a dangerous and 
restrictive object animated by an 
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antilibidinal omnipotence. All of these 
pregenital relics will heavily mark the 
phallic phase and will confer upon the boy's 
castration anxiety a fundamentally 
devalorizing character" (p,129). 
To summarize, subsequent to Klein, object relations theorists have drawn 
attention to the fundamental importance of the quality of the relationship 
between mother and ch il d, and have high 1 i ghted that the i nab i 1 ity of the 
mother to provide a holding (containing) environment and positive reflection 
of the child has profound implications on the child's development. One of 
these implications is the experience of a narcissistic wounding of the 
child's sense of omnipotence. 
These theorists· have also provided a growing understanding of the role of 
envy of the separateness of the other (the object), together wi th 
elaboration of the conflictual relations between the ego and the other - the 
dual nature of narcissism. There is i ncreas i ng soph i st i cat ion of an 
intrapsychic understanding in the work of Bion, 'the psychotic personality', 
Rosenfeld, 'destructive narcissism', Grotstein, 'the psychotic twin', to 
Green's understanding of the profoundly internal narcissistic object which 
is shaped by the impossibility of omnipotence and desire. 
3.8. "Independent" theorists." 
Fa irba irn 
Fairbairn (1963), whi le well grounded in psychoanalytic and object 
relations theory, created (1952) an independent set of postulates based on 
an instinct of primary object seeking, rather than an energic model, which 
is in clear oppos it ion to class i ca 1 theory. He rejected Freud's pleasure 
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principle, the libido theory and the death instinct. At base Fairbairn 
focused on the vicissitudes of dependency and the self-object dyad, 
postulating aggression as a secondary phenomenon, dependent upon a 
disappointing/frustrating object. Without an adequate maternal object the 
infant increasingly 1 ives in an inner world of fantasy. In this 
formulation the death instinct of Klein is rejected, as is the primordial 
role given to fantasy by Kleinian thinkers. Thus Fairbairn postulates 
that the earliest experiences are the structuralization of the introjection 
of the bad object of rea I experience. This is in contrast to Klein who 
postulates that the psyche develops internally through cycles of projection 
and introjection, relatively independently of the environment . For Klein 
it is splitting and the projective identification with the split fantasy 
which constitutes the major determinant of development. 
Within this frame work, Fairbairn presented a cogent contribution towards a 
developing understanding of the importance for a differentiation of clinical 
syndromes within the diffuse designation borderline. In his paper Schizoid 
Factors in the Persona lity, (1940) Fairbairn singled out three prominent 
characteristics of schizoid functioning; 1) an attitude of omnipotence; 2) 
an attitude of isolation and detachment; and 3) a preoccupation with inner 
reality (p.6). 
Fairbairn's definition of schizoid phenomena is extremely broad and he 
maintains that everyone must be regarded as schizoid. This position is 
defended by his conceptualization of splitting. The fundamental schizoid 
phenomenon is postulated to be the presence of sp li ts in the ego which is a 
universal mode of defense of the early oral phase. For Fairbairn, there 
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is a close connection between a splitting of the ego and a libidinal 
attitude of oral incorporation, thus any degree of fixation in the early 
oral phase, plays a dominant role in determining the pattern of schizoid 
attitudes. Particularly it promotes the tendency to treat others as less 
than persons with an inherent value. The schizoid individual must neither 
love, nor be loved and must keep his libidinal objects at a distance. 
Fairbairn maintained that the schizoid phenomenon is a regressive one, 
determined 
"by unsatisfactory emotional relationships 
with their parents, and particularly with 
their mothers ... the type of mother ... . who 
fails to convince her child by spontaneous 
and genuine expressions of affection that 
she herse lf loves him as a person. Both 
possess i ve mothers and i nd ifferent mothers 
fall in this category" (p.13). 
The resultant sense of deprivation influences a fixation upon the mother . 
Th i s 1 i bi dina 1 att i tude is characteri zed by extreme dependence wh i ch is 
however also self-preservative and narcissistic due to the anxiety over the 
situation which the individual experiences as threatening to the ego. 
The schizoid individual experiences great difficulty over giving in the 
emotional sense, which is dealt with in two basic ways; playing roles and 
exhibitionism. The latter, as a defence, "represents a technique for 
giving without giving, by means of a substitute of 'showing' for 'giving'" 
(p.16). Such an individual has a sense of inner superiority based on 
secret over- valuation of personal contents and a narcissistic inflation of 
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the ego arising out of secret possession of, and identification with, 
internalized libidinal objects . There is thus over-valuation of the 
internal world, and others are treated as less than persons with an 
inherent value of their own. Affects are treated in much the same way i . e. 
'kept inside ' , due to overvaluation of the inner life. The individual thus 
appears aloof and detached. Fairbairn points out that such individuals are 
also characterized by 'incorporating' and' internalizing', thus furthering 
the tendency to over va lue inner contents. Anxi ety over los i ng the va 1 ued 
inner contents, affects the capac i ty for product i v ity, creat i v ity and 
work . The most important aspect of thi s dynami c of overva 1 uat i on is 
maintained to be an attitude of omnipotence which remains largely 
unconscious. 
Chessick (1988) describes Guntrip's (1974) presentation of Fairbairn's 
three-fold split in the self and the internal struggle which he terms the 
"ego-object relations". There is the libidinal ego in relation to the 
exciting object (a bad object) which never satisfies the infant . Secondly 
is postulated the antilibidinal ego (the sadistic aspects) which represent 
identification with rejecting objects. Thirdly is the self or central ego, 
the conscious self of everyday living . Guntrip splits Fairbairn's 
libidinal ego into the clamouring, orally active hysteric libidinal ego and 
the deeply withdrawn, passive schizoid libidinal ego. Guntrip, like 
Kohut, sees certain states such as anger as defending against the schizoid 
sense of a depleted, empty self. 
Robbins (1980) questions Fairbairn's conceptualization of aggression. It 
is gi ven no norma 1 deve lopmenta 1 ro 1 e as a resu 1t of the de-emphas i s on 
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drives and instinct. He further criticises the theoretical paradox of the 
undifferentiated state which is co-existent with capacities to differentiate 
part-objects, to introject and to structuralize. Robbins sees Fairbairn's 
concepts as forerunners of Kohut's theoretical development; the de-emphasis 
on libido, aggression as a result of frustration, a primary relationship 
between the self as a dynamic structure and the importance of an empathic 
self-object (p.484) . 
Ba lint. 
Balint (1960) holds that Freud's concept of primary narcissism is inadequate 
to clinical observation. He emphasizes primary object love, denying all 
autonomy to primary narcissism. Balint maintains that development 
progresses only along a line of object relations, moving from primary 
object relations to mature object love . Balint suggests that all evidences 
of what Freud termed 'primary narcissism' were in fact 'secondary 
narcissism'. Balint stresses that Freud's work dealt essentially with 
clinical structures which had already achieved a more or less successful 
internalizaton of the object, whereas the clinical material which Balint 
presents is concerned with non-neurot i c structures. These structures are 
characterized by a failure of internalization. The relative failure is 
what Balint terms the basic fault. This is a primordial defect giving rise 
to the fault which then devolves upon the primary love object. 
In contradistinction to the ego psychologists, Balint maintains that the 
infant is born in a state of intense relatedness to the environment. Balint 
(1959) proposes a theory of primary relationship to the environment i.e. 
primary love. The aim of all human strivings is to re-establish an all 
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embracing harmony with one's environment, thus to be able to love in peace. 
Balint proposes that there are three types of object relationship; 
l.The primitive, harmonious, interpenetrating 'mix-up', out of which the 
primary objects emerge i.e. the mother and the archaic mother symbols : 
water, earth, air, and fire. 
2.The 'ocnophilic', where the object is felt as a vitally important 
support. Threats of separation create intense anxiety. There may be 
defensive clinging or the object is so overwhelmingly important that no 
concern can be given it, it must have no separate interests and is taken 
for granted. The consequences are overvaluation of the object and 
comparative inhibition of personal skills which might create independence 
from the object. 
3.The 'philobatic', where the objects are experienced as deceitful or 
indifferent, hence there is a preference for objectless expanses, such as 
deserts, sea, air, all potentially primary objects. 
Winn icott. 
Winnicott (1962) maintains that his theoretical understanding owes much to 
Kleinian thinking. However it may be said that Winnicott lies on the 
border between object re 1 at ions theory and the psycho 1 og ies of the se 1 f. 
By his own admission to Khan, Winnicott is a thinker who is fiercely 
ind i vidualistic (Khan, 1978) and concerned with interactional 'potential' 
space between the mother and her infant, rather than with an explication of 
the inner world of the infant, as was Klein. 
63 
Winnicott (1951) offers an extended understanding of Freud's model of 
rea 1 i ty test i ng, as already ment ioned - that 'the object is and is not 
there' . This metaconcept permeates his theoretical thinking and focuses 
upon what is potentia I. 
"-there is the third part of the 1 ife of a 
human being, a part that we cannot ignore, 
. an intermediate area of experiencing, to 
wh i ch inner rea 1 ity and externa 1 1 ife both 
contribute. --(it is the area) of keep i ng 
inner and outer reality separate yet inter-
related" (1951, p,230). 
In Winnicott's theoretical model, the instincts, at birth, are maintained 
to be not as yet clearly identified as internal to the infant. His 
conceptualization (1956) sees the development of the ego as dependent upon 
the containing ego of the mother. The infant's ego builds strength and 
moves towards a state in which the id demands are felt as part of the self, 
and not as environmental. This development occurs within the good enough 
mothering of the mother who is capable of primary materna I preoccupation, a 
postulated dissociated state of the mother, whereby some aspect of the 
personality takes over temporarily in the interests of the infant. This 
experience occurs to the degree that the mother and infant are identified in 
what may be termed a symbiotic relationship. 
In Winnicott's theoretical elaborations there is an explicit duality of 
subjective experience. Developmentally Id satisfactions are seen to be 
important strengtheners of the ego, the True Self (1960b) . The mother who 
is not ab le to imp lement the infant's omn i potence and who subst itutes her 
own gestures, induces the infant to compliance which is the earliest stage 
of the Fa Ise Se If. Winn i cott postu lates the emergence of a Fa 1 se Se lf 
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which acts to protect the True Self against impingements from the 
environment. The mother's actions are conceived of as impingements which 
do not allow the infant the experience of his own omnipotence. Rather the 
infant must ' r eact' to protect his True Se If. The Fa 1 se Se lf is thus 
constituted of, and by, an extension of the impinging environment. It is 
thus concerned with compliance to maternal demands, and not in exploring an 
authentic self or its needs . Winnicott postulates a number of levels of 
the false self, from the extreme where the False Self sets up as real, to 
the state of health, where the False Self represents mans' adjustment to 
the demands of a mannered social attitude. 
The False Self, as stated, evolves in response to environmental failures 
and thus preserves the 'going on being' of the True Self. The False Self is 
merely a collection of reactions to environmental failure at the stage of 
emergence from primary identification {1945} . The False Self is 
postulated by Winnicott to be a defence against that which is unthinkable, 
the exploitation of the inner reality, the annihilation of the True Self . 
Winnicott sees the True Self as the state prior to the stage of individual 
inner reality of objects. The True Self potent ial appears as soon as there 
is any menta 1 organ i zat i on , wh i ch is postu 1 ated to occur with i n the 
summation of the earliest sensori-motor aliveness. 
As a consequence of protection against an impinging environment, the True 
Self is impoverished by lack of experience. Cr itically , the False Self 
cannot experience 1 ife and it cannot feel real . It has an inherent 
r igidity and lacks autonomy and spontaneous feelings . As a consequence of 
the influence of the False Self, the infant's gesture or hallucination is 
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not made rea 1, and hence the capac i ty of the infant to use a symbo 1 is 
deficient. It is only the True Self which is said to be able to be creative 
and fee 1 rea 1. 
Khan 
"the False Self, however well set up, 
lacks something, and that something is the 
essential central element of creative 
originality" (p,152). 
Khan is greatly . influenced by the conceptualizations of Winnicott and 
Hartmann. While also focusing on the earliest mother-infant bond, he 
postulates the effects of, what Khan terms 'cumulative trauma'. Khan's 
(1963) concept suggests that damage to the infant occurs at a pre-verbal 
stage due to the breakdown of the mother's capacity to function as a 
protective shield. The concept of cumulative trauma, occurring in the 
ear ly stages of ego deve lopment and in the context of the mother-ch i 1 d 
relationship, is offered as a complementary hypothesis to the concept of 
fixation points in libidinal development. 
Khan sees frequent maternal failure resulting in premature and selective ego 
development, which mitigates against the development of the differentiation 
of a separate and coherent ego and se 1 f . Dependency thus becomes "an 
eng i neered exp 1 0 i tat i on of i nst i nctua 1 and ego-dependence, with a 
precocious narcissistic cathexis of the mother" (p,54). By this is 
ensured that further disi llusionment of the mother need not be negotiated 
and a false identificatory oneness is encouraged. Concern for the mother 
is manifest yet this concern is an ego-interest which substitutes for a true 
object cathexis. The identificatory oneness and the ego-interest do not 
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allow for sadistic instinctual attacks and the ensuing feelings of guilt 
which would lead to attempts at reparation and the development of a 
separate, coherent ego and self. 
Enid Balint (1963) discusses a clinical case which appears to illustrate 
Khan's formulation . Ba 1 int notes that her c 1 i ent, by not find i ng an echo 
of herse If from her mother, was 1 eft with a chron i c experi ence of being 
empty of herse If , wh ich echoes Wi nn i cott' s concept of a Fa 1 se Se If or 
Khan's false identificatory oneness. Balint remarks, 
"Because of the lack of proper feed-back, 
the child, as well as the environment, got 
poorer; th i s ultimate ly resu lted in the 
void outside and the emptiness inside; life 
only being lived in a fantastic and 
nightmare world dominated by id impulses, 
but out of touch with body sensations and 
feelings ------- a world of 'thinking 
without feeling and feeling without 
thinking'" (p,447). 
In Khan's formulation, the experience of the state of impingements 
resulting from the fai led protective shield i.e. the cumulative trauma, 
forces a precocious cathexis of external and internal reality. This 
disrupts the ego's subjective experience and awareness of itself as a 
coherent ent ity. However, the most specific effect of the pre-verbal 
trauma is seen by Khan to be on the vicissitudes of the body-ego 
development, specifically at the earliest stage of the ego-id 
differentiation and the gradual integration of the sense of self . The 
infant's struggle is thought to shape his adult character and contributes to 
a defensive idealization which remains essentially incorporative and 
projective, which interferes with the internalization and assimilation of 
new object representations . Proper differentiation and growth of internal 
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psychic structures become confused. In line with his concept of 
'cumulative' trauma, there is envisioned a distortion of later libidinal 
strivings and object relations. 
From these aet io logi ca 1 cons i derat ions Khan (1960) proposes that the "new 
character disorders" (p,436) seen in therapeutic settings, are suffering 
from disturbed primary affective integration. This disruption becomes 
manifest in what he terms schizoid individuals. In discussing schizoid 
phenomena, Khan postulates that a characteristic passivity masks a total 
inability to tolerate anxiety. Two techniques are used to combat anxiety; 
The first is to translate anxiety into psychic pain. This suffering acts 
as a defence against anxiety and against the realization of dependence and 
deprivation. The second technique is the translation of anxiety into 
diffuse and excessive tension states. These states act as a defence 
against a psychic realization of the real instinct-tension and needs. 
Anxiety for schizoid individuals is often a reaction to an experience of 
total emptiness and desolation. Khan maintains that psychic pain and 
masochism act as a defence against this emptiness by raising the threshold 
of cathexes and so sponsoring a sense of self. 
Khan sees the defense mechanisms of splitting, devaluation of objects and 
emot iona 1 experi ences, project ive i dent ificat ion, and idea 1 i zat ion, as 
reconstructing the "reality of their earl iest objects and its effects on 
the developmental and integrative process" (1960 p.434). Khan maintains 
that idealization is neither on a narcissistic basis nor on an 
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identification with the object, rather he maintains that it is a defensive, 
psychic structure, against the emotional reality of hopelessness, 
emptiness, and futility. 
3.9. Dialectical Approach: Grunberger. 
For Grunberger (1971) there is a continuous inter-relatedness between 
instinctual factors and narcissism. He postulates a basic antagonism 
between narcissism and object-libidinal aims at birth, but proposes that 
growth and maturation provide for their integration within the personality. 
The aims of narcissism remain constant throughout life but can be attained 
or frustrated at each development stage. The narcissistic aim is 
attainment of lost omnipotence. Man never ceases longing to recapture his 
prenatal existence which Grunberger maintains is a live experience, not an 
inanimate state. He maintains that the infinite, with all its spiritual, 
cosmic, and mystical ramifications, including oceanic feelings, can be 
traced to an e 1 aborat i on of foeta 1 ex i stence (p .16) . And aga in, "the 
memories man has of it (the Land of Cockaigne, Paradise, the Golden Age, 
etc.) very clearly bear the imprint of conditions that characterize 
prenatal existence" (p.19). 
While the narcissistic aim remains constant, the means for attainment of 
gratification change from the primitive reliance on magical thinking to 
mature forms of gratification based on complex object-instinctual 
interdependency. Integrat ion, in Grunberger' s sense, enta il s a number of 
tasks . These include the overcoming of narcissistic injury inherent upon 
the existence of biological needs which lead to an inevitable dependence 
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upon objects, the differences between the sexes and the generations, and 
mans' finitude. After birth the illusion of omnipotence is limited and the 
child suffers a two fold trauma. The euphoric universe is disturbed and the 
child must reconstruct his economy on an instinctual and object basis i.e. 
he must reconstruct his narciss istic economy to become an active individual 
who bears the burden of his existence alone. The narcissistic components 
of his economy are retained as he attempts integration. 
In the ch i 1 d's horror and ecstasy of 1 ife, he tri es to perpetuate his 
euphoria and to curb his instinctua l impulses to that end. He integrates 
the instincts into his elated state by narcissizing them. There ensues a 
continual conflict between instinctual strivings and narcissistic strivings. 
For support, part of his narc i ss i sm is projected onto the ego idea 1. 
Consistent with the idea that the aim of narcissism remains constant is 
Grunberger's proposal that behind all narcissistic aims is the striving for 
un i quenes s, omn i potence, and merg i ng wi th idea 1 i zed objects. Thus wh i 1 e 
the narciss ism is unchanging the ego must at each stage of development be in 
a dialectic with the narcissistic aims to be placed within the total 
persona 1 ity. The ro le of narc i ss i sm is a silent restructuri ng, whi ch 
acts through other agencies. Grunberger's major integrative postulation is 
that the libido comes from the the id, and the ego - thanks to narcissistic 
cathexis (p.24) . 
With maturation, the restructuring allows gratification from the real world . 
Mastery of each development phase supports the renunciation of the claims of 
the narcissistic strivings. Each phase of development is thought to offer 
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a substitute source of gratification. It is when the substitute is felt to 
be insufficient that narcissistic injury occurs. Grunberger, quoting van 
der Waals (1949), "It is the effects of the interaction between the 
interpretation of reality and the efforts to maintain the sense of the self 
that make up the body of narcissistic problems" (p.524). Grunberger 
suggests that the greatest obstacle to integration of narcissistic demands 
to the. satisfactions of the real world are failures in the anal phase of 
development. He suggests that here lies the struggle to give up magical 
solutions in favour of gratifications requiring action and mastery. 
Aggression is brought into the service of mastery and object relations 
instead of bei ng expressed destruct i ve ly or repressed, and narc i ss i st i c 
gratification is obtained through dreams of an ideal world. 
Grunberger's theory suggests that the self and object world can be studied 
as a whole and that the one is not a defence against the other. Every 
frustration and every fixation has repercussions in self-esteem and leads to 
the wish for regressed modes of gratification e.g. sleep, withdrawal, 
fantasies of omnipotence, and idealization, compensation for a 
disappointing world . This theory also highlights the parallel which exists 
between the concept of divinity and the desire for narcissistic 
gratification . Either man projects his ideal of perfect narcissistic 
integrity, or in achieving narcissistic wholeness he becomes God. It is 
felt that Grunberger's conceptualization captures the dilemma of man without 
the concept of divinity . In his attempts to be both God and foetus he 
discovers his finitude. 
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.3.10. Theoretical developments of the ego and the self. 
Green (1986f) observes that with the development of object relations 
thinking, Freud's concept of the ego did not provide an adequate 
theoret i ca 1 comp 1 ement to deve lop ing formu 1 at ions of the object. Ego 
re 1 ated concepts, such as the 'self' and the 'I' have emerged to address 
this issue. Although these concepts have addressed the subjectivity of the 
subject, a neglected area in Freud's thinking, no two theorists appear to 
have used the terms in exactly the same way. 
Historically, the concepts of the ego and the self have undergone much 
evolution. Fenichel (1945) introduced the concept of the self concept 
which arises from perceptions of internal experiences, as well as 
percept ions of the body and interact ions with others. Hartmann (1950) 
differentiated the ego from the self. 
such as menta I se If and phys ica I se If. 
Jacobson (1964) introduced terms 
It wou 1 d appear that se If became 
the term to denote the subject as agent. Se If representation and se If 
image are terms wh i ch have been used i nterchangeab lye. g. Kohut (1971) and 
Kernberg (1975) use self image to denote dynamically organized intrapsychic 
structures, while others use the term to denote the structures of the se7f. 
According to Chessick (1988) the psychology of the self is not considered an 
object relations theory as defined by the British object relations school 
and Kernberg, rather it is a '" modern' or neo-object re 1 at ions theory" 
(p.96). It has a commonality with the theories of Fairbairn, Balint, and 
Winnicott in the emphasis on the quality of mother-infant interaction as 
crucial to the formation of the basic personality. 
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Hartmann. 
According to Kinston (1980), Hartmann (1950) attempted to clarify Freud's 
definition of narcissism as the libidinal cathexis of the ego, by 
d i st i ngu i sh i ng between the ego (a structure wi th i n the menta I apparatus) 
and the self (the whole person in external reality including both his 
physical and mental attributes) (p.383). 
Hartmann (1939) was concerned in his theory to enhance the role of reality. 
Consequent ly the ego becomes an ego of adaptat i on. To th i s end Hartmann 
proposed a refinement of the structural model which had significant 
implications for a concept of narcissism . Hartmann proposed that the 
functions of the ego do not evolve out of the id, but that rather, ego and 
id differentiate out of a common source. Development is thus not only 
dependent upon frustration, but there are channels relating the infant to 
reality from the outset, which follow their own maturational course. 
Hartmann (1950) argued that in Freud's topograph i ca I mode I, narc i ss i sm is 
defined as libidinal cathexis of the ego, but that in this model the ego is 
vague ly conceptua I i zed as the 'who Ie person' or the ' se If' . Hartmann 
maintains that the ego, as a discrete system, could not refer to investment 
of lib i do in the se lf , as opposed to investment in objects. He thus 
redefined narcissism as the libidinal cathexis of the self rather than of 
the system ego. 
According to Hartmann's (1964) theory, he still retains the libidinal focus 
of the energic model, yet the self is defined as a representation i.e. an 
experi ent i a I construct, the same as an object representat ion. The ego 
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evolves out of interaction with the real world and is a motivational 
consequence of this impact with real ity. He maintains that the impact is 
guaranteed by the biologically determined fitting of the ego and the 
environment (1956a). The ego is biologically adaptive and acts to translate 
'reality ' into internal forces. The ego acts here within what Hartmann terms 
a ' conflict-free sphere' of ego functioning. This concept takes his theory 
outside of Freud's conflict theory, to address what Hartmann sees as an 
adaptive function. Motivational influence can be attributed to any of the 
psychic structures, with the 'ego interests' playing no essential role in 
the format i on of neuros is. They "fa 11 ow not the 1 aws of the i d but of the 
ego" (1950c p.13?). 
Khan (1974) claims that Hartmann's concept of a conflict-free sphere of ego 
functioning has been helpful to the work of Winnicott, and moves towards 
explaining how grossly disturbed infants could have effective ego-
capacities. Stolorow et al (1980) suggest that this concept, together with 
the contributions of the genetic and adaptive points of view, are useful in 
the study of severe pathology. 
Khan suggests that the concept of the conflict-free sphere offers an 
understanding of how ego-functions can be symptomatic of primitive defences 
against impingements (p.24) . He discusses how the failure of the ego to 
neutralize primitive l ibidinal cathexes di storts the formation of the ego-
idea 1, wh i ch can become cathected from the stage of auto-erot i sm and 
primary narcissism. With this occurrence, the ego becomes fixated on the 
early i nt ra-psychic system and energy is thus depleted from the ego-
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functions (p.196). 
Stolorow et al (1980) suggest that Hartmann laid the groundwork for a 
functional definition of narcissism, whereby it became possible for the 
defensive function of narcissism to be elaborated by other theorists e.g. 
Reich (1953). Kernberg (1975). and Kohut (1971, 1977). Narcissism is 
thus seen both as a normal state of development, and as a defens ive 
react i on to narci ss i st ic trauma. That psychic 1 ife is not a unitary 
dimension and that functions have a duality of function and purpose has been 
pointed out by both Grunberger (1971) and Andreas-Salome (1962), as already 
mentioned. This point was grasped by Kris's (1936) concept of regression in 
the service of the ego . Kris elaborates a crucial aspect of Freud's 
thinking on narcissism. This is that Freud has introduced a notion of 
reversibility into the developmental process . Regression may be 
regress i ve, in the sense of dis i ntegrat ion, but it may a 1 so serve a 
defensive function of preserving the integrity of the ego against threatened 
loss. Mahler et . al. (1975b) view such a development as sound secondary 
narcissism, a normal withdrawal in terms of the vicissitudes of structure 
formation. 
Hartmann's theory has however, been cr i ticized on a number of counts . 
Green (1986f) writes of Hartmann's Freud as an 'American Freud ' . Green's 
critic i sm is that Hartmann's theory has, 
"oegun to grow rather less psychoanalytic, 
rather more psychological . Attention 
shifted from libidinal development to the 
development of the ego, whose relationship 
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to reality became (ideally) equivalent to 
the post-ambivalent genital relationship" 
(p. 282) . 
Greenberg et a 1 (1983) prov i de a simi 1 ar crit i que when they suggest that 
Hartmann's theory fails to provide an understanding of the continuum between 
health and neurosis. He brought object relations into the pleasure sphere, 
yet he was unwilling to bring the external world (relations with others) 
into more intimate connection with intrapsychic conflict (p.266). 
Hartmann makes the assumption that the basic function of the psychic field 
is adaptation, which, although not contradictory to Freud, does change the 
emphasis . Green (1986f) finds that Hartmann has simplified the functioning 
of the psychic apparatus too radically, and that an ego, seen in relation 
to control of affects, misses the rich and contradictory subjective 
experience of the affects. He points out that the American school has not 
been able to appreciate the implications of the English school, who have 
taken the affects back to primitive object relations, rather than to 
biology, and postulated the existence of a fantasy world. 
Balint (1960) claims that the formulations of Hartmann, Lowenstein, and 
Kris (1946) merely beg the issue of the problematic in Freud's theory of the 
development of narcissism. They tidy the theory, but they do not add to 
our knowledge (p.17) . 
Grunberger (1971), at odds with the more positive view of Khan (1974) is far 
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more stringent in his criticism. He attacks the concept of an 'autonomous 
ego'. In a footnote, Grunberger states, 
"the notion of the "autonomous ego', with 
its denial of the conflicted genesis of the 
ego, would deprive psychoanalytic theory of 
the whole primitive instinctual dialectic, 
that is, the unconscious as conceived by 
depth psychology, and would foster a trend 
(which already is evident) towards 
superficial study of the 'ego functions' 
exclusively. To follow such a course would 
be to depart from the Freudian orientation 
and regress towards academic psychology" 
(p.14) . 
Jacobson. 
Green (1986f) makes the observation that, whilst based on Hartmann's 
t hinking, Jacobson ' s theory gives the feeling of bearing c lin ical truth. 
His conception of her work sees it as an attempt at an homoeostatic view of 
affective regulation, without being confined only to a phenomenological 
view. Her's is a dynamic view in which process is more important than 
discharge (p . 194). 
Jacobson (1954, 1964) herse If, while acknowledging her indebtedness to 
Hartmann, 
experience. 
is more concerned to exp lore the phenomeno logy of human 
She maintains that, like Hartmann (1939), her experiential 
concepts are derived from biologically given drives and that she too, 
recognizes that the biological and the social are ' not distinct parts of a 
relationship. Her emphas i sis, however, on the re 1 at i ona 1 aspects of 
experience . She focuses on mans' representational world and the influence 
of the interpersonal. Her theory has been influenced by the observations of 
Mahler (1975a) on child development. Jacobson postulates that images of a 
' good' or 'bad' mother are formed through the infants experiences of 
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satisfaction or dissatisfaction . These images, wi th attendant affects, 
constitute the beginnings of internal objects. Their motivational power is 
thought to be independent of the drives. In this view the representational 
world attains a lawfulness of its own. 
Jacobson (1954) initially proposed the elimination of the terms 'primary 
and secondary' narcissism. In 1964 she maintained that narcissism is not 
identical with the 1 ibidinal endowment of the ego system or ego functions 
as maintained by Freud (1914). She maintained that the concept of primary 
narcissism was not compatible with emergent understandings about ego-
development and that the ego must develop first, before there can be 
object-cathexis. Jacobson (1964) reintroduced the terms but with revised 
meanings. Jacobson claimed that since self and object images are not 
different i ated at the ear 1 i est neonata 1 stage, it is more appropriate to 
the phenomenology of the stage to describe a state of primary 
nondifferentiation. "'Secondary narcissism' sets in at the stage of 
beginning ego formation" (p.1l). 
"Secondary narcissism --- are not identical 
with the libidinal and aggressive endowments 
of the self, constituted in the course of 
ego formation, which become cathected with 
1 ibido and aggression and turn into object 
love and hate" (p . 19) . 
Stolorow et al (1980) elaborate on Jacobson's thinking with the concept of 
primary nondifferentiation. They suggest that, 
"the earliest manifestations of narcissistic 
function occur in relation to primary 
selfobjects, and that the earl iest object 
relationships serve a basic narcissistic 
function. Primary object relationship and 
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primitive narcissism are two sides of the 
same coin" (p . 19) . 
Jacobson's concept of narc i ss i sm draws from an emphas i s upon the infants 
experience, not from instinctual vicissitudes. Freud had been concerned 
with drive tension and reduction. The role of the mother had been seen 
within this parameter. Jacobson, however, saw the role of the mother in a 
far broader perspective . The infant's interactions with the mother lead to 
representat ions of both h imse lf and the mother wh i ch are accompani ed by 
object directed aims. Jacobson claims that experiences of frustration lead 
to fantasies of expulsion, while those of satisfaction give rise to 
fantasies of merger, ideas of 'total incorporation' i.e. of becoming the 
object. It is these fantasies of merger which are postulated to be the 
basis of object relations. With development 'selective identification ' 
gradua lly comes to rep 1 ace the stri v i ngs toward refus i on (merger) and the 
ego ideal is established . 
Kinston (1980) highlights a developmental and differential understanding of 
the concept of the 'Self' and focuses on self-representation (self-image) as 
a neglected area of clinical material, as opposed to object relations and 
object narcissism. He suggests that narc i ss i sm can be conceptua 1 i zed in 
two ways. A mode of relating to others and the corresponding intrapsychic 
object relations, or a person's relationship to himself and the nature of 
his self-representation. He claims that Jacobson's definition lies in the 
latter meaning. Narcissism as the cathexis of the self has been expanded to 
inc 1 ude a cons i derat i on of the discrepancy between the 'actua 1 state of 
self' and an 'ideal self-representation' (p.384). In Jacobson's view, with 
deve lopment the ego res ists the pull to merger and moves towards a desire 
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for '1 i keness " both to the idea 1 object and a 1 so to its own idea 1 se If . 
As Kinston points out, narcissism finds its phenomenological home in the 
dwelling place between the individual's sense of who he is and who he should 
be . 
Th i s concept captures Jacobson's rev i 5 ion of Freud's ego idea 1. Freud 
(1914) saw the ego ideal as serving as a refuge for the lost narcissism of 
the infant, his lost perfection. Jacobson, in line with her 
understanding of narcissism, sees the ideal as an arena where the ideal 
self and the ideal object images fuse, and can thus compensate for the lost 
fantas i es of merger. Jacobson's concept clear ly states that the bas i s of 
relational being and identity is founded within a fused image of mother, 
from which the individual must separate. 
Mah ler 
Mahler and Kaplan (1977) put forward the thesis that borderline as well as 
narcissistic patients do not proceed through the ordinary development 
sequence that culminates in the Oedipal complex. There is an interlocking 
of narcissism, psychosexual development, and object relations which are 
intimately connected with the development of borderl ine and narcissistic 
phenomena. 
Mahler's theory has focused on the initial symbiotic immersion of the infant 
with his mother and the vicissitudes of the gradual struggle towards 
separation and selfhood which ensues. Mahler sees the child as continually 
having to reconcile his longing for autonomy with his equally powerful 
longing for merger with the fused mother of his orig ins. 
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Mahler (1972, 1975b) provided a systematic formulation of the developmental 
process . The phases most relevant for the thesis are the periods Mahler has 
termed the practis ing and rapprochement subphases. These phases prov i de for 
the early practising of the child, who with the growing ability to be 
locomotive, is able to move further and further away from 'home base', 
while returning for 'emotional refuelling'. This is conceptualized as a time 
of dramatic growth of the autonomous functions of the ego, which occurs 
optimally in the close proximity of the mother. In the practising subphase 
the 'psychological birth' of the child is envisioned to take place. The 
child manifests pleasure in his own body and his new abilities. Mahler 
conceptualizes this time as the height of narcissism and object love. The 
importance of sound secondary narcissism is postulated to lie in the 
structura1ization of a positive sense of identity. It is fe lt that at this 
time it is particularly important for the mother to be attuned to her child, 
as he is and not to damage his narcissism by imposing an image of what she 
would like him to be. He is then able to believe in his worth and realness 
and is better able to cope with the loss involved in separation from the 
mother. 
In the fo llowi ng subphase, that of the rapprochement, the ch i 1 d becomes 
confronted by the loss of his earl ier sense of narcissistic omnipotence. 
There is separation anxiety and the growing sense of the mother as a 
separate person . The ch il d 'woos' the mother in an attempt to ga i n her 
partic i pation in his world within the context of his separateness. It is 
in this subphase that the first signs of directed aggression occur and these 
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coincide with the anal phase (1975c). There are also signs of potential 
danger for the child, so that, "falling asleep is like a regression and is 
an experience of separation; hence, ---- defence against the threat of 
symbiotic fusion represented by sleep " (p.488). 
The loss of the ideal sense of self leads to the 'rapprochement crisis'. 
It is marked by periods of ambivalence between intense need for the mother 
and strong des ires for separateness . Ouri ng the rapprochement subphase, 
prior to and dependent on the resolution of the rapprochement crisis, 
narcissism (particularly omnipotence shaken by the coming of age of 
represent at i ona 1 i nte 11 i gence) is subphase-specifi c. Oeve lopmenta 1 arrest 
or fixation at this stage of separation-individuation has been cited by a 
number of authors (Rinsley 1977, Hartocollis1977) as the aetiology of the 
so-called borderl ine states. Mahler et al (1977) discuss the pathological 
consequence of such arrest as an incomplete differentiation of the mental 
representation of one's self from that of the mother (the object). Thus 
self and object constancy are not viable for the development of the 
triangular whole object relations of the Oedipal phase, which is cathected 
with neutralized libido and aggression. Thus there is not scope for the 
emergence of a flexible narcissistic genital orientation. She does however 
point out that the overriding dominance of the one subphase must not obscure 
the fact of the corrective or pathogenic influences from the other 
subphases. 
Mahler (1975a) writes of the complementary nature of constitutional factors 
and early traumatization, for the development of pathological development . 
She does not however discuss the nature of these constitutional factors. 
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Mahler et a1 (1963) discuss the unconscious meanings of the infant for the 
mother. Mah 1 er suggests that the ch i 1d represents a body part of the 
mother, usually her illusory phallus. The mother's behaviour is thus 
modified by the fantasy. The mother's character is also a majo r 
determinant of her reaction to her ch i ld, and the ch i ld must adapt to this 
unique situation . 
Parkin (1985). who is influenced by the writing of Hartmann and Mahler, 
suggests that the study of narcissism is concerned with the history of the 
introjects and the relationships of either the ego-superego or the ego-ego 
ideal. He terms this the reflexive-object line of development. 
Development of the ideal ego out of the ego nuclei leads to the struggle of 
the ch i 1 d to rna i nta in a sense of omn i potence and to what Park i n terms the 
narcissistic crises, which he equates with Mahler's rapprochement crisis 
i.e. the necessity to give up to reality the child ' s illusory omnipotence . 
The crisis may engender separation anxiety, narcissistic rage and fear of 
the loss, not on 1y of the externa 1 mother but a 1 so the i nterna 1 object of 
love. This latter anxiety is postulat ed to characterize the future 
relations of the ego to the ego-ideal. The ego ideal introject is sought as 
the object of love, while the ego itself, reflexively takes itself as the 
object of its loving. Parkin postulates this state as the state of 
secondary narcissism, where the reciprocal relationship of the mother and 
child becomes repeated intrapsychically, and inter nal regulat i on of self 
esteem becomes possible . 
Parkin discus s es various narci ss i stic 
grandiosity , arrogance, to name a few, 
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states and affects, shame, 
which are t he results of either 
hypercathexis of the introjects of the ego ideal (or remnants of the ideal 
ego) and the resulting conflict with the ego, or are hypocathexis of the 
introject and result in dormancy of the ego ideal. 
Of particular significance for the thesis is Mahler's conceptualization of 
the pathological consequences of arrest in the rapprochement subphase. The 
chil dis unab le to different i ate the se If representat ion from that of the 
mother. This confounds the ambivalence of the phase, prevent i ng the 
deve lopment of se If and object constancy and a reso 1 ut ion of the Oed i pa 1 
phase. Parkin suggests that the ego ideal introject is then sought as the 
object of love, wh i 1 e the ego takes itse If ref lex i ve ly as the object of 
love - an i nterna 1 regu 1 at i on of se If esteem based upon the mode 1 of the 
reciprocal relationship between mother and child being repeated 
intrapsychically. 
Kernberg. 
Kernberg (1966, 1967) in a series of papers detailed a model of structural 
derivatives of object relationships which suggests that so-called 
' borderline' personalities present a pathological fixation at what Kernberg 
terms the basic level of ego functioning. Kernberg draws attention to the 
overwhelming nature of the early affects and their irradiating effect on all 
other perceptua 1 elements of introject i on. The va lenee of the introject, 
positive and negative, are kept apart at the early stage because of the 
lack of integrative capacity of the ego . The first ego state is seen to be 
a fused self-object state of the 'purified pleasure ego', while the 
negative introjects become ejected and considered 'not me ' . 
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Kernberg (1966) suggests the use of a new term, 'border line persona 1 ity 
organization' , as these pat i ents represent a spec ifi c and stab le 
pathological organization of ego structure, predominated by splitting 
" 
mechan isms and re 1 ated defens i ve operat ions . There is a 1 so a concomitant 
failure of the normal processes of development and integration of 
identification systems, which results in the development of a depersonified 
superego. Splitting becomes not only a defect in the ego but it is also a 
crucial defensive operation. 
"The persistence of 'non-metabolized' early 
introjections is the outcome of a severe ly 
disturbed, early object relationships, a 
fixation which is intimately related to the 
pathological development of splitting which 
interferes with the integration of self and 
object images and the depersonal ization of 
internal object relationships in general" 
(1966, p. 243)" . 
Kernberg (1974) postu 1 ates that the idea 1 i zed object images wh i ch wou 1 d 
normally be integrated into the ego ideal, constituting the forerunners of 
the superego, become pathologically condensed with the self concept i.e. 
ego components. Thi s condensat ion blurs the boundaries between ego and 
superego and interferes with the normal development of the superego. 
Kernberg thus postulates, not a lack, but an active distortion of idealized 
superego. forerunners, which occurs with a pathological devaluation of 
external objects. 
Kernberg (1967) makes the observation that most of the narcissist ic 
personalities present an underlying borderline personality organization. The 
difference between the border line and the narc i ss i st i c persona 1 ity lies, 
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for Kernberg (1974), in the evolution of the stable grandiose self of the 
narcissistic personalities. This is seen in contrast to the presence of 
non-specific manifestations of ego weakness which is characteristic of the 
borderline personality organization . The latter include a lack of anxiety 
tolerance, 
channels, 
lack of impulse control, and lack of developed sublimatory 
together with the particular defences of splitting, primitive 
idealization, early forms of projection, especially projective 
identification, denial, and omnipotence . The narcissistic personality is 
characteri zed by an apparent absence of object re 1 at i onsh ips, yet th i s 
belies an intense, primitive , internalized object relationship of a 
frightening kind, together with an incapacity to depend upon an 
internalized good object. 
McDougall (1980), discussing the apparent l ack of internal object relations, 
points to the terror of separateness of the narcissistic personality. He 
sees grandiosity and idealization as serving the function of gratification, 
by sustaining an illusion of fusion and denying the reality of the 
separateness of the self and the loss of the object. McDougall maintains 
that behind a positive transference, is hidden a hostile symbiosis, with 
intense dependency needs. McDouga 11 appears to confuse a structura 1 
understanding with what is possibly more appropriately understood as the 
experiential identification of the self with the maternal object. 
Kernberg (1974) later maintained that the narcissistic personality 
represents a disturbance in object re 1 at ions, wh i ch is characteri zed by a 
pathological defensive position against conflicts in the earliest stage of 
mature (self-object differentiated) dependency. Narcissism is defined as 
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the libidinal investment of the self- representation . Kernberg maintains 
there is not a primary narcissistic state, but that narcissism, including 
pathological narcissism, occurs after the attainment of the capacity for 
self-object differentiation and ambivalent whole object relations. Thus 
narcissism is seen to occur after the formation of a cohesive self, in 
contrast to the lack of self object constancy of the borderline. 
Kernberg (1970) states that all character defenses have, among other 
functions, a narcissistic function i.e. to protect self-esteem . In 
add it i on, he sees 'narc i ss i st i c character defenses I in essent ia lly non-
narcissistic personality structures, within various other pathologies. 
These are differentiated from narcissistic personalities by the different 
nature and functioning of the ego ideal. Here excess i ve deve I opment of 
narcissistic character defenses results from an exacerbation of the early 
infantile ego ideal as a defense against fear and guilt over multiple 
conflicts, while fixation on the ego ideal is not accompanied by a 
primitive fusion of the self concept with the ego ideal, nor by concomitant 
devaluation of object representation and external objects. In the 
narc i ss i st i c persona I ity these processes are seen to occur to protect the 
self against primitive oral conflicts and frustration. 
Dynamically, Kernberg (1974) sees pathological condensation of genital and 
pregenita I needs occurring under the overriding influence of pregenital 
aggression (especially oral) as character i stic of the personality 
organization of narcissistic and borderline functioning. Oral conflicts 
are discussed by Kernberg (1968) as the excessive pregenital and oral 
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aggression which tends to be projected and determines the paranoid 
di stort ions of the ear ly parenta 1 images, espec i a lly those of the mother. 
She comes to be seen as potent i a lly dangerous. Hatred of her extends to 
hatred of both parents. 'Contamination' of the father image can occur when 
there is a lack of differentiation between the father and the hated mother, 
whose images become a combined, dangerous father-mother image. In such 
cases Kernberg po stu 1 ates that all 1 ater conceptua 1 i zat ions of sexua 1 
relationships will be characterized by danger and infiltrated by aggression. 
Kernberg (1974) sees important differences between h imse lf and Kohut in 
terms of their views of the relation between borderl ine and narcissistic 
conditions. Kernberg states that Kohut differentiates the narcissistic 
persona 1 it ies disorders from the the psychos i s and border 1 i ne states but 
does not differentiate between the latter, borderline and psychosis. 
Kernberg maintains that the defensive organization of the narcissistic 
personality is both similar to, and different in a specific way to 
borderline organization. These differences lie in the structural 
organ i zat ion and stabil ity of the grandiose se If. Kernberg (1970, 1971) is 
optimistic as regards analysis for narcissistic organizations, except where 
there is an 'overt borderline level' i.e . evidence of the non-specific 
manifestations of ego weakness. 
guarded. 
In these instances the prognosis is more 
Similarity, between narcissistic and borderline organizations, lies in the 
predominance of mechanisms of splitting or primitive dissociation as 
observed in spl it-off ego states. Spl itting is maintained and reinforced 
by primitive forms of projection, especially projective identification, 
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primitive and pathological idealization, omnipotent control, narcissistic 
withdrawal and devaluation . Primitive idealization is held to be an 
important defense of the narci ss i st i c structure (1968) . Underneath the 
idea 1 i zat i on there are often parano i d fears and qu i te direct, primi t i ve 
aggressive feelings towards the object. Kernberg (1974) maintains that the 
idealization of borderline individuals is characterized by an unrealistic, 
'all good' image of a powerful, gratifying object. Idealization is used 
as a protection of the other against contamination by the paranoid 
projection of an 'all bad' sadistic primitive object. Thus primitive 
idealization is related to the predominance of splitting. With the 
narcissistic personality, idealization reflects the projection on to the 
other of the patient's own grandiose self, an extension of his own 
grandiosity. Kernberg postulates that there is thus no dependency and to 
this extent there is no merger. Thus the reaction of Kernberg's 
narcissistic personality is different to those reactions discussed by 
Jacobson (1954) - psychotic identification, and by Mahler (1968) - the 
symbiotic phase. 
Rosenfeld (1978) discusses Kernberg's suggestion that there is an excessive 
development of pregenital and, especially oral aggression, which holds true 
for both the borderline and narcissist ic persona lity. Rosenfeld cautions 
that a clear distinction must be made between the confusional anxieties and 
pathological ' splitting of the borderli ne and the destructive narcissistic 
patient. The borderline patient is felt to be unable to withstand 
interpretations of the destructive self wh ere non-specific ego weakness may 
result in a psychotic break. 
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This distinction is supported by Kernberg's formulation of the differences 
between the two disorders . The narcissistic personality is maintained to 
have an integrated, although highly pathological grandiose self, which 
reflects some aspects of the real self, the ideal self, and the ideal 
object. Kernberg (1970) postulates that the normal tension between these 
three aspects has become eliminated by the building up of an inflated self 
concept within which the actual self and the ideal self and ideal object are 
confused . The remnants of the unacceptable self images are repressed and 
projected onto externa 1 objects, wh i ch as a consequence become deva 1 ued . 
Kernberg stresses that because of the lack of integration, the generally 
aggressive and primitive kind of superego is easily reprojected in the form 
of paranoid projections. A result is the devaluation of not only external 
objects but also internalized object images . 
"Idealized people, on whom these patients 
seem to 'depend', regularly turn out to be 
projections of their own aggrandized self 
concepts. Idealized representations of the 
se If, the' shadows' of others, and ---
dreaded enemies, are all that seem to exist 
in the inner world of these patients" 
(p . 57). 
The idealized other plays an important role in narcissistic functioning. 
Projective identification is postulated as a characteristic defense of both 
narcissistic and borderline functioning . He sees projective identification 
in the narcissist, operationally defined, as the pathological, grandiose 
self projected onto the object. Empathy with the projected self remains, 
as well as attempts to exert maximum control to maintain the projection and 
avo i d the emergence of the other as an independent, autonomous object . 
Kernberg sees his concept i on as close 1 y correspond i ng to Kohut's (1971 ) 
descr iption of the 'mirror transference ' . There is a need to deny the 
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autonomous ex i stence of the other. The denial constitutes a denial of 
dependency and is a rigid defence against more primitive, pathological 
object relations centred around narcissistic rage and envy, and fears over 
this rage. Such individuals 
"need to destroy the source of love and 
gratification in order to el iminate the 
source of envy and projected rage, wh i le 
simultaneously withdrawing into a grandiose 
self, which represents a primitive refusion 
of the idealized images of the parental 
figures and idea 1 i zed images of the se lf , 
so that they escape from a vicious circle of 
anger, frustration and aggressive 
de va 1 uat i on of the potent i a 1 source of 
gratification at the cost of serious damage 
to the internalized object relations" 
(p.221). 
Kernberg discusses the difficulty in facing feelings of hatred and envy due 
to the fear of the destructive potential of such feelings, both in 
destroying the potential loving other and their own capacity to give and 
receive love. Grandiosity serves to protect against dangerous awareness of 
the depreciated self, surrounded by dangerous, sadistically frustrating 
and revengeful objects. 
Horowitz (1975) discusses a similar formulation in his proposal that in 
narcissistic personalities, an habitual defensive operation is the shift in 
meanings which is used to protect the self-concept from threatening ideas 
and emot ions. He proposes that the narcissistic sty7e involves the 
externa 1 izat ion of bad and the i nterna 1 i zat i on of the good, in order to 
stabilize the self. To maintain these operations reality must be distorted 
and there must be 
"either a willingness to corrupt fidelity to 
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rea 1 ity, a low capac ity to appra i se and 
reappra i se rea 1 i ty and fantasy, or a high 
capacity to disguise the distortions. The 
disguises are accompanied by shifting 
meanings and the exaggeration and minimizing 
bits of reality as a nidus for fantasy 
elaboration" (p.169) . 
Kernberg points to a simi larity between his concept of the grandiose self 
and Rosenfeld's (1964) omnipotent mad self. The integration of this 
structure compensates for the lack of integration of a normal self-concept. 
This structure is seen to explain the paradox of relatively good ego 
funct ion i ng and surf ace adaptat i on, in the presence of a predomi nance of 
splitting mechanisms, related primitive defenses, and a lack of integrated 
object representations. 
Kernberg (1974) views a central difference with Kohut in terms of the origin 
of this grandiose se If. He questions whether the grandiose se lf reflects 
the fixation of an archaic 'normal' primitive self, as maintained by Kohut, 
or whether, as he maintains, it reflects a pathological structure, 
different from normal narcissism. 
According to Kernberg (1974) pathological narcissism is strikingly different 
to normal narcissism. He rejects a continuity concept between normal and 
pathological narcissism as is proposed by Kohut (1971). Kernberg stresses 
that pathological narcissism does not merely reflects libidinal investment 
in the self, in contrast to 1 i bid i na 1 investment in objects. Rather 
Kernberg maintains there is a libidinal investment in a pathological self 
structure which has defensive functions against underlying libidinal and 
aggressively invested primitive self and object images. These images 
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reflect intense, predominantly pregenital conflicts around both love and 
aggression. Kernberg criticises Kohut's examination of narcissism in terms 
of the quality of the instinctual charge, rather than the vicissitudes of 
the internal relations claiming that his conceptualization fails to address 
the pathology of the structure. 
Kernberg (1970) maintains that the grandiose self is a stable, pathological, 
defensive structure which at its deepest level of self concept, is a basic 
dread of attack and destruction. 
"It is the image of a hungry, enraged, 
empty self, full of impotent anger at being 
frustrated, and fearfu 1 of a wor ld whi ch 
seems as hateful and revengeful as the 
patient himself' (p.57). 
Kernberg observes that with the intense oral frustration, the infant must 
defend against extreme envy and hatred, thus the greatest fear of the 
narc i ss i st is dependence upon another. Dependence revea 1 s hate and envy 
and exposes the danger of frustration. Devaluation is necessary to defend 
against envy yet results in a sense of emptiness and inability to experience 
depression over the loss of a good object or lost ideal image of the self. 
Kernberg (1974) makes a distinction between those narcissistic organizations 
where rage is expressed as a funct i on of an overt border 1 i ne leve 1 of 
functioning (presenting a serious risk for treatment) and those where rage 
may appear after the working through of the defenses against the primitive 
object relationships related to conflicts around oral aggression. 
Both Robbins (1980) and May (1985) point to the similarities between 
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Kernberg and Klein. The Kleinian aspects, in Kernberg's theory, are seen 
to be the emphas i s on the pre-oed ipa 1 dyad, the dua 1 i nst i nct theory, the 
pre-formation of the psychic apparatus with emphasis on the central role of 
fantasy, internal objects and primitive splitting as a central defense. 
Robbins states that Kernberg's specific theory of narcissism is identical to 
Klein's description of the manic defenses in the depressive position. He 
does not elaborate this formulation but it is assumed that he sees the 
grandiose self as a defence against awareness of the destructive aspects of 
envy and hate . Robbins does however criticize, both Klein and Kernberg, 
for an adultomorphic and pathomorphic view of the infant psyche, which is 
seen to posses precocious functioning, while no model of a pre-object, 
prior to integration, is provided. Both theories, according to Robbins, 
do not detail the significance of the developmental role of external 
objects. 
Robbins. 
Robbins (l981a, 1981b, 1982), influenced by the thinking of Klein and 
Kernberg , postulates that some instances of narcissistic personality, like 
the borderline personality, may be best understood in terms of a pathology 
of symbiotic bonding. These 'personalities-to-be' fail to negotiate viab le 
unconditional and territorial symbiotic bonding. The normal consequences of 
development, which he states as the development of libido and aggression as 
internal representations, self-object differentiation and the capacity for 
ambivalence, cannot occur. 
"Instead a pathological self-destructive 
introject (being possessed) achieves the 
internality and psychic primacy ordinarily 
characteristic of the unconditional 
symbiotic representation" (p.461) 
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Robbins postu lates that the personality behaves as two di ssociated sub-
persona 1 it ies, the possessor and the possessed. Each conf i gurat ion 
strives to merge with an object . The possessor by projecting, to disavow 
and attr i bute, and the possessed, introject i ve ly, to over- i nc 1 ude. The 
un integrated primitive psyche is postulated to form mirror image dissociated 
relationships with pre-objects. Pre-objects are def i ned as funct i ona lly 
essential mergers in which the object acts in lieu of intrapsychic 
structures . Significantly these relationships are not conceptualized as 
arrested stages of development . Rather they are compensatory for failures 
of the normal unconditional bonding, territorial bonding, and ambivalent 
dialogue between mother and infant. These relationships are incompatible 
to further growth. 
As the possession of another, the narcissist suffers an internal sense of 
crippling disruption which precludes recognition of object-related needs. 
Such an individual seeks to be the possession of another, with dissociated 
narcissistic problems, to represent the unintegrated, devalued but in 
fantasy, perfectible parts of the other. By introjection the possessed, 
though deva 1 ued, a ims to expunge hi s needs to ga i n perfect i on through 
devotion to the grandiose aims of the object. Such an individual lacks 
self esteem and devalues his own needs, interests, and autonomous 
initiative, while paradoxically holding to grandiose fantasies of his own 
and vigorously supporting the narcissistic agenda of the object . 
The possessor projects his dependency, neediness and imperfection onto the 
possessed, while he remains perfect, omnipotent and totally sel f -
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sufficient. The object is infantilized and condescended to for the 
projected qualities, while being expected to worshipfully mirror the 
illusionary grandiosity of the narcissistic personality and to care, 
unobtrusively, for his needs. 
Robbins, like Winnicott, maintains that the distinction between borderline 
and narcissistic personalities is not the attained stage of development, as 
is postu 1 ated by Kernberg and Kohut. Rather, Robbi ns hypothes i zes that 
the distinction lies in the nature of the maternal contribution, 
specifically, the quality of her fantasy projections. The mothering of 
the narcissist-to-be, while similar to that of the borderline-to be, is 
seen to be more rea 1 i st i c of the needs of the infant. There is, however, 
an unrespons iveness, with lack of encouragement of the infant's signals. 
The mother imposes an agenda of compl iance to her own demands for 
perfectionistic grandiosity. Maternal responses are accompanied by a 
complex of fantasy-attribution combining devaluation and potential 
perfect ibi 1 ity. The deva luat ion is associated with the pers i stence of 
dependent, needy states, while specialness is accorded to compliance . 
Robbins writes of the possessed configuration of the narcissistic 
personality which includes a placid, nirvana-like recognition-
representation of mother, providing a conditional symbiotic representat i on, 
conditional on the renunciation (by dissociation) of infantile needs and 
initiatives. There develops a source of inner stability conditional upon 
the disavowal and projection of these needs. The chi ld develops 
'unrealistic' attitudes of grandeur and complacency, yet his 
accomplishments are not experienced as real and self-fulfilling. This 
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conceptualization is similar to the False Self concept of Winnicott, except 
that Robbins has gone further and detailed the specific behavioural 
concomitants of the mothers of both borderline and narcissistic 
personalities. The 'narcissistic' representation is called a conditional 
symbiotic representation, which is a stabilizing factor lacking in the 
borderline personality. They are seen to be possessed exclusively by 
bizarre ideas of badness and self-destructive feelings. 
Kohut 
Kohut's theoretical roots are not specifically acknowledged by himself. 
Robbins (1980) traces the differences between Kernberg and Kohut as 
reflective of a schism between the theories of Fairbairn and Klein. 
Robbins maintains that, although Kohut views his work as almost entirely 
original, it is remarkably similar to that of Fairbairn . Fairbairn's 
ideas are seen as 'harbingers' of those of Kohut, "particularly his 
(Fairbairn's) de-emphasis of l ibido, his conception of aggression as a 
disintegration product and his focus on the primary relationship between the 
self as a dynamic structure, and an empathic self-object" (p.484). 
Characteristically, both theorists maintain that environmental failure 
produces rage react i on and the deve lopment of auto-erot i c phenomena, with 
apathy and detachment alternating with excitement, based on the horizontal 
and/or vertical splitting of the psyche. 
May (1985) while drawing attention to similar theoretical issues as Robbins, 
sees these as stemming from theoretical similarities between Kohut and 
Winnicott . These include an emphasis of the concept of a Self ( the False 
Se If) constructed through adaptati on to others needs, a focus on ear ly 
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maternal failure as the central pathogen, with anger as a secondary 
element, due to failure in responsiveness and mirroring from the maternal 
environment. 
It is interesting to note that Khan (1960) pointed out the influence of 
Fairbairn's conceptualizations of schizoid functioning on the work of 
Winnicott. The individualism of Fairbairn may well be reflected in the 
thinking of both Winnicott and Kohut . 
Kohut (1971, 1977) departed from traditional metapsychology and developed a 
psychology of the Self. Within this understanding, Kohut (1966) maintains 
that there are various forms of narcissism. These are not only the 
forerunners of object love but are also independent psychological 
conste 11 at ions, wh i ch contri bute to the autonomous persona 1 i ty through 
their transformations. The aims of therapy need not be seen only in terms 
of the move towards object love but may encompass the transformation of 
narcissism to humour, creativity, empathy, 
disturbance to narcissism (or self esteem 
of the self. 
and wi sdom. Where there is 
it is seen as a disturbance 
Kohut's (1966) early definitions of the self involved a focus on the 
subjective experience of an inner sense of self. Self esteem was 
understood in relation to the largely unconscious ambitions and ideals of 
the individual, which develop out of relations principally to the mother. 
The quality of this relation may lead to either a relatively cohesive or 
fragmented self. Fragmentat ion is experienced with discomfort as feelings 
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of depress i on or deadness, or even empt iness . Chess i ck (1988) describes 
how within this understanding the 'ego' represents organizations and 
functions which are more fixed and remote from consciousness, where as the 
'self' is the experiential consciousness of who one experiences oneself to 
be. He sees Kohut's concept of mastery of the narc i ss i st i c (grand i ose) 
self as vaguely defined as a function of the ego's capacity to harness 
narcissistic energies and transform narcissistic constellations into more 
mature constellations . 
Kohut et al. (1978) claim that, while one may identify an unusually labile 
self-esteem and sensitivity to failure in narcissistic personality 
disorders, it is not the symptomatology as such, but rather the process of 
treatment, which illuminates their disturbance . The transference is seen 
as pathognomonic and consists of two types; the mirror transference and the 
idealizing transference. These transferences are understood to reflect a 
weakened self which cannot be understood by classical drive-defense 
formulations. Kohut et al. categorize the disturbances of the self into 
secondary disturbances which are reactions to the vicissitudes of life, 
while the primary disturbances include the psychoses, the borderline 
states, the narcissistic behaviour disorders, and the narcissistic 
personality disorders. From this categorization, it is maintained that 
only the narcissistic and personality disorders are analysable . 
Kohut (1966) maintains that primary narcissism is the original narcissistic 
balance of the child. Kohut argues that narcissism follows an independent 
line of development and he disregards the concept of secondary narcissism, 
focus i ng rather on the transformations of narciss i sm with development. 
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Residues of the primary narcissistic position are postulated to remain 
throughout 1 i fe, yet due to disturbance from maturat i ona 1 pressure and 
painful psychic tensions, two forms of narcissism become differentiated; 
the narcissistic self and the idealized parent. (Kohut (1968) changed the 
term narcissistic self, to that of grandiose self, which shall be the term 
used henceforth to minimise confusion.) 
Robbins (1982) writes of the emergence of these two forms of narcissism from 
the nascent self, as the twin debut. The nascent self is the primary 
psychic structure, it has no antecedent psychic developments as are 
postulated by Klein, Kernberg, Mahler etc. Rather Kohut ' s nascent self is 
conceptualized as a dynamic, dissociated, structural pair (the twin debut) 
which emerges from the merged self-object representation. 
Grandiose self - (self-esteem). 
Kohut (1966, 1968, 1971, 1977) proposes a theoretical formulation whereby in 
the grandiose self, cathexis is retained within the self and does not move 
towards object love and idealization. His later definition of the self 
postulated a bipolar self. These are se If-esteem, derived from the 
grandiose self and its strivings for exhibitionistic acclaim and mirroring, 
and guiding idea Is, derived from internalization of the idealized parent 
imago. In normal development the grandiose self is seen as a 
maturat iona lly predetermi ned step, with corresponding phase-appropriate 
grandiose fantasies. The grandiosity and exhibitionism of the archaic 
grandiose self becomes the matrix of adu l t ideals and ambitions. 
If the child experiences narcissistic trauma i.e. damage to the child's 
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self-esteem, then the grandiose self does not merge with the relevant ego 
contents but remains unaltered, striving for archaic aims. The adult ego 
will vacillate between irrational overestimation of the self and feelings of 
inferiority. 
"The essential genetic trauma is grounded in 
the parent's own narcissistic fixations, 
and the parent's narcissistic needs 
contribute decisively to the child's 
remaining enmeshed within the narcissistic 
web of the parent I s persona 1 ity" (1968, 
p.92). 
Kohut introduces a concept of curat i ve processes, whereby a defect in the 
structure of the self can manifest itself through reparative activities. 
Chessick (1988) details these as either defensive structures which mask the 
defect - pseudovitality, pseudodrama, and sadistic fantasies of power to 
counteract a sense of deadness, or compensatory structures which make up 
for weakness of one pole by strengthening the other . 
Idealized parent - (guiding ideals). 
The idea 1 i zed parent imago is part 1 y invested wi th object- 1 i b i do and the 
idealized qualities become loved as a source of gratification. This imago 
becomes integrated into the idealized superego . If there is disappointment 
in the admired adu lt, then the psyche will not res i gn i tse lf to the loss, 
but wi 11 take the una ltered imago as an introject. This introject is 
thought to take over the funct ions prev i ous ly performed by the object. 
Given that the idealized parent i s the carrier of the original narcissistic 
perfection and omnipotence, these circumstances explain the absoluteness of 
the superego. The idealized parent imago remains as an archaic, 
transitional object functioning to maintain narcissistic homoeostasis. 
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Kohut (1966, 1968, 1971, 1972) discusses the significance of shame. 
Exhibitionistic libido of the grandiose self, which is not mirrored, 
results in an imbalance of cathexis with which the ego cannot cope. There 
is both a press for discharge in an exhibitionistic urge, and a blockage 
due to the ego's attempts to stop the flow. This disorganized mixture is 
understood to be experienced as shame. Kohut suggests that shame 
propensity is characteristic of a defective idealized superego self 
cathected narcissistic libido. It is thus the ambitious individual, with a 
poorly integrated grandiose self and intense exhibitionistic-narcissistic 
tensions who is liable to shame. 
Kohut (1972) claims a similar understanding for the experience of 
narcissistic rage. Whereas boundless exhibitionism underlies shame, the 
under lying structure of rage is omnipotence. "The grand iose se 1 f expects 
absolute control over a narcissistically experienced archaic environment" 
(p . 396). The rage can be observed in two related phenomena; the 
'catastrophic' reaction, and in what Kohut designates as 'the child's 
reaction to painful injuries' i . e. the oscillation between rage at the 
imperfect grandiose self and at the failure of the omnipotent self-object. 
"It is the disorganized mixture of massive 
discharge (tension decrease) and blockage 
(tension increase) in the area of 
unneutralized aggression, arising after the 
non-compliance of the archaic self-object, 
which is the metapsychological substratum of 
the manifestations and of the experience of 
narcissistic rage" (p.396). 
In the development of pathology the grandiose self may become horizontally 
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split-off resulting in depletion of the ego, and lor vertically split-off, 
where episodic grandiosity alternates dissociatively with normal functioning 
(1971). Kohut (1977) emphasizes that empathic failure results in the 
grandiose self and the idealizing self configurations fragmenting, first 
into perverse exhibitionistic and voyeuristic elements respectively, and 
then to rage and auto-erotic elements. This theorizing demonstrates Kohut's 
conception that pathology is the result of environmental failure, with 
aggression a derivative of this failure. 
In Kohut's theory narcissism is not seen as a defense against the Oedipus 
complex. This phase is postulated to rather firm the self, and only in 
cases of fragmentation is there fixation on Oedipal strivings. 
Chessick (1988) points out that motivation for development is seen as an 
inner motivation which results in transmuting internalization, but that the 
bas i s of the mot i vat i on is not exp 1 a i ned . It is however, fundamenta 11y 
different to Freud's instinctual drive theory and conflict resolution. 
3.11 . Kernberg, Kohut: Conceptua I issues. 
Kernberg (1974) details the essential difference between himself and Kohut 
as revolving around a disagreement about the origin of the grandiose self . 
Kernberg's understanding of Kohut (1971) is that Kohut maintains that the 
narcissistic personality reflects a fixation on archaic grandiose self-
configurations and/or on archaic, over-estimated, narcissistically 
cathected objects. He sees the narcissistic personaiity as suffering from a 
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lack of optimal internalization of the archaic self-object - the idealized 
parent imago. The characteristic dependency of the narcissistic 
personality upon an idealized object is understood to be formulated on the 
need to replace the functions of an aspect of the mental apparatus which was 
not established in childhood. A continuity between normal and pathological 
narcissism is postulated, with emphasis on libidinal cathexis, without 
examination of the vicissitudes of aggression. Following Kernberg, Kohut 
appears to give the impression that he analyses the vicissitudes of normal 
and pathological narcissism, and normal and pathological object relations 
as primarily dependent upon the libidinal cathexis rather than only on the 
vicissitudes of internalized object relations. Kernberg presents clinica l 
material aimed at supporting his propositions that 
"one cannot divorce the study of normal and 
pathological narcissism from the 
vicissitudes of both libidinal and 
aggressive drive derivatives, and from the 
development of structural derivatives of 
internalized object relations" (p.219). 
Kernberg (1974) maintains that rather than reflecting a lack of development, 
such patients display a pathological condensation of components of the ego 
ideal (the fore-runners of the superego) with ego components, thus there 
is an active distortion and pathological devaluation of external objects. 
This pathological structure when analysed, reveals 
"defens i ve funct ions aga i nst the emergence 
of direct oral rage and envy, against 
paranoid fears related to projection of 
sadistic trends on the analyst (representing 
a primitive, hated and sadistically 
perceived mother image) and against basic 
feelings of terrifying loneliness, hunger 
for love, and gu i It over the aggress ion 
directed against the frustrating parental 
images" (pp224). 
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Treurniet (1980) maintains that the self-psychology of Kohut (1977), 
disposes of some of the most valuable aspects of Freud's theory. Treurniet 
points out that self-psychology appropriates the most central functions of 
the third phase of ego development; the synthetic, organizing, 
harmonizing, and restoring aspects and relegates Classical analysis to 
the status of only conflict psychology. Thus in Treurniet's understanding, 
the instinctual pole is lacking in Kohut's model. By using only 
experiential, rather than observational categories, Kohut postulates that 
drive intensity is not the cause, but the result of pathology. It is thus 
assumed that narcissism and aggression ensue through failures in 
environmental empathy. Robbins (1982) makes an analogous point in claiming 
that the archaic self-object configuration is not linked to infant 
observational studies nor to theories about early infancy. Robbins claims 
that Kohut implies that the early period of development is meaningless as 
analogues of adult primitive pathologies. 
For Kernberg, narcissism cannot be separated from libidinal and aggressive 
drives and the vicissitudes of internalized object relations. Kohut 
however, conceptualizes a separate line of development for narcissism which 
Hanlyet al. (1976) criticise as Kohut's 'dualistic theory' of the libido . 
Kohut (1971) postulated two separate and largely independent lines of 
development; from auto-eroticism via narcissism to object love, the other, 
from auto-erotism via narcissism to higher forms and transformations of 
narcissism . It is within this frame of reference that Kohut identifies 
narcissistic personality disorders occurring independently of significant 
psychopathology in the development of object libido. Hanly questions the 
independence of narcissism and sexuality, pointing to their interaction in 
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libidinal development. This criticism appears to have a similar motivation 
as that of Treurniet i.e. that the experiential, rather than the 
observational, aspects are given priority. Hanly, examining clinical 
material, maintains the following propositions; 
"1. Narcissism is intrinsically related to 
the vicissitudes of instinctual development 
and the impact of object relations upon 
these vicissitudes; 
2. pathological narcissism is especially 
related to libidinal and aggressive 
fixations at the pre-oedipal stages of 
development; 
3. narcissism serves a defensive, 
compensatory function in relation to the 
confl icts in object relations which are 
generated by these fixations; 
(the later postulations involve specific 
therapeutic orientations) (p.54). 
Robbins (1980, 1982) states that it does not seem to be theoretically 
poss i b 1 e to conceptua 1 i ze separate 1 i nes of deve lopment of the se lf and 
object relations i.e. the self as differentiated, while this state exists 
only in the context of an undifferentiated relationship . Robbins maintains 
it is not necessary to ho ld the conceptua 1 i zat i on of separate 1 ines of 
deve lopment in order to make use of Kohut's ideas, even though Kohut 
maintains this view. Kohut appears not to take into account the 
hierarchies of psychic organization and differentiation, and assigns, 
according to Robbins (1980), an inadequate significance, in both normal 
and pathological development, to the role of aggression and devaluation. 
This latter point is made by Kernberg's (1974) observation that Kohut 
focuses on the vicissitudes of libidinal development, so that analysis of 
pathological narcissism is unrelated to to an examination of the 
vicissitudes of aggression. 
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Kohut's theory emphazises the responsibility of the object for the subject ' s 
growth, deve 1 opmenta 11y and therapeut i ca 11y . "The mother of deve lopment 
is seen as the mother of holding and letting go rather than the mother of 
libidinal gratification and frustration" i.e. Kernberg's 'mother'. 
Kernberg stresses the respons ibil ity of the subject for aggress ion and 
badness (Robbins 1980, p.487) 
Chessick (1988) discusses a differing 'moral' base to the two theories . 
Kernberg va 1 ues the move towards 'i ndependence' through reso 1 ut i on of the 
Oedipal complex, and stresses the primacy of hostility and Kleinian 
defenses. Kohut however, stresses the importance of an empath i c 
selfobject matrix for a cohesive sense of self and effective functioning. 
Without this matrix, creative-productive activity ceases, ego functioning 
deteriorates and fragmentation may occur. 
May (1985) maintains there is an instructive symmetry in the disputes about 
technique between, what he terms the "Kleinians/Kernbergians" and the 
"Winnicottians/Kohutians". The former, who tend towards a belief in 
Original Sin, argue that it is incorrect to take the envious, hateful 
fantasies as the history of real maternal failure. Rather they are complex 
fantasy constructions which are not analysed by a technique which fosters 
mutual idealization. The latter theorists, who have a faith in human 
perfectibility, maintain that the Kleinians/Kernbergians mistake neediness 
for hatefulness and that it is important to recapitulate the early maternal 
holding environment. They see the interpretative technique as over-active 
and persecutory . May makes the point that the different techniques used 
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tend to elicit the response which confirms the differing theories. 
80th Kernberg and Kohut agree that the centra 1 structura 1 d iffi cu lty in 
narci ss i sm is the dependence of se 1 f-esteem upon an i nterna 1 re 1 at ionshi p 
between the self and the idealized object. (Seen as pathological 
construction and development arrest respectively . ) The need to maintain 
mutual admiration with a perfect other to circumvent collapse of a sense of 
self is stressed by both theorists. May (1985) elaborates that both agree 
that there is initial idealization, with perhaps masochistic submission, 
based on an unconsc i ous wi sh that the other be perfect. Threats to the 
idealization results in the relationship being discarded. Relationships 
may also be avoided due to adherence to a particular internal object-ideal. 
Saperstein et al. (1978) in discussing the divergent views between Kernberg 
and Kohut, compare their competing views of man and nature. It is 
maintained that the origin of their differences lies in that Kernberg's 
approach is mainly anti-reductionistic, which is not the case with Kohut. 
Kohut's formulation of the psyche consists of forces, energies and 
aggregates of structures by which all clinical events are explained. 
Saperstein et al. see this formulation as reducing the 'person' to merely a 
funct i on of parts, acted upon by externa 1 forces. (a theory of parent 
blaming). As such there can be no meaning given to motives i.e. self- as-
agent. The claim is made that Kohut 
" in his theorizing deals with his 
experiential data in a natural science 
rhetoric - namely that the real cause of the 
narcissistic pathology is the persistence of 
a defective psychic apparatus which is 
discussed in traditional terms of 
formalistic quasi-biological, ' supposedly 
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more really real' causes" (p . 416). 
By claiming that the 'deficiency' of narcissism can be replaced, Kohut 
implies that man can be viewed as additive parts, and that 'selfness' or 
subject i vity as an agent, can on ly be represented as representat i ona I 
contents. The di st inct i on between norma I and patho I ogi ca lis not fu 11 y 
articulated by Kohut, and he sees the former as a potential derivative of 
the latter. 
Kohut views the incorrectness of interpretation in terms of it interfering 
with the repair of the narcissistic wound . It is argued that by denying 
the responsibility of the subject, he becomes merely an additive entity. 
Mirroring and idealization are seen within the purposes of cure. 
Saperstein et al. point out that this conceptualization precludes the 
perception of the particular meanings and motivations of any behaviour. 
Kernberg's vignettes demonstrate that Kernberg views his patient's 
manifestations of pathological narcissism as a series of meanings, which 
elaborate defenses and prevent i ntegrat i on. Sign if i cant ly the pat i ent is 
seen as responsible and active in this process. Thus the idea of an 
isolated retention of a pathological fixation becomes inimical, being 
replaced by a hierarchically organized complex system where object 
relations, and their meanings, develop epigenetically. 
Reductionism is seen as less evident in Kernberg's description of 
narcissistic personalities. He implies that behaviour is a series of 
derivatives, manifest by internal and external object relations . As such 
they cannot be reducible to one another and they acquire unique meanings and 
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motivations. Saperstein et a1. argue that Kernberg does not however 
develop the implications of meanings for his theory. The example given by 
Saperstein et a1 . concerns what they claim to be Kernberg's 
phenomeno log i ca 1 refutat i on of Kohut's c 1 a im for simi 1 ar i ty of norma 1 and 
pathological narcissism. They claim that Kernberg truncates his theory by 
not developing the hierarchical aspects of meanings which unequivocally 
demonstrate that the two narcissisms cannot be the same. 
The major limitation of Kernberg's formulations, according to Saperstein et 
al., lie in the implication that the grandiose self, which is meant as a 
part of the psychic apparatus, becomes "reified as an agent and 
anthromorphized by being used as an agent" (p.421). 
Fine11 (1985) provides a pragmatic view. She suggests that it is arbitrary 
to force dynamics into either a development or defensive explanation. She 
points out that splitting and projection, while major defenses, may co-
exist along with higher level defenses. (this is similar to the functional 
understanding of Sto10row et a1 (1980).) Finell maintains that narcissism 
is a function of a self which has difficulty in containing painful states 
and feelings, yet pre-oedipal and oedipal issues appear in narcissistic 
funct i on i ng . She proposes a cont i nuum mode 1 based on Freud's concept of 
the ego - structure and neurotic conflict co-exist with splitting and 
projection. Fine11 maintains that different situations activate different 
defensive reactions. Fine11 suggests that narcissism reflects complex 
character configurations with elements of structural defects, as well as 
regression from conflict. The concept of mis sing structure as proposed by 
Kohut is problematic for Fine11, as she maintains that the concept of void 
110 
is inimical, what must be there is either pathological or skewed structure. 
A comparison of the theories of Kernberg and Kohut reveal largely 
antagon i st i c metapsycho 1 ogi ca 1 paradi gms with confus ion as to whether the 
patients they categorize as narcissistic are even similar. Kernberg 
postulates the development of a pathological structure, while Kohut looks 
to developmental arrest. Kernberg emphasizes the innate role of aggression 
while Kohut stresses the necessity of an empathic selfobject. Kernberg 
would maintain that Kohut ' s idealizing and mirror transferences are 
alternative components of the fused pathological grandiose self. Kohut's 
therapeut i c stance is seen by Kernberg to mere ly lead to greater adapt i ve 
use of the grandiose self without changing the basic structure. Despite 
these theoretical differences both theorists have contributed greatly to the 
debate and awareness of narcissistic phenomena and to the effectiveness of 
treatment modalities. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. METHODOLOGY . 
"Li sten, my rotten heart, 
My dog's heart. 
For you, as for a thief, 
I have hidden a knife in my sleeve." 
Sergei Esenin, A Biographical Sketch. 
4.1. Aims of the research. 
The major aim of this research is to explore a psychoanalytic understanding 
of the theme of narcissistic wounding in White's novel The Solid Mandala. 
This endeavour involves; 
1) Engaging the text as a partner in dialoguing 
the 1 ived experience of the twins, Wa ldo and 
Arthur, using the hermeneutic method, which 
is described further on in the chapter. 
2) Using the dialogical understanding as a 
source of clinical material to be analysed and 
understood. 
3) To consider this understanding in 
conjunction with clinical material, from both 
published sources, and the researcher's 
personal experience as a psychotherapist . 
4) Thereby using the analysis as a contribution 
to clinical understanding of narcissistic 
phenomena and the underlying conflicts and 
anxieties. 
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4.2. Concerns. 
For the purposes of this methodological chapter it is felt that the critique 
of the natural scientific approach, in its relevance to psychology, has 
been sufficiently articulated by writers such as Boss (1979), Giorgi (1970, 
1971), Kockelmans (1967), Kruger (1988), Merleau-Ponty (1942, 1945) and 
Romanyshyn (1975, 1978). The vicissitudes of paradigms within scientific 
revolutions and discontinuities, as discussed by Kuhn (1970) are also well 
known. 
What is considered relevant for this chapter is an elucidation of the 
concerns and issues of understanding and dialogue which faced the researcher 
in approaching a text such as the Solid Mandala. 
Th i s researcher is grounded ina psychoana lyt i c background where 
understanding the human condition in terms of unconscious motivations is 
both a meaningful and relevant framework. The researcher's experience as a 
psychotherapist, gives this understanding a 'lived' meaningfulness in terms 
of the progress i ve unfo ld i ng of the c 1 i ent 's prev i ous ly unconsc i ous/pre-
reflective experience, an unfolding which occurs within the client 
therapist dialogue. This therapeutic dialogue is conceptualized as a 
hermeneutic endeavour (Steele 1982). However, the conceptual tension for 
the researcher, is the elucidation of the unconscious/ pre-reflective 
experience and its relations to the conscious experience contained within 
the text. The writings of Merleau-Ponty (1945) are helpful in this regard. 
He postulates the simultaneous relation between the visible and the 
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invisible i.e. the simultaneous relation between what is conscious and that 
which is hidden from consciousness. It is suggested that "the invisible 
is the visible's only way of being visible. The unconscious is not what we 
see but it is that through which what we see is perceived" (Watts, 1987). 
Thus the unconscious provides the matrix of meanings through which £ 
particular set of meanings come to have meaning within the context of 
dialogue with another. 
Articulation of this invisible/pre-reflective mode of being is the focus of 
the therapist - client dialogue, it is the co-constituted dialogue of which 
Barton (1974) writes, which brings to visibility £ particular 
understanding between the therapist and the client. Articulation of a co-
constituted dialogue is also the focus of this researcher's meeting with the 
text. Such an articulation acknowledges the Heideggerian concept that the 
meaning of being is revealed in existence and as such there is no absolute 
truth to a text, but rather a particular truth which is revealed within a 
particular dialogue with the text. 
Linguists have pointed to difficulties with this view. Barthes and Levi -
Strauss (quoted in Seldon 1986) have proposed that meaning is 'textual', 
part of a system of relations. These relations are seen to be governed, 
not by the individual but by the systems which govern the individual. The 
meaning of the text is thus cut off from the, perhaps, particular intent 
of the author. Thorpe (1987) discusses how the result "is an approach which 
is static and ahistorica1, an approach which elucidates the underlying laws 
governing the use of language but which fails to speak to the process of 
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change" (p.3). 
Thorpe shows how the post-structuralists have pointed to the instability of 
meaning. The deconstruction of Derrida suggests that "the sign (pointing to 
the signified) is not so much a unit with two sides but a momentary 'fix' 
between two moving layers" (p.5). It is the 'potential space' (Winnicott 
1951) of the momentary 'fix' to which this research is addressed. 
Deconstruction gives licence to 'ideas', to 'half truths', as it were, 
and recognizes that the text does not have one meaning. 
In terms of articulating the meaning, the experiential context, of an 
individual's life, it had seemed natural to Freud (1910, 1928) to treat 
characters in a text like real people and hence his undertaking of character 
analysis and the search for clues to the character's unconscious. The 
challenge of the New Critics, as explored by Skura (1981) revolves around 
the question of to what extent the traits of the 1 iterary character are 
merely the requirements of the text and only part of a design for the text. 
The danger then of character analysis, she suggests, is that it may lie 
perhaps in the enriching of psychoanalysis at the price of misreading 
1 iterature. 
"Neither Freud nor the poets presented us with 
'human nature'; we as critics are left to 
compare human nature as Freud represented it to 
human nature as the poets represented it, and 
we face problems of translation whenever we try 
to confront their views of man" (p.33). 
Skura suggests that what is problematic about the psychoanalytic method for 
a reading of the text is that while the method identifies 'strange' 
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behaviour and locates the source to fixations, these sources are seen as 
independent of, and often alien to, the current conscious experience of 
the text. Thus the experiences with which the analyst deals, find hiding 
places within the text, but are conceptualized as often not responsive to 
the ongoing realities of life. In the text it can be argued that " nothing 
demands to be understood in terms other than those introduced by the text. 
Irrat i ona 1 behavi our is made sense of by extern a 1 i zi ng it and exp 1 anat ion 
lies in the context" (ibid, p.40). 
It is, however, argued by the researcher that the reader ret a i ns some 
authori ty, if on ly in terms of a un iversa 1 ity of experi ence to wh i ch the 
text speaks and to which the reader/researcher can respond. It is also 
postulated that the conceptual bridge for this problematic lies in the 
phenomenological approach which sees understanding of behaviour as grounded 
in the human condition, in a shared world of common meanings. The text can 
be placed in the potentia7 space between understanding as both literal and 
symbolic meaning. The potential space is that tension between the 
character as 1 iterary character and the character as a pre-ref 1 ect i ve ly 
recognized Everyman. 
The tension of this potentia7 space finds its home in the propositions of 
phenomenology and the aims of a hermeneutic inquiry . 
(1975) such an understanding 
"requires a dialogue with the text in which the 
text rea 1 i zes its power ina hermeneut i c 
reading. A reading where the ongoing 
incomplete form of the reader's life is brought 
into a dialogue with the unity of form of the 
text in a process of appropriation. This 
appropriation dissolves the distance between 
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Following Sardello 
reader and text through an image which is the 
re-enactment by the reader of what the text 
says by itself" (ibid,p.276). 
4. 3. Theoretica I propos itions. 
This section is concerned with an elucidation of the fundamental 
propositions which have informed the researcher's choice for a hermeneutic 
inquiry. 
Historical development can be traced to Dilthey (1833 -1911) (discussed in 
Packer 1985) who was concerned with the limitations of an 'explaining' 
science and who stressed the centrality of understanding as the basis of a 
'verstehende' sc i ence - Ge isteswissenschaft. He postu 1 ated that an 
exp 1 a i n ing or object i ve science de-contextua 1 i zed the phenomenon of study, 
while an acceptance of subjectivity, of participation, in reflecting the 
facts of consc i ousness, centra 11y contextua 1 i zed understand ing wi th i n an 
understanding science. Dilthey's understanding provided the impetus for a 
hermeneut ica 11y based psycho logy, a psycho logy " concerned with semantics 
rather than a logical or causal organization" (p.1081) . 
Husserl's work, contained in Magill (1961), may be summed up as the search 
for the transcendental conditions which make 'meaning' (scientific, 
ethical, aesthetic, ' religious) possible. Husserl (1913) was concerned to 
distinguish, within experience, that which experiences from that which i s 
experienced i . e. to find the essence of the meanings of acts of 
consciousness . To this end he proposed that one must suspend, by making 
explicit, the presuppositions of na t ural belief . Suspension of belief is 
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achieved through a method of bracketing, whereby the essence of the 
phenomena is not perceived as external to experience. This allows a 
progressive emergence of the assumptions of the natural attitude. Husserl 
postulates that noema, that which is perceived, is dependent upon noesis, 
the perceiving. An important part of the analysis of consciousness consists 
in trac i ng the re lat i on between these two. Noema, a 1 though dependent and 
'unreal', has being i.e. it is composed entirely of essences which are 
eternally what they are . The essence of a phenomenon is never originally 
separate from the experi ent i a 1 qua 1 it i es of 1 ife. Understanding must, 
therefor, be grounded in percept i on whereby in bracket i ng the essence of 
the phenomenon is striven towards in the transcendental attitude. 
Husserl defined the central position of consciousness as intentionality and 
the Lebenswelt i.e. the world as personally lived and experienced. The 
implication of this philosophy for psychology is that descriptive statements 
(interpretations) about human conscious experience come to be seen as 
meaningful. Meaningful, in that they strive to accurately describe 
phenomena which are pre-reflectively given in the experience . The 
interpretations strive to explicate the tensions between the 'lived' and the 
known (Watts, 1987). Husserl's emphasis on fidelity to the lived world, 
through progress ive ' bracket i ng' of the natura 1 att i tude, serves as a 
discipline to the act of interpretation. Meaningfulness is evaluated 
against a rigorously contextualized experiential phenomenon. 
The principle ideas put forward by Heidegger (1927), as contained in Magill 
(1961), are that the world is a region of human concern. Man is seen as 
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being-in-the-world, in that by his participation and involvement the world 
becomes constitutive of man's being . Dasein discloses first of all the 
foundational experience of 'being-in-the-world. There is no world without 
man, which is shared with others. Man's being-in-the-world includes a 
re 1 atedness to an env i ronmenta 1, the Umwe It, and a re 1 atedness to a 
communal region, the Mitwelt and a relatedness to himself, the Eigenwelt . 
The world, existentially understood, is never disclosed independently of 
the concern of man. In his primordial experience man already has his world 
given in his immediate concerns and preoccupations. Heidegger's 
phenomeno logy undercuts the Cartes i an subject-object dichotomy. Wi th i n 
this understanding, experience and action, or understanding and doing are 
an inseparable entity. 
Packer (1985) claims that in the hermeneutic inquiry, and the ontology which 
grounds it, the primary origin of knowledge is taken to be practica I 
activity. Such activity exists prior to any theorizing and has a character 
distinct from theory. Notably it involves no context-free elements 
definable in the absence of interpretation. Interpretation "seeks to 
e 1 uc i date and make exp 1 i cit our pract i ca 1 understand i ng of human act i on" 
(ibid,p.1088). 
Lawson (1985) discusses Heidegger's use of reflexivity as a positive 
paradox, prov i ding the force and direct i on of the hermeneut i c enterpr i se. 
Heidegger argues that if prejudice is inevitable, one cannot eradicate it 
by uncovering all examples of prejudice, for the uncovering is itself a 
prejudice . Rather, the implicit circularity of always already, applied 
to the Being of Dasein, provides for Dasein to have always understood the 
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meaning of Being. For Heidegger man ii understanding, it is his 
constitutedness of being, which entails the pre-reflected nature of his 
knowing, his 'pre-judice'. Man is never without understanding for then he 
would be nothing. 
The implication of these thoughts for the text in question is that Heidegger 
conceives of existence as necessarily engaged in the act of revealing the 
meaning of being, thus meaning is revealed through the reading of the text. 
Schweitzer (1983) states that for phenomenology, meaning and reality are 
intrinsically related, to the extent that real ity is the result of a 
fundamentally meaningful relationship with the world. Thus the 
relationship between the reader and the text provide the meaning of the 
text, for there is no textual meaning without the reader. (This concept is 
reminiscent of Winnicott's famous statement, "There is no such thing as a 
baby, only a mother and baby".) 
Pontalis (1983), in examining Merleau-Ponty's exposition of meaning, 
suggests a pre-linguistic conceptualization where the primordial 
articulation is perceptive, "a type of being with regard to which the 
subject is not sovereign without nevertheless being inserted in it" (p.87). 
Mean i ng can on ly occur withi n the context of man's i nvo 1 vement with the 
meanings of his world. 
The value of the hermeneutic inquiry is given in that our understanding of 
act i on (1 ike the text) is never comprehens i ve or stra i ghtforward at the 
onset. Interpretation has the potential to be 'revelatory' of this 
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unreflected understanding (Packer 1985). Thus interpretation can be seen 
as articulated understanding (Prof. Kruger, 
communication). 
Rhodes Univers ity, personal 
Steele (1982) discusses how communication occurs between subjects, not 
between subjects and objects and that the text can be approached in the same 
spirit, within the context of the hermeneutic circle. The text can be 
viewed as a carrier of meaning, capable of answering one's questions and 
aided to speak through interpretation. Hermeneutics attempts to understand 
through part i cipat ion and openness. The interpreter, a lthough he has 
presuppositions, tries to meet and understand the text on its own ground. 
One may check the progress of the endeavour by testing the part against the 
whole, seeing that each new interpretation fits with an emerging conception 
of the whole. Steele maintains that the goal of interpretation is to make 
man ifest the mean i ngs that have been unart i cu 1 ated, unseen, or hidden. 
Understanding is seen to be provisional. There are no absolute truths 
which arise from interpretation, it is a process of 'self-reflection' which 
never ends. At best one is confronted wi th 'se 1f -decept i on I , at wh i ch 
time new meanings may be found . 
Kruger (1988) conceptualizes psychology and its task as an intersubjective, 
communicative science which seeks to explicate the structures of the pre-
reflective life-world, i.e. of our lived world. The aims of this research 
are within this spirit, to strive towards a communicative understanding of 
the pre-reflective life-world of the twins, which cannot be articulated by 
a psychology which presumes objective knowledge and which objectifies the 
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'subject' of its interest. 
Giorgi (1971,1975a, 1975b) has described most extensively a methodological 
framework within phenomenology. What has been appropriated for this 
research is his articulation of the requirements necessary for accountable 
research. These include the characteristics of; 
1. Receptivity - time for the phenomenon to 
emerge so that its intrinsic constituents can 
be discovered. 
2. Fidel ity - the need to describe the 
phenomenon prec i se ly as it presents itse 1 f to 
the researcher. 
3.Rigour - harmony between the demands of the 
situated phenomenon and the intent ions of the 
researcher. 
4. Appreciation of the trans-situational 
consistency of meaning. 
In brief summary, interpretations are given principally in narrative, 
natural language form . Within this form there is a structure which is 
never context free. Understanding at the outset is within the natural 
att itude or percept i ve consc i ousness. The hermeneut i c method emp loys a 
detailed, progressive description of episodes of human interchange which 
gradua l ly art i culates more and more of their organization in the 
transcendental attitude . Fi delity and rigour are striven for through a 
dialogue between text and reader in which understanding is always an 
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i ncomp 1 ete ref 1 ect i on. The open dialogical nature of the method 
progressively refines and corrects understanding through interpretations and 
the emergence of new questions which are answered by returning to the text 
and revising the interpretations. 
4.4. Method. 
The text was met in the spirit of Giorgi's characteristics for accountable 
research and within the structures of the hermeneutic reading of the text as 
discussed by Sardello (1975). 
1. The inquiry began with a prel iminary and 
tentative pre-understanding. To this end the 
text was read three times, with the a im of 
increasing understanding by encountering and 
refl ect i ng on the text as a who le. Each 
experience with the text resulted in the total 
image of the text being affected and more or 
less modified. 
2. The second step was a dialogical 
paraphrasing of those aspects of the text which 
were immediately concerned with the twin's 
experience of their lives . (Thus aspects 
which involved description which might have 
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provided inferential information was generally 
not included.) 
The hermeneutic dialogue is given in units from 
1 to 130 for Wa 1 do, and from 1 to 69 for 
Arthur. Th i s step proved to be long and 
provided repetitive thematic information. 
Repetition which went towards refining an 
understanding of the emerging themes was 
included. Aspects which were clearly mere 
repetition were not included. 
This step is included in the appendix for it 
provides a valuable sense of historical 
connection to the text. 
3. During step two, the text was interrogated 
with the aim of finding out how it could 
i 11 umi nate an understand i ng of the experi ence 
of narcissistic wounding. Thus in this step 
the researcher's own pre-suppos it ions of the 
dual nature of the intrapsychic conflict 
arising from narcissistic wounding were brought 
into the ongoing dialogue. 
Following Sardello (ibid. p.277), the 
researcher did not strive to be too obedient in 
the dialogical paraphrasing, for mere 
repetition serves to close dialogue . 
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4. Articulation of the Exposition involved a 
merger of the thought of the text and the 
researcher's pre-suppositions which sought 
recognition from each other. Where the text 
answered to what had been asked through the 
presuppositions, the dialogue continued. 
Where, either the text did not answer, or 
answered to an unworded question, the 
presuppos i t ions of the researcher were either 
modified or abandoned . Thus it was necessary 
to remain continually open to being in the 
dialogue. 
5. The Exposition involves a systematization 
of the researcher's understanding of the lives 
of Waldo and Arthur, which had been reached 
through dialogue with the text in steps one to 
three. Systematization involved drawing 
understanding into thematic areas, dealing 
first with Waldo and then with Arthur . 
6. This thematic understanding formed the 
basis for the final hermeneutic description of 
narcissistic wounding. This description was 
again couched thematically, dealing with 
mother, Arthur and Waldo. 
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7. The discussion chapter augmented 
understanding through reference to specific 
clinical examples and attention to relevant 
literature. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. EXPOSITION 
Sisters kiss freely and unsubtle friends 
Wrestle like lovers; brothers loudly laugh: 
These in a dreamier bondage dare not touch. 
Each is the other's soul and hears too much 
The heartbeat of the other; each apprehends 
The sad duality and the imperfect half. 
("The Twins" - Karl Shapiro) 
Th i s chapter pro v i des an expos it i on of the exper i ences of the twi ns wh i ch 
was illuminated through the researcher's dialogue with the novel. (The 
numbering in brackets refers to the thematic units of the appendix.) 
Wa 7do. 
(Units 1 to 130.) 
"Human nature is able to endure only a very 
little reality." 
T.S. Eliot. 
5.1 Wa7do - re7ations to se7f (Eigenwe7t). 
The twi sted bowe 1 prob lem of Wa 1 do's infancy concret i zed hi s struggl e to 
feed and express the twisted, confused nature of his inner world. 
(34,35,37,38.) 
As ch i 1 dren there is an i ntertwi ned qua 1 ity to the 1 ives of Wa 1 do and 
Arthur. The fusion of boundaries and emotional life is more apparent. 
(39, 40, 42.) 
As a child and as an adult Waldo does not feel loved, or seen . His 
experience is rather that he is possessed . He cannot love for the other 
then has power over him, the power to possess him. 
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(84, 95.) 
He adopts a grandiose image of himself., which compensates for the unloved 
emptiness of his existence. His unmet needs are denied and the other 
becomes devalued, feared and hated. 
31,41,87,89,91, 111, 123.) 
Wa 1 do attempts to contro 1 both h imse If and others, a imi ng to conta i nand 
deny his feelings, and the dangerous consequences of his hate. 
(31, 56, 69, 73, 104, 123.) 
As a young man, Waldo has moments of recognizing that it is his nature 
which denies him hope. He despairs that even the possibility of death 
fails to give meaning and excite passion to his existence. 
that he does not have a known sense of his existence. 
(106, 107, 114, 115.) 
He despairs 
Waldo is not capable of wanting to give pleasure, and the one wish to make 
reparation to his father, is thwarted in its inception. Waldo cannot 
experience compassion, for he has not sufficiently integrated the good and 
bad splits, to feel guilt for his sadistic impulses towards others. He 
fears rather the persecution of the other . 
(18, 49, 84.) 
Waldo adapts, in a significant way to his parents . The duty and habits of 
their lives provide him with a framework of being, a frame with which to 
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avoid intimacy with both himself and others . 
(1, 6, 7, 12, 56, 83 . ) 
In his adaptation he cultivates an image of himself based upon the 
attitudes his mother sees and admires. The image allows him to not show or 
give of himself. 
(18, 38.) 
There is thus a selective showing of himself aimed to impress the other, to 
impress rather than please, to watch rather than participate. 
(18, 56.) 
Wa 1 do I s search for h imse 1 f and for someth ing, someone, to be 1 i eve in is 
truncated. He must deny to others, and even h imse If , the importance of 
people or things in his world, for the need would reveal his confusion (and 
envy). 
(44, 46, 59, 71.) 
In his dad's phi losophy he wou ld be reduced, were he to strugg 1 e, for 
ultimately "nothing is nothing". 
(44) 
This philosophy gives Waldo a sense of strength in his moral superiority -
the purity of his ideals. In the final analysis all one has is nothing . 
It saves Waldo from the overwhelming confusion which threatens, but also 
leaves him empty. 
(73, 85, 87, 88.) 
The myths which offered hope in childhood, become devalued and destroyed . 
Waldo destroys whatever offers hope for fea r of the hope. 
(40, 46, 73, 85 . ) 
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Wa 1 do's boundari es are concrete and fragil e due to the 1 ack of a bounded 
sense of self. There is a massive split to his existence, and any people 
or events which threaten the split, precipitate an increase in self 
grandiosity and devaluation in others. 
(94,95, 110, 111, 114, 121.) 
His boundaries are as concretely experienced as his clothing - a disguise 
which hides the real Waldo inside. 
(126) 
His intactness is maintained only by his skin. Events and peop 1 e are 
experienced as 'colliding' with his life. 
quality to his bodiliness. 
(12, 94) 
There is a brittle, unyielding 
Arthur is not enough to ho 1 d the project ions of Wa 1 do's 'badness' (pus) . 
He retains a sense of his hatefulness being revealed through his skin, and 
he learns to hide, eventually to seduce himself into a denial of this 
sense, by creat i ng the impress ions wh i ch adapt to the expectat ions of 
others (hence feeling their power to possess). 
(88, 89, 91, 104) 
Thus while Waldo continues to impress he remains unconvinced of his 
realness, of his boundedness. 
(66, 70, 104, 114, 115) 
The mirror and words plays an important role in defining Waldo's 'shape', 
not his substance. He is reassured of his existence by seeing himself and 
in uniting with himself in the mirror. 
He is also able to fulfil his need for love and recognition, for being 
seen, without the need of the other. 
(Arthur is also a mirror, both as a reflection of his physicalness i.e. 
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that he ex i sts, and as his emotiona l complement.) 
(41, 51, 73, 83, 87, 88, 122) 
Waldo is not capable of concern for another, he is too split and 
experiences the other as impinging upon his fragile, rigid boundaries . 
(122, 126) 
Emot ions 'puncture' Wa 1 do, as a concrete experi ence . The image wh i ch 
hides him, and which he presents and cultivates, contains him. Emotions 
puncture this image, and therefor he is punctured, he is revealed. 
(12) 
Reality is viewed from an omnipotent stance which lacks distinctions between 
self and other . Waldo invests the objects of his world with emotions which 
allow an experiencing of his feeling state through the objects . 
(81, 98, 110) 
Negative self aspects are split off and projected, while the great thoughts 
of others are used to fill a sense of self, in a delusional way. 
Nothing has worth in its own r ight. He has emptied it of its goodness, 
and projected his badnes s . 
appropr iated, swallowed whole. 
The goodness of the other is mere ly 
Waldo is unable to process it, unable to 
digest and incorporate . 
(29, 91, 98) 
He is too fearful of persecution. 
Confusion is experienced as persecutory, it mirrors the confused nature of 
his inner world, and t he revelation would threaten the brittleness of his 
boundaries . 
(9 , 21) 
Wa 1 do cannot experience potent i a 1 space and the p lay of symbo 1 i zat i on for 
there is not the stab il i ty of a fe It, stab 1 e, sense of a safe se If . Thus 
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Wa 1 do is not open to poss i b i 1 it i es, to potent i a 1 space for these enta i 1 a 
drawing from one's inner sense of se If , from his sense of inner confus ion 
and ambivalence. He is defended against confusion and ambiguity. The 
world is either good or bad. 
(3) 
Waldo denies his experiences of vulnerability, clinging to his sense of 
superiority . 
(114 ) 
Yet he fears punishment and rejection for wanting and feeling. There is a 
fear of introjection, (fear of the re-introjection of his hate and envy) 
and as a result he fears punishment and cannot thrive on that which 1 ife 
and people offer him, on what he is fed. His hunger is experienced as a 
greed for which he will be punished. 
(4, 99) 
He attempts to control and avoid vulnerability and punishment through 
feeding only on himself. 
(7, 84, 88) 
He will not allow others to witness a wanting. 
(12, 15, 33) 
He develops "personal detachment" to the point of it becoming a rel igion . 
Later in life, his detachment is such that he becomes aware of hurt only 
years after the event. 
(124) 
He is controlled and vigilant, hence he is not able to be spontaneous, he 
i s not able to be enthralled by anything or anyone . 
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Flexibility, play, spontaneity are experienced as debilitating and not to 
be trusted. 
Waldo rejects / cannot respond to poetry, to the soul of the image (to the 
soul of his life). 
Imagination entails the ability to be able to endure ambiguity, to allow 
the multiplicity of the image to speak and not to seek premature closure . 
Waldo cannot allow the image to speak. 
He fears the confusion of ambiguity, the confusion of his world. Waldo 
rigidly maintains the reality of his world and cannot be open to the 
vicissitudes of the other. 
(1, 2, 3, 7) 
Due to his brittle boundaries and the confusion, Waldo has a fear of 
fragmenting. He experiences his life fragmenting whenever he is confronted 
by an outer reality which undermines (confuses) his reality. 
Control attempts to defend against fragmentation and revealing, but it keeps 
him outside of his experience and his inner life is experienced as stagnant, 
dark, and hidden from light. 
Even death is viewed in terms of will, of control. He denies his finitude 
and ultimate vulnerability and will not think about anything which 
challenges his rigidly held beliefs. 
(21, 96, 110) 
Words are used to define him, to give him a sense of existence and outline . 
Wa 1 do experi ences Arthur's use of words as imp ingements wh i ch spoil. 
Waldo's envy of Arthur and the brittleness of his sense of self result in 
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his spoiling of Arthur's touch. 
(49, 50, 51) 
Waldo has a blind faith in words, he cannot see that words have no life 
outside of the life given them . He denies the emptiness of the words and 
clings to them as concrete validation of his existence. 
He is not able to use the words as symbols to his life, for they have a 
concrete use, to define his boundedness, his shape. 
(87) 
The manuscripts embody his grandiosity and allow him a sense of there being 
something which he can bel ieve in, 
exists. 
something which shows him that he 
His "book" is felt to be his life, the validation of his existence. The 
notes are tangible evidence that he ii. 
(87, 122, 130) 
There is vague awareness that he may have found distinctness in the world, 
but he is too fearful of extinction, to be alone in the world. (He would 
have to integrate his split.) 
That which he has been taught, which fills him, becomes dogma, devoid of 
confusion . The steri 1 i ty of the dogma generates a pervas i ve sense of 
barrenness and emptiness in his life. 
Due to the inability to use symbolization, there is a concretization of 
experience, and the fear and sense of 'emptiness ' results from th i s lack of 
a symbolic world - from an aspect of his existence which is split off, 
denied and projected, rather than integrated and symbolized. 
The sense of emptiness acts as a defense against the confusion of the 
un integrated emotions of love and hate, against his ' badness ' . It is also 
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a defense against the integration of the split poles of his existence. 
The fear of nothingness acts as a denial of the passionate life which does 
exist and of which he is terrified. He thus remains locked in dogma and 
the known and does not feel himself to be in his life, although there is a 
desperate longing. 
(69, 97, 105, 107, 113, 114, 115, 126, - 94, 95, 110, 111) 
Waldo is unable to see into a part of himself which matters. He cannot 
overcome his own avoidance, for fear of what he may see - for fear that his 
'badness' may destroy him. 
He hates Arthur for having a part of himself which matters, a part in which 
he can believe - a part which has a sense of stability. 
In his life he is confronted by a blurred confusion, both in his inner and 
external world and he becomes envious of the stability of Arthur. 
There is no distinct reality, nothing distinct to hold onto. 
As a child the bank had been important in providing that sense of stability. 
It had concretely provided something permanent to believe in, and he had 
experienced a deflation of importance with the cessations of the bank visits 
- his sense of worth being intimately bound to the stability of his world. 
Waldo hates what he is envious of and thus comes to hate Arthur. 
(27,67, 107, 108, 110) 
As he cannot show himself, 
experienced as depression . 
(12) 
his anger and hate is turned inwards and 
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Waldo's inner life is full, yet the fearful and devalued aspects are denied 
and projected, and he is left feeling emptied and persecuted. 
His split off and denied life (passion) is betrayed by the life of his body. 
His voice and body contain a life which is unknown to Waldo. He uses his 
voice to seduce and impress but he denies the inherent sensuousness of his 
being. 
He identifies with the position of the mind . The mind embodies 
consciousness - rationality, rather than the chaos of feelings. 
He controls his inner life, his fantasies, through the 'sterility' of 
habit, duty, his relations to others and his career. 
(1, 3, 6, 7, 19, 20) 
As a child his fantasies had vividly contained tales of murderous intent, 
and the murder of children to satisfy a blood lust. These fantasies speak 
to a neglected aspect of Waldo's experience which has not become integrated, 
- his own sadistic impulses and the fears of persecutory retaliation . 
He does not experience his life as real, for he has split off large aspects 
in terror of losing his blood - being destroyed by the other, and in terror 
of spilling blood - his murderous rage. 
Waldo is afraid of passion, of what is inside him. 
Our i ng the war, Wa 1 do fe 1 t gu i lt for the atroc i ties of the war . The 
enormity of the chaos and atrocities link with his unconscious fantasies of 
his split off inner world - an unconscious guilt for the projection of his 
sadistic impulses . 
The lack of integration results in splitting where the grandiose illusions 
of self protect him from the horror of his internal world. 
(19, 20, 21, 62, 69, 70, 91, 123) 
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The possibilities of the peace offer Waldo the hope of life after 
destruction, the possibilities of love and forgiveness. The doll for Mrs 
Poulter is an offering of this hope. His gesture is however truncated and 
not met, and he retreats further from people, into grandiosity and hate. 
(125) 
He projects his own sense of evil and is left feeling purified (but 
empt i er) . 
(85) 
As an older man, Waldo fantasizes about being on an island - having a world 
known and contained; of abandoning himself to sensuality - allowing himself 
to experience the denied and split off life; and of being spiritually 
celibate - having his mind uncluttered with Arthur. 
(113 ) 
5.2. Waldo - relations to Arthur. 
As a child, prior to the impact of the outside world, Waldo felt lost 
without Arthur, he was aware and accepting of his need for Arthur. 
As children, the 'femaleness' of Arthur is a complement to Waldo's way of 
being. 
It allows a sensuous enjoyment, fed by Arthur, a filled out a sense of 
himself and an ability to love himself through Arthur. 
Waldo is able to rest, to just sit and not think, to cease his vigilance 
and have a sense of just 'being'. 
(39, 40, 41, 42, 65) 
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With development, Waldo becomes afraid of the emotion which Arthur evokes 
in him. He destroys it by making it meaningless, by devaluing Arthur and 
by himself becoming more grandiose. Waldo begins to deny feelings of love 
and affection towards Arthur, deny any sense of a personal involvement. 
As they develop the poetry and sensuality of Arthur is rejected. 
He will not allow Arthur to speak. 
Waldo progressively denies his reliance on Arthur and devalues what he sees 
as the female in Arthur as helpless. 
Waldo comes to experience his life as 'flawed' because of Arthur. 
(1, 59, 63, 67, 71, 72, 73, 78) 
He is env ious of Arthur's fi rst born status, of Arthur's hea 1 th. Arthur 
fills a space which should have been Waldo's. Waldo's omnipotence and 
uniqueness is thwarted from the first. 
He splits off and projects his own intuitive way of being for fear of 
emotions, 
himself. 
of experiencing himself as weakened by the feminine within 
Waldo splits the sensuous (feeling, intuitive) from the conscious, 
(rational) and projects the devalued sensuous aspects onto Arthur. 
(17, 34,46,57,65,91, 106) 
There rema i ns however an amb i va lence. Arthur is able to keep alive an 
aspect for Waldo. Waldo is both fascinated and repulsed by the 
sensuousness of Arthur . There is an unconscious betrayal by the body of 
this fascination, i . e . the shivering of his body wh i ch captures the threat 
to his concretely experienced boundaries. On the conscious leve l , he 
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experiences revulsion for what is soft and feminine. 
(3, 19, 20) 
Waldo is afraid of passion, of what is inside him. He experiences 
Arthur's love as an impingement which threatens to reveal his inner most 
core, something which would expose the split off denied aspects of his 
existence. Therefore, Arthur who holds the projections, remains most 
feared and persecutory. 
(59, 71 , 114, 121, 125) 
Waldo physically leads them into the world . 
He re 1 i es on duty and habit to prav i de the framework . The framework 
protects both h imse If and Arthur from awareness of the comp lex i ty of the 
world and people. A complexity wh i ch is fearsome and confusing, and felt 
as an impingement by Waldo (and parents) . 
He is dr i ven to protect Arthur in order to protect h imse If , from the 
thoughts of others, which might harm, or destroy his sense of self. 
(6,7,21,52) 
Although denied, there is a sense of needing Arthur . Arthur is his "twin 
consciousness", a hindrance and a consolation. Arthur is the only one he 
can communicate with, and this at a most fundamental level. 
Arthur rema i ns capab 1 e of evok i ng love in Wa 1 do at those moments of 
spiritual union in bread making . Arthur evoked a sense of the spiritual, 
of the mystical, in his bread bak i ng. The moment is spoilt by Waldo ' s 
guilt, guilt for his unconscious destructi ve urges . 
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Waldo is held together by Arthur but his experience is that Arthur feeds off 
him. 
(21, 42, 53, 105) 
Rather than need ing Arthur and peop 1 e, Wa 1 do withdraws into grand iose 
isolation, devaluing the other. Arthur acts as a mirror, continually 
there as the 'denied other' - his split off aspects. 
Positive and negative; male and female; conscious and unconscious - Waldo 
and Arthur respectively. 
(88, 93, 110) 
Waldo keeps them joined to guard against his world fragmenting. Arthur is 
needed to hold the negative projections, which Waldo cannot acknowledge for 
fear of his world fragmenting 
Waldo's experience of himself is lived through and against Arthur. 
He cannot allow Arthur a separate existence, it is too threatening to his 
own - he fears the consequences of the return of his project ions - of 
integration. 
(28, 67, 73, 88, 105) 
And yet he desperately wants an existence separate from Arthur . Arthur sees 
into his innermost core, he cannot defend himself against Arthur . 
Arthur absorbs everything. 
Arthur is experienced as continually present, as a mirror to his mind which 
he cannot escape. 
(57,93, 113) 
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It seems to Wa 1 do that Arthur is protected aga i nst evi 1 s wh i ch threaten 
Waldo, he thus both needs and hates Arthur for having that which he wishes 
to possess . 
He exper iences the twinship as a harness. 
persecutory and containing all the badness. 
projections.} 
(6, 17, 63, 67) 
Arthur is perceived as 
(Arthur has received the 
Waldo can only catch at the specialness of Arthur's mathematical gift . He is 
unab 1 e to be moved by the rea 1 ness of it, he cannot be conv i nced of its 
substance. This results from his own destruction of Arthur through his 
projections, Arthur can have nothing good for holding the bad. It is also 
the result of his envy of Arthur's goodness, envy of his substance. 
Arthur is capable of pure logic. This however becomes circumscribed. 
Waldo destroys through envy the clarity of Arthur's thoughts, denies him 
the words, for fear of his own confusion. 
(66, 67) 
Arthur's life holds no meaning for Waldo, due to its devaluation . 
(71, 72, 73, 85, 91) 
Waldo only understands Arthur from t he perspective of his own life, from a 
perspective which does not threaten hi s world. 
He is unable to enter into the life of another, for fear of the impingement 
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upon his brittle, fragile boundaries . 
(109, 110, 118, 126) 
He hates Arthur's ability to be in the world, which is experienced as being 
free and absent . (His object must be concretely present to hold the 
project ions and to be experi enced as rea 1 e. g. Du 1 c ie, Wa 11y, Dad cease 
to exist for Waldo as living others.) 
Waldo is terrified to be free, for then he would be alone and separate. 
He must therefore deny his pain and disappointment with his parents and 
project his wishes to destroy onto Arthur. 
(105) 
Arthur is the perfect receptac le for Wa 1 do's project ions, for it is the 
feeling aspects of his being which Waldo devalues and projects, and it is 
Arthur who feels for the family . 
and hated by Waldo. 
It is Arthur who becomes the persecutor 
(19, 20, 40, 65) 
Arthur's anger is experienced as shameful and revealing. 
Waldo experiences shame whenever there is a needing, a commitment, any 
feeling which is in conflict with the 'purity' of the classical ideal 
espoused by dad, then one is reduced to a shameful lump. 
(71, 72, 73) 
Arthur rescues by attempting to merge (to integrate?), 
The merger wh i ch is evoked by Arthur is we 11 known to Wa 1 do, he gives 
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himself to it, 
' knowledge' . 
but with fear, fear that he is not protected by 
'Knowledge' is the purity of ideals of his parents, the framework by which 
he holds himself bounded. His fear is the loss of boundedness which occurs 
with Arthur and the possibility of himself being revealed to himself. 
Upon reflection, Waldo always retreats and devalues the experience of 
merger and continues to fight Arthur. 
(77, 78, 88, 125, 127) 
Wa 1 do is consumed by the fear that Arthur wi 11 destroy him by someth ing 
which he will reveal. 
And Arthur, who acts as the mirror, attempts to understand the hate and 
sadism of the crucifixion, Waldo must close his mind to such thoughts for 
fear of the atrocities of his inner world. 
(88, 123) 
Arthur's truth begins to take shape in his old age. He suggests that love 
might help one forget the hate (he too gropes towards understanding Waldo's 
hate). Arthur's articulates his pain at his inability to help Waldo from 
being what he is . 
Waldo rejects Arthur's revelation as madness, it is too close to his 
denied, split off sense of himself. He must not give room to the thoughts 
of either himself or Arthur. 
(127) 
The poem integrates the split in the existence of the twins. Arthur's 
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truth takes shape in the words wh i ch Wa 1 do had appropr i ated and den ied 
Arthur (for fear of his words). The poem integrates the intuitive life of 
Arthur with a conscious understanding of the life of Waldo. 
Arthur writes of understanding Waldo's sadism, of the inevitability of pain 
in loving another. He sees the giving of the blood, in compassion for the 
other, as the sacr if i ce of love . It is the sacrif i ce he has made to 
Waldo, to offer himself for dissection, for Waldo to find life. 
The contact is too much. Wa 1 do cannot withstand the force of Arthur's 
integration. He must rid himself of the overload of emotion and thus must 
destroy, to empty himself of his inner experience. He burns his papers, 
and hence destroys his life . He ii his papers and his "moral purity" is 
taken to its logical conclusion. He must be purified. 
The fear of the touch of another's life has become embodied in his act of 
purification. The touch has been yearned for with such a desperate passion 
that it has become hated and dreaded to the point of terror. 
To overcome the terror Arthur must die. He must no longer 1 ive in Waldo, 
and Waldo dies in his desperation to destroy Arthur. 
(128, 129) 
5.3 . Waldo - relations to mother. 
Mother presents nothing of substance for Waldo to believe in. 
faith in another or the belief in the value of another. 
She has no 
She negates truth by the falsity of her attitudes and devalues the meaning 
and value of giving. 
She does not provide a mirror to experience, or to Waldo's experience of 
himself. She looks to Arthur to be the genius to fill the special place 
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which Waldo feels is his, the place which defines him - his intellectual 
genius. Mother does not give him a reflection of himself which he 
recognizes and he must know himself through and against Arthur. 
Life remains static and predictable - nothing happens. 
There is thus no truth, no other, no substance in which to believe. 
(24, 35, 50, 61) 
Waldo adapts to the barrier around his mother through imitation and 
adaptation to her needs. He seduces with his adaptation, both himself and 
the other, seducing with his words and his role, seducing himself out of 
himself for her sake. 
As a ch i ld his i dent ity is enmeshed with adaptat i on to mother I s needs, 
defining him as weak, sad, and feminine. 
He is also identified with her in her superiority and contempt towards 
others, and also in her fear of others. 
Mother is gratified by the sensuous and feminine in her sons, in their 
diminished masculinity which does not threaten her. 
(18, 19, 38, 56, 100, 101) 
Chi ldren are experienced as a burden . 
destroy her . 
(32) 
She does not want them and they 
Arthur had tried to share his pain at the still born hope of the family, at 
their disappointment in him (and Waldo and their lives) but mother is not 
comforted . 
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She does however look to Arthur to find something with which to be filled, 
and the child in Waldo trembles with the possibility that she will find what 
she seeks in Arthur, that he then too may be filled. But ne i ther he nor 
mother know what they are look i ng for and the need is too great, the 
desperation too strong. He falls back upon rationality . He is blinded by 
his rationality for his fear is too great . 
Mother becomes strong, is fi lled, through dad's weakness. No man is 
enough for her and she feeds on his weakness, identifying in him her own 
strength. 
(22, 37, 58, 103) 
Waldo longs for her touch, yet he knows that she cannot help or touch him 
where he most longs for her. She does not see him, or Arthur. She too 
fears her interior, her emotions. 
(75, 121) 
It is his fantasy that words wi 11 at last be unnecessary when he has his 
mother to himself - (when she has given him life, touched him, rather than 
given him words.) 
He cannot give space to mother's grief over dad's death, experiencing it as 
a cruel deprivation and abandonment. 
Waldo is jealous of his dad and wishes to catch his mother out in her 
"mistake", her love of dad . He longs to have her acknowledge / see him. 
(100, 101, 102, 112, 117) 
Even after dad's death, mother rema i ns out of reach, 1 inked to dad . 
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Waldo is envious and hates the bond between them. 
With dad's death Waldo attempts to take his father's place. 
He looks to mother to fill the spaces of his life with grandeur. She does 
not however live up to his illusions. 
of her mind. 
She is afraid of the dark interiors 
Waldo therefore continues to feed himself, filling his spaces with visions 
of splendid interiors which denies their dark, stagnant, hiddenness. 
He is unable to use the reality of his world to fill his spaces for external 
reality would impinge upon his boundedness and his reality, 
precariously held together. 
(121) 
which is 
Mother's interest in his book / his life is experienced as an indecent 
intrusion . Her inability to reflect and feed him, feeding rather herself 
on his life, results in love and intimacy being feared, and prematurely 
sexualized. 
(122) 
Du lc ie's 'reject i on' comes to embody the feared aspects of mother, the 
Goddess of a Thousand Breasts - incorporating, sucking in, incubating his 
life, (the blood lust). His experience is that he has not been loved for 
himself, but for what mother can possess, for what she can feed upon. 
(119 ) 
In the end however, he needs his mother to protect him from Arthur. 
Waldo takes refuge from Arthur behind grandiose images of his mother's 
superiority and his identification with her, the identificat ion concretized 
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in the colour of their eyes. 
The image of mother bolsters the projections of his own feelings of 
inferiority, while his merger with the mother image further denies the 
split-off and projected aspects given to Arthur. 
He denies her dying, and is not able to grieve. Instead he internalizes 
her image and she lives on, merged with him in grandeur. His devaluation 
and withdrawa 1 from others increases, wi th a consequent increase in his 
sensitivity to persecution . 
(89, 121) 
As an old man, Waldo becomes merged with mother in "ice", impenetrable, 
superior and unfeeling. 
By throwing off his clothes, he abandons his disguise and feels revealed in 
his true brilliance - not Waldo, but "Memory herself". 
with his image of the splendid and grand Great Mother . 
He becomes merged 
By seeing his boundedness he is able to be deluded as to the 'realness' of 
the "ice", the realness of his detached superiority. 
(126) 
5.4. Wa Ida - re lations to dad. 
Dad's clubbed foot is the psychosomatic container for his inability to be in 
the world. 
(37) 
As a child Waldo had looked to dad and the myths for hope, for a stability, 
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a reflection which fed, something not received from his mother. 
had rather consumed. 
(44, 46) 
Mother 
He imitated dad to protect himself from his fear of others and his own envy 
and hate. 
(68) 
He used dad's view of the wor 1 d as a framework to be, a framework wi th 
which to define his life, and to contain the chaos within. 
which mother had not been able to reflect. 
(44) 
The chaos 
Like his dad, Waldo seeks to hide from the world a blurred inner life and 
disillusionment. 
(48) 
In dad's philosophy, the 'gods' are images removed from interaction with 
the living. They offer no hope, compassion or comfort. To struggle and 
strive is to be reduced, there is no meaning to striving or engaging in 
one's life because there is nothing in which to believe. Nothing is only 
nothing. 
(44, 46) 
But dad fails him. Fails him through his lack of substance . Dad is unable 
to believe the image of himself which he created, he is therefore unable to 
offer Waldo a substance in which to believe himself. 
contemptuous and hateful. 
(48, 79) 
Wa 1 do becomes 
In his parents Waldo sees a death embodied in the meaninglessness of their 
149 
lives and their fear to love. 
(54) 
Waldo is failed by not having a special place with dad. He was unable to 
meet Waldo's childhood attempts at creativity and omnipotence without 
ambivalence and defensiveness. 
(55) 
Dad loved Arthur and had fantasy images of Arthur's beauty and strength, 
images which saved him from being a spectator to life. 
(43, 46, 47) 
Waldo cannot save for he is too like dad. 
Arthur is the hope, the 'god', but dad cannot forgive Arthur his 
humanness. 
(48) 
As a youth Waldo wished to make amends to dad for not being what dad needed, 
and for not being Arthur. 
Dad's pain however pulls Waldo in, he becomes identified with the 
crippling, loses his already fragile sense of self and must withdraw. He 
becomes a watcher, 1 ike his father, to 1 ife. 
(49) 
Waldo is confronted with dad's defeat by life. He cannot turn to mother for 
she feeds off him, 
requires his blood. 
(82) 
she requires his pain to give life to hers - she 
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Dad and mother form a un i t wh i ch exc 1 udes Wa 1 do, and he on ly has Arthur 
left . 
He hates the 'strength' which mother sees in dad, he sees it as weakness. 
(79) 
Waldo despairs that he will ever be touched in the place most aching to be 
touched. 
He watches the helplessness of his parents to bel ieve and defend their 
child, to know the truth of Arthur and himself. 
Dad appears to never recover from the shock of having his image of Arthur 
shattered. Dad is unable to withstand the force of other's opinion - it 
shows Waldo how the thoughts of others can destroy. 
Dad shows Waldo how fearful emotions can be, when he fears his own son 
(Arthur). 
(75, 76, 80) 
At the death of his dad, grief calls out, against Waldo's will, the 
little boy within him . He is terrified that he will be rejected, 
humiliated, shamed by the pain of the grieving child. He is afraid that 
he will be possessed by the child within. Containment and compassion have 
not been his experi ence and he fears that he wi 11 be overwhe lmed by an 
archaic world . 
(99) 
(He looks to his manly wrists to remind himself of his shape, of who he 
is . ) 
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5.5. Waldo - relations to others. 
Wa 1 do projects his 'badness' onto others and the wor 1 d, wh i ch is then 
devalued and experienced as devoid of beauty and value. It is peopled by 
small, mean, contemptuous, ordinary people who are feared for their 
persecutory natures. 
(29, 67, 68, 89, 91) 
Inf 1 at i on and deva 1 uat i on of the other is cont i ngent upon the degree to 
which Waldo feels himself seen or reflected positively. 
(95, 111) 
Wa 1 do is both attracted and repu 1 sed by the sensua 1 i ty of others, yet he 
is a watcher, 
of his desire, 
a voyeur to life. He experiences guilt (shame) as a result 
with a resultant devaluation (crushing underfoot) of the 
other, the only way he has of relieving his emotions. 
(19, 20, 49) 
There is a strongly denied sexuality, with a displaced, 
homosexual interest, with faint sado-masochistic elements. 
(20, 68, 92, 116, 121) 
unconscious 
The offered intimacy and interest of others in his life is experienced as a 
frightening impingement, which acquires a sexual overtone. 
It is experienced as indecent, a rape of his being. 
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The thwarted desire for love results in a premature sexual ization, which 
acts as a defense against the chaos and confusion of his unreflected world . 
Unable to be alone, separate, Waldo seeks security through identificat ion 
with the primary rapist, his mother. 
(122, 126) 
Waldo, as an adolescent, was aware that but for the people he created he 
would be lost. He is confused by the world and the vicissitudes of people, 
and they remain unknown to him. 
As a youngster, Waldo was envious of the richness of the thoughts of 
others, while he felt empty. 
He wi 11 not allow others to fi 11 him, 
possessed by the other. 
feed him, for he fears being 
His solution is sought in passivity, time will reveal the truth of his 
life . There is passive avoidance to his life . 
(l09. 110) 
He is envious of the contained lives of others . 'Contained' implying 
fullness, substance and a sense of being, all of which Waldo lacks. 
Waldo therefor hates others for having what he envies and does not have. 
(33) 
He is only able to see the other as a mirror to himself . 
(116 ) 
The value of differences is denied, 
relations. 
as are the confusions of human 
Wa 1 do cannot see the other, 
existence, their separateness, 
for to see the other acknowledges their 
their Eomplexity and the void between 
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himself and the other. A void which is not able to be filled by 
understanding, Waldo is unable to symbolize his world . 
place of his mind. 
It ~ the fearful 
He must therefore control both his feel ings and others, for fear of the 
dangerous consequences of his fear and hate, for fear of fragmenting. 
(112 ) 
In the quest for understanding, Mrs Musto introduces the possibil ity of 
God. She is the first to articulate that one can live in the flesh, and 
not feed off the flesh. Her hope is that life and fulfilment (feeding) are 
ideals to be embraced. 
Arthur is open to cons i der the possibilities - God is a "rock crystal", 
something which always is . 
Waldo remains caught in identification with his mother, in the ideals of 
intellectual purity and spiritual abstinence, in emptiness as a defense 
against the fear of the confusion of an emotional life. 
(108) 
Arthur. 
(Units 1 to 69) . 
"It is never far enough, my shadow is always 
out there striding ahead of me . " 
5. 6. Arthur - relations to self. 
Arthur's memories date back far earlier than Wa l do. 
merger wi th oceanic, expansive symbols . 
(2) 
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They are memories of 
Arthur experi ences his wor ld through be i ng submerged in the exper ience, 
through a sense of being undifferentiated from the object. 
(7) 
He becomes flooded with the moment (as opposed to Waldo's constriction), 
and has a sense of the gods - life and beauty. (10) 
In his merger, absorption, Arthur is able to deny a personal hurt for his 
experience always involves the other, the feeling with, or for the other. 
(23, 51) 
In music Arthur merges with an oceanic experience of beauty and pain, but 
he is unable to give the experience structure. 
Hearing, seeing, and feeling overlap in the experience. 
(12, 35) 
There is a sensuous delight and curiosity in his world and others, which 
becomes c ircumscri bed through mother's fear . She fears his exh i bition i sm 
and wi shes to grasp the sun (h i s omn ipotence) . She, and therefore he, 
fear that he may 'fall' and be lost for ever - she would lose him to 
'knowing', to consciousness . 
(2, 6) 
There always remains a wish to understand, and be understood by his world. 
(2, 13) 
The icebergs in the sea of the unconscious speak of the danger of the frozen 
spaces - the spaces without warmth and feeling. Arthur inflates the 
twinship as protection against danger, giving added importance to the bond 
with Waldo . 
(11 ) 
(The danger of the ice lies in the denial of emotion, in the death of 
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passion, the death which takes his father and the fear of which kills 
Waldo.) 
Arthur does not fear the emotional, instinctual life, yet he is unable to 
articulate and integrate the vicissitudes and complexities of life. He 
becomes 'stupid' without the words, without the consciousness. 
(12, 20) 
It is in the logic of numbers that Arthur can express his understanding 
without the confounding of the complexity of life. 
(34) 
Arthur finds the dance of the mandala a mode of expression which allows him 
to communicate his understanding and emotional identification with the 
significant others in his life. 
The release and articulation of the dance is never again repeated for it 
requires a state of merger and union with another and nature, which is 
never again available to Arthur. 
The struggle to emerge from the unconscious is too great. 
(35, 49) 
As an older man he no longer fears falling, for he has attained a sense of 
being beyond merely his body. 
Arthur's inner world is peopled by alive, loving others, and he is able to 
grieve their loss, while retaining them in his inner world. 
(22, 44) 
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Arthur has a sense of himself as being different, "abnormal", yet he is 
able to accept his difference, and look to others to do likewise. 
(24) 
Arthur has a belief in his "permanencies " - the meanings within the marbles. 
(45) 
Arthur is without words, without consciousness to articulate and make 
external the reality of his world. 
Waldo has the words, while Arthur is left inarticulate. 
(27) 
He experiences it as too difficult, and himself as too lazy. 
(20) 
Arthur is without the anger to move him from the unconscious. He needs 
anger to fight the pull of the unconscious and to find the words to define 
himself as separate and distinct - as integrated. Without the wish to 
fight for his ex i stence, Arthur is lost to merger, wi thout defi nit i ve 
boundaries. 
(12, 15, 23) 
Arthur can on 1 y know h imse lf through the need of the other, the ir need 
defines his boundaries. 
gu i It. 
(27, 28, 29) 
Waldo's need defines him, defines him in his 
Hence the search for the other who will make whole, who does not need, who 
can give to him in order that he may make Waldo and himself whole, 
integrated - his search for the totality of the mandala. 
(45) 
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The mandala which will heal the split within his nature - will bring order 
to the chaos which he cannot articulate. 
Arthur's marbles symbolizes his understanding of himself as understandings 
within understandings, being within being. 
(25) 
Waldo is unable to help, and Arthur eventually looks to what is Waldo's to 
find the wholeness - he looks to books . 
(38) 
He feels inferior and foolish in comparison to his articulate family. 
He fears their ridicule and lack of understanding . Rather than acknowledge 
the deprivation to his life from their limitations, 
himself . 
(20) 
Arthur devalues 
He is afra i d of scorn of his marb les. The other has the power to destroy 
his "permanencies", by showi ng the hatefu 1 ness of thei r natures, by 
destroying what he sees and believes in. 
(37) 
Arthur feels identified with women. 
(21) 
He experiences need as an expression of love, and he looks to women and 
their need of him to fulfil his need for love. 
This quest is an attempt to find that the mother is still whole, and his 
attempts to make reparation to her. 
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(53, 56) 
There is a denial of hurt, and of a need for Waldo to help him be in the 
world. 
Arthur denies his own frailty. 
Arthur's experience is only open to being needed by the other. He is not 
open to his own need of the other, except for a need for mother to need 
him . 
Arthur is unaware of his need. In his perception, his need is an 
aggressiveness, an aggressiveness which he can withdraw. It is the denied 
demanding quality of his need which gives it the experiential quality of 
aggression. 
Arthur denies his need for fear that he will destroy or be destroyed by the 
other, thus he makes reparation/pacification through feeding , literally 
and symbolically, the other. 
(31, 32, 41, 43, 45, 51, 64) 
Arthur gives his life to Waldo, in guilt for his inability to find the 
wholeness which they lack, in his inability to give meaning and fullness to 
Wa I do. In the end he comes to fee I that he depri ved Wa I do of who I eness 
through being his twin - through taking away from Waldo . 
(67, 68 , 69) 
Arthur will submit to the will of Waldo, become whatever Waldo wishes, be 
it female, stupid, inarticulate, in an effort to make reparation, or to 
pacify. 
(33, 62) 
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Arthur is strongly identified with the suffering of the other . (Like Waldo, 
he is gu i lty for the sufferi ng of the other. Yet un 1 ike Wa 1 do, he does 
not close his mind to his guilt.) He seeks to make reparation through his 
redemptive blood, sacrificing himself for others. The extent of his 
unconsc i ous gu i It is so great that he becomes grand i ose ly i dent ifi ed with 
Christ. 
(29, 48, 50, 57, 63, 64, 68, 69) 
(Thus while Waldo is responsible for the atrocities of the world, Arthur is 
responsible for making reparation. They have so destroyed the mother that 
their existence becomes irrevocably split, with Waldo immobilized by the 
fear of his destroying hate, and Arthur consumed by his guilt.) 
Even with the death of mother, Arthur must continue his responsibility to 
others, and he transfers it to his other love, Dulcie. He continues to 
save the mother from his attempts to separate, to attain consciousness, 
which he experiences as his destruction. 
(56) 
Later in life, spirituality attains an importance and fragility which Arthur 
tr ies to share wi th Wa 1 do, feari ng his reject ion. Arthur's who 1 eness is 
i nextr i cab ly entwi ned wi th Wa ldo . If Wa 1 do cou ld be made who le, Arthur 
would no longer be guilty. 
(58) 
He is most guilty in the poem. There he reveals his own pain and despair, 
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in his bleeding for/from Waldo's dissection of life. His guilt is such 
that he assumes responsibility for Waldo's hate, he is to blame for the 
shame and hate of the other, for he is the cause. (A grandiose 
compensation for the emptiness and inability to find meaning to their 
lives.) 
(67, 68, 69) 
5.7. Arthur - relations to Waldo. 
Arthur holds the symbolic images of the mother. Waldo is only able to 
appropriate them towards the end of his life, when he merges for the first 
time in a symbolic act with his mother. 
(Arthur has kept the life of the mother image to himself and Waldo becomes 
encased in enmeshment with the icy deadness of the empty great mother 
image. ) 
(1, 68, 69) 
Arthur has held mother to himself (has taken life away from Waldo), and 
even at her death, he and Wa 1 do cant inue to consp i re to keep mother away 
from Waldo. Arthur 'protects' Waldo from their mother's death, he also 
di storts the express ion of his love to make it more acceptab 1 e to Wa ldo. 
The result is that Waldo is left without a true reflection of the world and 
the substance of the people around him. 
In the end Arthur's poem reveals to Waldo the nature of their relationship, 
and the integration results in Waldo's act of self destruction. 
(56, 57, 68, 69) 
Arthur is aware that Waldo lacks an experience of inner richness, and yet 
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Arthur needs Waldo to give form to the expansiveness of his own experience. 
(10 ) 
Waldo has always been left to word their experience. 
(12) 
As they develop Waldo withdraws through fear of the emotions which Arthur 
requires him to word. 
Wa 1 do distorts the ir experi ence, and blocks the path of knowi ng to both 
himself and Arthur 
(14, 27) 
While Waldo pulls back from his task of wording the unconscious, Arthur 
continues to strive to keep Waldo 'alive'. He is the only one to be able 
to "jerk" open Waldo's 'closedness', who is able to see beyond Waldo's 
facade. 
(14, 26, 40) 
At the times when Waldo mergers with Arthur (in the symbolic time of night) 
Arthur is needed (loved) and he is able to feel that his understanding gives 
light. Waldo's darkness has been overcome. Arthur's giving gives love, 
(life) to Waldo. 
(26) 
Wa ldo destroys their union, he cannot accept Arthur's understanding, for 
then he is confronted by his own need and emotions. 
Thus Waldo continues to fight the intuitive femaleness of Arthur, his 
love of Arthur. Waldo fights integration. 
Arthur's quest is to find wholeness with Waldo who is the complement to 
their wholeness. 
(27,35) 
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It ish i s need to be understood and to understand, while Waldo uses 
understanding to defend against understanding. 
Arthur acknowledges that they have not trusted the distinctness of each 
other, that they are flawed - abnormal and narcissistic. This 
understanding makes the maintenance of their relationship primary for 
Arthur. 
He cannot let Waldo go but continues to carry him 'inside himself' even 
after the betraya 1 at the 1 i brary. Th i s speaks of Arthur's sense of 
incompleteness, his need of Waldo to give this completeness. 
(13, 15, 59) 
Arthur believes in the 'realness' of people, he keeps their realness before 
Waldo. 
Arthur's belief grounds him to some degree in the world, while Waldo defends 
himself from others through grandiose illusions of his worth . 
Arthur's absorption and seeing into the lives of others, gives him a 
perspect i ve of Wa 1 do's flawed or knotted depths. He understands, but 
cannot articulate Waldo's central convolution of self feeding and self love. 
(14, 18, 22, 44) 
While Arthur has not been open to an experience of anger (due to his guilt), 
it is Waldo who carries the anger. 
Waldo becomes the victim of his anger, for it exists without the 
conta i nment of compass i on. Wh i 1 e Arthur 'absorbs' and rema i ns 'permeab le' , 
Waldo becomes brittle and rigid with the burden of consciousness . 
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( 12) 
Arthur's attempts to define a world without Waldo are self sabotaged. 
Others are experienced as irritated with him, and the image of Waldo's need 
calls him back to being for others. 
(40, 60) 
Arthur denies the destructiveness of Waldo towards himself . Rather he 
retains an inflated image of Waldo, denying the hate, for fear of losing 
what he experiences as "more than half of him". 
(Arthur fears he would die without Waldo.) 
Arthur is unaware of Wa 1 do's experi ence of bei ng possessed and that he 
shri ve 1 s through the dep 1 et i on of the hate and the need to defend aga i nst 
the impingements of Arthur. 
(51, 66) 
Arthur cannot take for h imse lf, thus he is on ly ab 1 e to need hea 1 i ng and 
understanding in the context of the need of the other . There is a total 
denial of the solidity and substance of his being, of his own personal 
need, denied in the interests of Waldo. 
Any experience for himself gives rise to guilt. 
(3, 10, 26, 29, 30, 33, 38, 40) 
Arthur finds meaning and shape to his life in being for Waldo, allowing 
Wa 1 do his grandeur. He 1 ives through Waldo, and is unable to have a 
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separated, ind i viduated existence. 
(27,28) 
Arthur assumes the guilt for Waldo's hate . 
He has a sense of himself as the "getter of pain" . 
(68) 
Arthur is left feeling guilty for being alive, that his having life is the 
cause of Waldo's death. 
Waldo has died through hate of him, thus he should not have lived. 
He has murdered Waldo . 
(69) 
5.B. Arthur - relations to mother. 
Arthur ass imi 1 ates the fragments of the mother image, 
glass. 
(1 ) 
the s p 1 inters of 
Arthur had loved mother from the start, and did not, l ike Waldo, turn to 
dad for protection or identification, as Waldo had. 
(4) 
He remains merged with the feminine. 
(15, 21, 32, 35) 
He feels that he is able to understand women. 
Yet the vastness of the mother image eludes him . He has not experienced 
the "generosity" of the breast, yet he is identif ied with the giving of the 
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breast. The loss of mother's breast evokes a horror and fear that she 
would not survive the severing by the knife. He is the breast to Waldo, 
and only the knife could severe them. 
the loss. 
He fears that he would not survive 
Mrs Pou Her offers Arthur the image of the feed i ng, g i vi ng, great mother, 
the loss of which devastates Arthur. 
(2,21,47,48) 
Arthur experiences mother as only half present to him, she does not see him 
for what he is. There are grandiose attempts to r eveal his genius where 
she distorts his potent i a 1 by attempt i ng to impose upon him her image, 
through music and the "rites" of the hearth. 
(6 ) 
Mother keeps Arthur tied to her through reifying their union in the rites of 
the hearth. Arthur becomes immersed in intuitive knowing. 
She is fearful of Arthur's exhibitionism, as she is of her own, there is a 
fear of showing. She is also fearful of Arthur's quest for knowledge, she 
attempts to keep him orientated to the home. 
(She had attempted to do the same to sickly Waldo, yet he had temporarily 
broken free by turning to dad. ) 
(2, 15, 35) 
Mother keeps Arthur merged, blocking his search to understand people. 
Arthur adapts and "gags" on the words he cannot find to express that which 
he knows. 
(15, 16) 
Arthur seeks the merger of the "vocation" of the hearth, for it offers him 
a sense of the completeness of the mandala, a closed circle with mother. 
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Their closed circle excludes Waldo. 
(35) 
Mother is not able to help him articulate the experiences to which he is 
open. 
(2, 6) 
She is disappointed in her life and harassed by the burdens of the twins, 
and her own thoughts. 
(Her family of origin feed off the notion of her troubles. 
the brutality and hypocrisy of the family.) 
(8, 9, 15, 16) 
She is aware of 
Arthur's family live in their thoughts, which are kept hidden and secret. 
Both mother and dad 1 i ve in the i r inner wor 1 ds, where mother eventua lly 
only looks to Arthur to find the image of another - dad, someone to believe 
in (to be fed by). 
(4, 31, 54) 
Mother denies her needs, but there is a sadism in her denial, a cruelty to 
her sons. 
Arthur suffers from her withdrawal into herself. He longs to be needed 
(loved) by her, but she does not need (love) him, except when dad dies. 
Arthur seeks the need (love) of others, giving that which he most needs 
himself - unconditional love . 
(53, 55) 
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Arthur ' s attempts to break away from mother are accompanied with fear of 
reprisals. He remains fearful of the power of the mother image. 
In his efforts to break away, he becomes destructive of the mother image, 
appropri ating the space of the feeding mother - Mrs Poulter. 
(60) 
5.9. Arthur - relations to dad. 
Arthur is identified with the feminine, which is devalued by dad . 
(21) 
Dad devalues his interest in the myths and the spiritual, denying the quest 
for knowledge in Arthur. 
Dad is unable to accept the intellectual 'flaw' in his son, and unable to 
see his substance. 
(18, 19) 
Arthur absorbs dad's rejection, dad becomes peripheral to his life. 
There is a denial of the hurt involved. He turns instead to women to fill 
the space, yet is only filled by men who can provide a substance which was 
not prov ided by his father. 
(20, 45, 47) 
Arthur has an unconscious sense of his father taking away his sight for fear 
of the truth of life, dad's fear of life . 
(20) 
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5.10. Arthur - re lations to others. 
Arthur cannot be for himself, his distress is experienced with and for the 
other. It is not a personal, encapsulated, experience. 
He has the ability to be merged with the other to the extent of living the 
life of the other, be that Waldo or music. 
(3, 17, 29, 32, 42) 
Arthur's own life is denied in the quest to be strong for others. 
He feels that he cannot be frail for the family is immobilized by its 
frailty and fear. 
(31 ) 
The family is experienced as needing him, mother unable to be in the world, 
Waldo bound by his thoughts, and dad afraid to love. 
(30, 31, 41) 
Arthur becomes silenced by the others, and he complies for his need is to 
be needed. Thus he cannot find the words to speak about God, crue lty, 
love, hate, - about life. 
(16) 
Arthur co 11 ects peop le, seek i ng his knowing through the other, but ina 
lived, involved way. Waldo collects words, but he in not involved. 
(17) 
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While Arthur feels he understands women, it is to men that he looks for the 
I d i st i nct I shape, for what is "truest". Mr Saporta and Mr A llwri ght are 
the two he finds, two father figures who are strong and do not require 
Arthur to look after them. They provide something for Arthur to believe 
in. 
(9) 
Mr Allwright introduces the concept of God, and the value of belief. He 
is able to show Arthur that one may love and believe and still be a distinct 
person. 
Significantly, Hera, who devotes herself, like Arthur, to others is not 
felt to be distinct. 
(22) 
The rest of the world, like Arthur himself, is experienced as fluctuating 
and dividing before his eyes. 
Arthur seeks the merger to gain a sense of shape and stability. In the 
merger, however, identity is confused and Arthur cannot be, for there are 
no boundaries to define him and his substance becomes for the other. 
(45) 
There is a truncated Christ image in Arthur sacrificing his life, in the 
hope of finding meaning, integration, for . the family, in the hope of 
making others whole (and hence himself). 
(29) (50, 57, 48, 54, 58, 59) 
Arthur experiences the fami ly as needing a sacrifice to be saved. He 
understands them as needing the blood of life, of passion to be spilt for 
them to be redeemed, to be brought to life. He must sacrifice his life to 
atone and make amends . (53). 
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5.11. Hermeneutic description. 
Mother. 
Mother gives her children nothing to believe in. She is disappointed in 
her own I ife and burdened by motherhood. In her attitude to others she 
adopts a superi or, contemptuous att itude, not hav i ng a sense of thei r 
substance and value. She is afraid of others, as she is afraid of her own 
dark interior. Physical proximity speaks of persecution. Life is held as 
a static, predictable experience to protect against the fear of the 
intrusion of others. 
There is a barrier around her which leads others to see her as aloof and 
cold . This belies an inner life of passionate resentment and suspicion of 
others. She is fearful of her own inner I ife, her "dark interiors", her 
exhibitionism and grandiosity. There is an experience of a withholding, 
rather than a generous breast. She I ives in her thoughts which are kept 
hidden from the children, engendering a sense of estrangement and confusion 
about themse I ves and others. The ch i I dren suffer from her wi thdrawa I, 
longing for her touch . But she neither sees them nor needs them, denying 
her needs in a sadistic way. The children adapt, in their own ways, to 
her needs, fulfi 11 ing her images, knowing that they are other than what 
she sees. They remain unsure , seeking assurance of who they are through 
their concrete reflections in mirrors and plate glass, through each other 
and through others. Mother rema i ns wi thdrawn from contact, despite the ir 
adaptations, even after the death of her husband. 
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Arthur's exhibitionism and curiosity are truncated and he adapts to her 
image of him through imitation, merged with her in the "rites of the 
hearth". In this context he experiences a sense of fulfilment with her in 
a "closed circle". Outside of this she is experienced as only half present 
to him, imposing grandiose visions of revealing his genius. She keeps him 
tied to her through reifying their union. 
She is fearfu 1 of his quest for knowledge, wh i ch leads her to block hi s 
curiosity and thirst for knowledge, except within the prescriptions of her 
domain - the intuitive, and feminine. He seeks merger with her for it 
offers the completeness he is unable to find and which he seeks . 
Mother is afraid of masculinity and emasculates her husband and sons. She 
becomes stronger as the men become more weak and unable to be in the world. 
She will not allow space for Waldo to attempt to be a man. 
She is gratified by the sensuous and feminine in her sons, encouraging them 
in this direction . She is not, however, able to provide a mirror to 
their experience when they search for knowledge, seeking to use their 
inte 11 ect. 
Wa 1 do adapts, a 1 so through imitat ion, but of the att i tudes and postures 
which mother finds socially acceptable, and which will gain him recognition 
from her. The words he uses to define his sense of himself become 
progress ively more devoid of hope and life. 
Mother and father are experienced as formi ng a un i t wh i ch prec 1 udes the 
sons. Waldo experiences jealousy and feels thwarted in his attempts to gain 
the mother's love, feeling envy and hate for their bond. The intensity of 
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hi s unmet need for her love is such that he exper iences her gri ef of 
father's death as a cruel deprivation, which evokes sadistic impulses . 
After father's death he attempts to take the father's place, but mother 
remains unable to feed him, not even with illusionary images of grandeur. 
She comes to be fearad as the incorporating Goddess of a Thousand Breasts 
and Waldo comes to the awareness that he has not been loved for himself but 
for what mother can possess of him . He comes to fear love and intimacy, 
fearing the incorporating, devouring mother. Her interest in him is 
experienced as "indecent ", the suppressed nature of his sexuality becoming 
apparent in his devaluation of others and his fear of their penetration. 
Waldo experiences her as timeless and indestructible, yet without her 
husband she begins to deteriorate, subsiding into drink and her memor ies. 
She is however afraid of the dark interiors of her mind . The faint glimpse 
which she has of failing her sons is repressed. 
Arthur's attempt to separate from her image after her death, to integrate a 
conscious knowledge with his intuitive knowing are accompanied by fears of 
reprisals and fail . In Wa l do's attempts to deal with the long ing and pain 
of unfulfilled reflection, identification with a grandiose mother image 
becomes rigid . He becomes merged with her in her coldness and super iority 
in an image of "ice" . 
Dad. 
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Father is afraid of the vicissitudes of the world. He is afraid of 
'living' knowledge and attempts to maintain a stability through immersing 
himself in the 'purity' of the Classics. He is unable to take his place in 
the wor 1 d, yet he becomes crushed by a 1 ongi ng for 1 ife, for love, for a 
future, to such an extent that he cannot breathe. He dies defeated by his 
longing and the world. 
Waldo had looked to him to discover how to be a man, to discover how to not 
be afraid, and for something, someone to believe in. He imitated and 
accepted his father's framework of how to be in the world. Like his 
father, Waldo used duty, habit and the classical ideals to hide his 
blurred inner world and the longings within. Waldo's cultivated image, 
based upon his internalization of father's va l ues, also served to hide the 
fear he experienced in relation to others. 
Father fails his sons . He is defeated by life and lacks a substance which 
allows him to believe in himse l f and in others. 
and blocks the boys' quest for knowledge, 
He fears the truth of life 
devaluing the struggle, 
devaluing the substance of truth, defeated by his fear and disappointment 
in life. 
Waldo's compassion for his father is thwarted by his merger with his 
father's pain. He becomes identified with the crippling, and becomes 
fearful, feeling contempt and hate for that which he fears. He becomes a 
watcher to l ife, like his father. 
The masculine shape which Waldo cultivates becomes brittle and rigid, unfed 
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by the touch and love of either mother or father. They form a unit which 
excludes the sons, valuing as strong attributes which impotize them in the 
world. In their fear of others and the world, there is devaluation of 
others and a grandiose inflation of themselves which keeps them separate and 
isolated from others in their superiority over the common struggle of 
mankind. 
Father, 1 ike mother, looked to be fed by the 1 ife of Arthur, to be saved 
from remaining a spectator to life. But father becomes afraid of the 
vicissitudes of the emotions Arthur brings to life for the family. He 
fears their irrationality, their lack of purity, their blood. 
Arthur. 
Emergence of the split. 
Arthur experienced a sensuous delight and curiosity about the world. 
Mother however fears that she wi 11 loose him to 'knowing', and Arthur too 
becomes afraid of "falling", he becomes afraid of the danger of the frozen 
spaces. He inflates the twinship as protection against the danger. He 
feels safe with a twin and leaves the articulation and understanding to 
Waldo. Arthur remains linked to the emotional and instinctual life and 
finds himself not angry enough to find the words to articulate and integrate 
the vicissitudes and complexities of 1 ife. In his adaptation and 
compliance with mother's needs, he "gags" himself, becomes 'stupid' 
without words, without a sense of completeness. 
He is aware that Waldo lacks an inner richness and he attempts to share his 
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own inner life but he becomes too submerged in the experience . He needs 
Waldo to give form to the expansiveness of his own experience. Waldo is 
left to articulate their experience. 
Arthur finds words too difficult, he experiences himself as too lazy. He 
is not angry enough. The complexity of life comes to be experienced as too 
confusing. This confusion is in contrast to the ease of his understanding 
of mathematics. Here he is able to express his understanding without being 
confounded by the complexities of life. 
Without words, Arthur finds meaning and shape to his life through Waldo, 
and he becomes unable to have a separate existence. 
He denies the hate and destructiveness of Waldo and clings to the twinship 
and Wa 1 do, a 11 owi ng Wa 1 do his grandeur . He fears to loose "more than 
half of him". 
With the deve 1 opment of the twi ns, Wa 1 do withdraws, through fear of the 
emotions which Arthur requires him to verbalise. Waldo distorts and blocks 
the path of knowing and uses understanding to defend against understanding . 
It remains Arthur's need to understand and to be understood. 
Merger. 
Arthur holds the symbolic images of the mother, 
of merging with oceanic, expansive symbols. 
submerged and und ifferent i ated from the object. 
his earliest memories are 
His experiences are 
He is flooded with the 
moment and experiences what he terms a sense of the gods. 
In music he merges with an oceanic experience of beauty and pain, but is 
unab le to give the experi ence structure . 
overlap in the experience . 
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Hearing , seeing and feeling 
Understand i ng is given to him through mergi ng with another and he knows 
himself through the need of the other. They define his boundaries. 
He is identified with women and their need of him fulfils his need for love. 
It is through this love that he is able to dance his understanding of the 
significant people in his life. Arthur's sense is that he is without the 
anger to move him toward words, i.e. toward understanding and separation. 
Sense of se lf . 
Arthur has an understanding of himself as "abnormal". He feels inferior and 
foolish in comparison to his articulate family. He fears their ridicule 
and lack of understanding and their scorn of his marbles (understanding). 
He fears their power to destroy his understand i ng (through all owi ng the 
suppressed hate of their natures to become manifest?). 
He knows that he and Waldo are flawed - "abnormal and narcissistic". 
Arthur understands that even though they have not trusted the "distinctness" 
of each other, they have needed each other. He cont inues to carry Wa 1 do 
"inside himself", despite Waldo's betrayal in the library. He has the 
understanding that he needs Waldo to give him completeness, thus he keeps 
Waldo 'alive', feeling that he is the only one able to "jerk" open Waldo's 
closedness. 
His inner world is peopled with alive, loving others, the loss of whom he 
is able to grieve while still retaining them in his inner world. As an 
older man he no longer fears fa 11 ing for he has a sense of be i ng beyond 
merely his body. His dance communicates this sense. 
Denial. 
Arthur denies a personal hurt and his own frailty . His need is to be for 
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the other, thus he is able to deny a personal hurt due to his involvement 
with the other, feeling either with or for the other. In being for 
others, there is a denial of his own needs and frailty, rather a belief in 
the need to be strong for his family. 
He does retain a need for his mother, in his desire for her to need him, a 
need she denies him. 
He experiences himself as aggressive, unaware that the power of his denied 
needs result in the quality of aggression being given to those moments when 
he does wish to be noticed and accepted. He cannot take for himself except 
in the context of the need of the other. There is a total denial of 
personal need, denied in the interests of Waldo. 
for himself gives rise to guilt. 
The quest. 
Any experience which is 
There remains for Arthur a wish to understand, his quest is to find a sense 
of wholeness to his being. He experiences himself as understandings within 
understandings, being within being. In this confusion he searches for the 
other who will give him understanding, a sense of totality, of wholeness, 
of himself . He searches for someone who does not need and in whom he can 
believe. 
In his quest he eventually looks to what is Waldo's to find the wholeness -
he looks to books (the symbolic). 
Spirituality attains an importance and fragility in his latter years. He 
tries to share this importance with Waldo, feeling it to be vitally 
important for them to find hope and love, but he fears Waldo's rejection. 
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Arthur's guilt. 
In his efforts to protect Waldo, 
image to himself. 
Arthur has kept the life of the mother 
He has been unaware of Waldo's experience of feeling possessed. He has 
been unaware too that Waldo shrivels through the depletion of the envy and 
hate he fee 1 s towards Arthur, and need to defend himself against the 
impingements of Arthur. 
Arthur gives his intellect and reason to Waldo in guilt for his inability to 
find wholeness. He feels that he has deprived Waldo of wholeness through 
being his twin. He assumes responsibility for Waldo's hate, believing 
that he is to blame for the shame and hate of others. 
He makes reparation/pacification through feeding the other (he makes 
reparation for Waldo's destruction?). 
In his efforts to make reparation (or to pacify?) he submits to the will of 
Waldo, becoming as Waldo wishes - female, stupid, and inarticulate. His 
reparation is an identification with the suffering of the other, 
grandiosely identified with the redemptive blood of Christ. 
He fee 1 s most gu i 1 ty in the poem, there he revea 1 s an inner pa in and 
despa ir, he has taken for h imse lf rather than be on ly for the other. He 
has bled for/from Waldo's dissection of life. He is guilty for being 
alive. His aliveness is the cause of Waldo's hate, it is the cause of 
Waldo's death, therefore he has murdered Waldo. 
Wi!. 7do. 
As children Waldo experienced a fusion of boundaries and emotional life with 
Arthur. He felt lost without Arthur. The femaleness of his brother acted 
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as a compliment which allowed a sensuous enjoyment, 
self and an ability to love himself through Arthur. 
a filled out sense of 
Alone with Arthur he 
was able to rest, to just sit and not think, to cease his vigilance and 
have a sense of 'just being'. 
With development he became afraid of emotion. He had a sense of not being 
loved or seen by his mother, but rather of be i ng possessed. He began to 
hide himself and to destroy his experience of life by rendering it 
meaningless, devaluing the other and adopting a grandiose view of himself. 
Concretization. 
Waldo's boundaries are concrete and fragile, he experiences a lack of a 
bounded sense of self, an experience of himself as existing. 
His boundaries are as concretely experienced as his clothing, a disguise 
which hides the real Waldo. His intactness (boundedness) is maintained by 
his skin and he fears others colliding with him. 
unyielding quality to his bodiliness. 
There is a britt le, 
Waldo had an experience of his hatefulness being revealed through his skin. 
He learnt to hide this sense from himself, and eventually to seduce 
himself into a denial, believing in the impression he created which adapted 
to the expectat ions of others (and hence his fee 1 ing that others have the 
power to possess him). 
Emotions 'puncture' him. The image which hides him, is also experienced 
as containing him. Emotions puncture this image for they reveal that which 
he attempts to hide, his emotions. He experiences shame whenever emotion 
is felt for in the "puncturing", he is "reduced". 
Waldo must maintain a vigilance due to the betrayal/revealing of himself 
which occurs through his voice and body . They contain a 1 ife unknown to 
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him, the sensuous 1 ife to which he has denied integrity. I nstead he 
misuses this 1 ife to seduce and impress both himself and the other into 
believing that he is that which he is not. 
In childhood the bank had offered a stability, it had provided a concretely 
experi enced permanence wh i ch gave to his 1 ife a sense of stab i 1 ity and 
worth. Waldo's stability remained tied to the 'stability' of his 
framework, and was easily deflated by any other who threatened to 'invade' 
his personal world. 
Mirrors and words are used to define his 'shape', it is his substance, his 
sense of existing which remains in question for Waldo. He is reassured by 
seeing himself. It fulfils a need for love and recognition without the 
other. 
The manuscripts embody his existence and his grandiosity, 
something which he can believe in i.e. that he exists. 
they provide 
He experiences his feeling states through objects. While he is able to 
maintain some contact with an emotional life and still denying any personal 
involvement, this concretization results in a fear and sense of emptiness. 
He cannot experience anything as 'potential', he is unable to symbolize and 
the world is experienced as either good or bad. 
He despairs that even the possibility of death fails to give meaning and 
~xcite passion to his life. He despairs at not having a known sense of his 
existence and he remains unconvinced of his realness. 
Fantasies. 
Waldo's childhood fantasies consisted of murderous intent. They reflected 
his own sadistic impulses and fears of persecutory retaliation. There is 
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a terror of loosing his blood, of being destroyed by the other and of his 
mother being unable to help. There is also a terror of spilling blood with 
his murderous rage and a consequent felt gui lt for the atrocities of the 
war. 
Confusion. 
Waldo experiences his anger and hate turned inward and suffers from 
depression. There is a sense of a confused, blurred inner and external 
world and he is envious of the stability of Arthur and others who live in 
their contained homes. Confusion is experienced as persecutory. 
To avoid confusion he clings to the dogma of his father's framework. While 
the framework maintains a rigid stability, the sterility engenders a 
pervasive sense of barrenness and emptiness. Similarly the moral 
superiority of his cultivated image saves him from the overwhelming 
confusion which threatens but it also leaves him feeling empty. 
Empt iness acts as a defense aga i nst the confus i on of the un integrated 
aspects of his life. Feeling 'empty' he is able to deny his 'badness' and 
block the integration of the split poles of his existence . 
His fear of nothingness is a denial of his passionate, desperate inner life 
of which he is terrified. 
There is a fear of fragmenting with the confusion. He experiences 
fragmentation when confronted by an outer reality which undermines hi s own 
rigidly maintained reality. 
He cannot allow the image or the soul of poetry to speak. The ambiguity 
and multiplicity of imagination induces a fear of confusion and he rigidly 
maintains the reality of his world and is not open to the vicissitudes of 
the other . He is left with a sense of emptiness and no sense of a distinct 
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real ity. 
Persecution . 
Waldo fears punishment and rejection for wanting and feeling. 
In his fear of persecut ion he cannot thrive on what he is fed for he is 
unable to digest and incorporate, fearing the impingement of the other. He 
experi ences his hunger as a greed for wh i ch he wi 11 be pun i shed. Thus he 
feeds on himself and develops personal detachment to the point of religion. 
He cannot love the other for fear of their power to possess them. 
He is able to understand the other only from the perspective of his own 
life, from a perspective which does not threaten the stability and validity 
of his beliefs. Thus he is unable to enter into the life of the other, 
for their needs and beliefs act as impingement upon his brittle, fragile 
boundaries. They have the power to possess him for they are able to 
penetrate his fragile boundaries. Others do not exist as living others for 
Waldo, he must deprive them of life for fear of his own life being 
devoured . Hence he is not ab le to maintain living internal others for fear 
that they wi ll consume his life. 
He is not able to be spontaneous or enthralled by the other, experienc ing 
playas debilitating and not to be trusted . He must remain vigilant and 
cannot allow his attention to be diverted. Any experience which he cannot 
control leaves him vulnerable to attack thus he cannot allow himself to be 
' free I. 
He must maintain a paradox, for he must appear not to struggle and yet must 
maintain a constant struggle against attack . There is a belief that he 
would be reduced were he to strugg le, for ultimately "nothing is nothing", 
and yet he struggles to write his life . He must attempt the writing 
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without revealing himself to himself or the other, thus he cannot draw on 
his substance, only his' shape'. 
Fear and hate of Arthur. 
Arthur's presence is experienced as an impingement which threatens to reveal 
Wa I do's innermost core and expose the den ied aspects of his life. Arthur 
thus becomes feared as a persecutor . He fears that Arthur will destroy him 
by something which he will reveal. 
Arthur's anger is revealing and Waldo experiences it as shameful. In the 
same vein he must reject the poetry and sensuality of Arthur and will not 
allow him to speak. Wa I do den i es re Ii ance on Arthur and deva I ues the 
femaleness of Arthur as helplessness. 
As words def i ne Wa I do, Arthur's use of words is ex per i enced as an 
impingement which spoils. Arthur's sensuality and words become a threat 
to his boundaries. 
Wa I do is envi ous of Arthur's first-born status, of his hea lth, and that he 
fills a special place with mother . He is envious of Arthur's use of words, 
sense of stabil ity and his separateness. Wa I do hates that wh i ch he is 
envious of and thus hates Arthur. 
He destroys through envy Arthur's clarity of thought and denies him the 
words for fear of his revelation . 
He feels his life is "flawed" because of Arthur. 
Arthur's understanding that love might help one forget hate and his guilt at 
his inability to help Waldo from being what he is, is experienced by Waldo 
as madness. Yet he is brought to tears. Integration is completed by the 
poem where the intuitive life of Arthur meets with a conscious understanding 
of the life of Waldo . Arthur reveals Waldo's sadism and his pain. He 
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reveals his sacrifice of blood. 
As a result of the integration Waldo must rid himself of the overload of 
emotion. He must destroy the integration, and empty himself of these 
aspects. 
Fear of the touch of another's life (integration) becomes embodied in his 
act of purification. The touch has been yearned for with such a desperation 
and passion that it has become hated and dreaded to the point of terror. 
To overcome the terror Arthur must die, and Waldo dies in his desperation 
to destroy Arthur. 
Ambivalence. 
Arthur keeps alive aspects of Waldo and Waldo is driven to protect him to 
protect h imse lf . Waldo is terrified to be "free", to be alone and 
separate. 
off him . 
He is held together by Arthur but experiences Arthur as feeding 
Waldo maintains their union to protect against his world 
Arthur holds the negative aspects which Waldo cannot hold for fragmenting. 
fear of fragmenting. Thus he cannot allow Arthur a separate existence and 
he must protect Arthur from the thoughts of others wh i ch mi ght harm or 
destroy. 
Yet Waldo wishes a separate existence for Arthur sees into his inner- most 
core and he cannot defend himself. Arthur absorbs everything and is 
continually present as a mirror to his denied aspects and he cannot escape. 
Waldo experiences Arthur as protected against evils, he thus needs and hates 
Arthur. 
Arthur is capable of invoking love and spiritual union in moments of 
aloneness and bread making. These moments are however spoilt for Waldo by 
his guilt. 
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Arthur attempts to rescue Waldo by merging and Waldo gives in to moments of 
merger at night. He is however afraid that he is not protected 'knowledge' 
i.e. the framework which holds him bounded. He fears the loss of the 
sense of boundedness wh i ch occurs in merger with Arthur. He fears the 
possibility of being revealed to himself and thus he continues to fight 
Arthur. 
Defenses. 
Splitting. 
Waldo suffers from a lack of integration, splitting his experience. There 
is a denial of the negative aspects of himself, while he maintains a 
grandiose image of himself . The image denies his sense of badness and 
protects him from the horrors of his internal world and the feared and 
devalued aspects of his life. 
No other has worth in his own right. The great thoughts of other's are 
used to fill Waldo's sense of himself, give him a sense of substance. 
Others are emptied of their goodness and devalued . Consequently he fears 
their persecution for having robbed them. He denies his evi 1, feel ing 
purified by the evil of others. 
He is not capable of wanting to give pleasure and is unable to experience 
compassion for the other. 
Peop 1 e or events wh i ch threaten the stabi 1 ity of Wa 1 do's den i ed and sp 1 it 
aspects , precipitate an increase in Waldo's grandiosity and his devaluation 
of the other. 
The split entails a denial of feelings of love and affection towards Arthur 
and any sense of personal involvement. 
186 
Adaptation. 
Waldo adapts to a framework of being based upon his father's philosophy and 
the attitudes his mother sees and admires. It is an image which allows him 
to show but not give of himself, to impress but not please, to watch and 
not participate. It is an adaptation which avoids the intimacy of love and 
the confrontation of separation. 
Waldo physically leads his brother into the world relying upon the 
framework . It protects them from awareness of the complexity of the world 
and people, a complexity which is experienced as fearsome, confusing and 
impinging. 
Grandiosity and devaluation. 
Rather than needing, Waldo withdraws into grandiose isolation, devaluing 
the other, who becomes feared and hated. The grand iose image is based on 
identification with the "mind", with what is conscious and rational. 
Denial. 
Wa 1 do deni es his vu 1 nerabil ity and the importance, to him, of peop 1 e and 
things. Waldo maintains his denial through control of his inner life in 
the sterility of his 'dogma'. 
Control. 
Control is used to defend against fragmentation and the revealing of his 
inner life He controls himself and others to contain and deny the 
dangerous consequences of his badness, his hate. 
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He is unable to see into a part of himself which matters, a part he can 
believe in. It is necessary to control his avoidance of himself for fear 
of what he may see - for fear of his badness . Thus he destroys whatever 
offers hope of integration and is left feeling empty, fearing the quality 
of stagnant, dark, hiddenness of his inner world. 
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CHAPTER SIX. DISCUSSION. 
"Two loves I have of comfort and despair, 
Which like two spirits do suggest me still: 
The better angel is a man right fair, 
The worser spirit a woman co10ur'd ill. 
And whether that my angel be turn'd fiend 
Suspect I may, yet not directly tell; 
But being both from me, both to each friend, 
I guess one angel in another's hell: 
Yet this shall I ne'er know, but live in doubt, 
Till my bad angel fire my good one out." 
William Shakespeare, Sonnet. 
The unders tand i ng reached by the researcher through the exp 1 i cated 
experience of the twins forms the basis, in this section, for a number of 
psychoanalytic formulations regarding the experience of narcissistic 
wounding. 
6. 1. Aetiologica I considerations. 
This thesis has reviewed a number of theorists who postulate man's essential 
need for reflection and containment of his experience in order that he may 
come to experience an integrity of being, a wholeness, in both his unique 
separateness and hi s common a lty with others, without terror and despair. 
This orientation moves psychological interest from the framework of Freudian 
Oedipal dynamics to the structuring role of pre-oedipal anxieties. It also 
broadens early Object Relations thinking from a predominantly intrapsychic 
perspective to a focus on the interactive influences which occur both 
intrapsychica11y and interpsychica11y in the mother-infant dyad. 
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Klein (1946) postulated and focused upon an innate developmental sequence, 
without e 1 aborat i ng upon the i nf 1 uence and mod if i cat i on effected by the 
maternal environment. Subsequent theorists postulate the importance of 
th i s interact ion, emphas i zing the ho 1 ding capacity of the mother. Th i s 
holding capacity is variously described as e.g. the containing and 
processing role of the mother, as discussed by Bion (1962, 1967), whereby 
beta elements are de-toxified and allow the infant to cohere his own benign 
elements and to develop the capacity for thought; Winnicott's (1956) 
emphasis on the ability of the mother to engage in primary maternal 
preoccupation whereby the containing ego of the mother allows the infant 
ego · a realization of its omnipotence and the subsequent development of 
symbolization through the experience of potential space (1971); to Mahler's 
(1975a) concept of separation-individuation whereby the mother must reflect 
and contain the narcissism and omnipotence of the infant to facilitate the 
ch i 1 d's eventua 1 i dent ity cohes ion. These theori sts, together with 
theorists such as Green 1986d), Mahler et al (1977), Hartocollis (1977) 
and Robbins (1982) see failure of the mother to provide for these infantile 
needs as resu It i ng in f i xat ion upon the mother, man ifest as excess i ve 
dependence and inability to separate a sense of identity from the matrix of 
an idealized maternal image. 
This thesis is unable to discuss the significance of constitutional 
vulnerability in the aetiology of narcissistic wounding. However a 
productive focus is offered in viewing the maternal environment provided by 
Mrs Brown. There is evidence to suggest that there is not a single 
aetiological maternal factor but that rather a number of maternal factors 
coalesce to provide a matrix of experience for the child which is 
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characterized by 'cumulative trauma' (Khan 1963). Such an environment fails 
the child's omnipotent and grandiose strivings and results in narcissistic 
wounding, or to use Stern's (1938) term, "affective (narcissistic) 
malnutrition" . 
1. Pathology of the mother. 
The persona 1 ity structure of Mrs Brown is postu 1 ated to have been too 
fragile to provide for these infantile needs. She appeared as too damaged 
from her own narcissistic wound. Her feelings of bitterness towards her 
family of origin, together with her longing for contact speak of ambivalent 
separat i on issues. She a 1 so presented wi th a number of characteri st i cs 
which suggest more clearly her wounding. She was characterized by a 
superior, contemptuous, withdrawn approach to others, devaluing them while 
remaining intensely afraid of their impingements . 
She presented a soc i a 1 facade of po 1 iteness and acceptance wh i ch hi d an 
intense dislike and suspicion of others. She was afraid of her dark 
internal world and related sadistically to the attempted intimacy of others, 
including her son. Kohut (1968) suggests that the essential genet i c 
narcissistic trauma for the chi l d lies in the narcissistic needs of the 
parents. It would seem that the narcissistic needs of both Mr and Mrs Brown 
laid the foundation for Arthur to remain enmeshed i n attempts to heal their 
wounds (Searles 1975), which frustrated his surmounting of narcissistic 
omnipotence (Green 1986d), and his moves toward an integrated sense of 
identity (Mahler 1968, 1972). 
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Klein (1957), Lichtenstein (1964) , Parkin (1985) and Green (1986d) 
discuss the significance of the unconscious meanings which the child has for 
the mother . Klein discusses the possibility, in predominantly schizoid-
paranoid functioning, that the birth of a child may result in reactivation 
in the mother, of envy of her own mother. In such cases the child is not 
experienced as a reparation to, and identification with the mother. Mrs 
8rown I s re 1 at ions wi th her mother are not detailed but one may postu 1 ate 
that the mi xture of dependence and envy shown toward her cous i n Mo 11 ie, 
reflect a conflictual mother-child relationship. Mrs Brown was unable to 
love her son for what he was, and thus she did not express spontaneous joy 
and pleasure in relation to him. Green draws a correlation between the 
mother's unempathic crushing of the child's desire for love and omnipotence 
(Mrs Brown's response to Arthur), and narcissistic wounding (the 
consequence), and the subsequent development in the child of an idealized, 
omnipotent image of the mother. (A formulation similar to that of Kernberg 
1975, and Rosenfeld 1971.) Waldo comes to see her as "timeless" and 
"indestructible", an image of "memory herse.lf". 
Arthur and Waldo represent differing poles of adaptation to the unconscious 
needs of the mother's pathology. Each in the end demonstrate the power of 
the mother to bind the child in symbiosis, for each is unable to 
differentiate. Arthur is unable to emerge from merger with the libidinous 
maternal object, while Waldo displays those postulated defensive adaptations 
discussed by theorists such as Kernberg (1967, 1970, 1975) , Robbins (1982), 
Bion (1957) and Rosenfeld (1971, 1978) which are characterized by 
destruct i ve impu 1 ses. It is genera 11y accepted that the infant adapts to 
the needs of the mother and develops those attributes which will gain love 
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and acceptance. Given the extent to which the child must adapt to an image 
of himself and deny intrinsic potential, 
outline of the child's sense of identity. 
the adaptation provides the 
It is th i s defens i ve out! ine 
which the researcher postulates constitutes the core of the intrapsychic 
object which comes into conf l ict with libidinous needs and is bent upon the 
destruction of the l ibidinous self. This conflict, instigated by the 
mother's inability to reflect the individual substance of the child, as 
opposed to her own image of him, denies him a sense of realness and power to 
overcome the power of the "psychot i c part" of the persona 1 ity. The out! ine 
is understood as a pathological development of adaptation which is motivated 
by the destructive impulses of envy and hate. 
Within this context Winnicott (1960b) elaborates the characteristics of the 
False Self. Lichtenstein (1964) uses the term' identity theme', while 
Khan (1963) discusses the "false identificatory oneness" which occurs, 
whi ch ensures the cont inued defens ive idea 1 i zat i on of the mother 
predominance of "ego interest" in place of true object cathexis 
and the 
i . e . the 
predominance of adaptation to the mother. The characteristics of this 
adaptation are seen to reflect a depersonalized, unreal sense of self, an 
outer shape which acts to protect an inner sense of self (Winnicott 1960b) 
or to destroy it (Robbins 1982, Grotstein 1981). The inner sense of self 
struggles from a lack of differentiation and experience and is characterized 
by its vulnerability to the demands of the adaptive self. It is this 
experience wh i ch is postu 1 ated to form the experi ence of the dua 1 ity of 
narcissistic wounding. 
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2 Interaction with the child. 
Mrs Brown was unable to provide a containing and reflecting environment. 
Rather she was experienced as burdened, both by external reality and by the 
darkness of her own thoughts. She remained self-absorbed and self 
sufficient in her relations with her husband which did not allow a place of 
specialness for the child to express his individuality. She was fearful of 
the world and unable to provide a containment which facilitated either a 
detoxification of her son's inner conflicts and anxieties, 
allow the child a sense of its omnipotence in the world. 
of Arthur's exhibitionism and curiosity about the world. 
or which could 
She was fearfu 1 
These tendencies 
activated fears of her own internal conflicts and anxieties and she became 
fearful of her own unconscious, and fearful for Arthur who remained in 
symbiosis and thus in a fused identificatory relationship with her. 
Following Mahler's (1975a) conceptualizations of the development of the 
child, it would seem that Mrs Brown was unable to allow Arthur a practicing 
phase of development. He thus remained in symbiotic union with her and the 
world remained an unknown and fearful place. 
Following Bion (1957) Mrs Brown, due to her own unconscious dynamics, was 
unable to transform Arthur's fear of dying (the dangers of the icebergs) and 
envy and hate into manageable elements. Rather she could offer the child 
nothing to bel ieve in, except her fear of the world and the hollowness of 
her grandeur. Her own fears of his quest for knowledge left her unable to 
reflect the positive nature of his experience . She substituted her own 
fears and was unable to process the anxieties of the child. This resulted 
in what Bion terms the formation of "minus K" and subsequent attacks, by 
Waldo, the split off "psychotic part of the personality", upon all links 
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which would facilitate "knowledge" i.e. awareness. 
his understanding from work with psychotic patients, 
While Bion formulated 
he does postulate that 
the deve 1 opment of the psychot i c part of the persona 1 ity stems from the 
mental mechanisms of the paranoid-schizoid position which persists, to 
varying degrees in everyone, and is thus not only manifest in psychotic 
patients. 
Following Kohut (1966, 1977) the mother's inability to reflect and contain 
the exhibitionism of Arthur resulted in the fixation upon an idealized image 
by an archaic primitive self . Kernberg (1974, 1975) suggests that the 
grandiose self reflects a pathological structure rather than a developmental 
arrest of normality. (This thesis suggests that Waldo embodies the 
pathologically defensive structure postulated by Kernberg, while Arthur 
embodies the libidinal fixations postulated by Kohut - an issue which will 
be elaborated further in the discussion.) 
Both Waldo and Arthur come to fear the mother image. Theorists have given 
dissimilar accounts as to the development of the fear of the mother which is 
either consciously or unconsciously experienced . Classical object 
relations theorists stress the role of envy. Klein (1946, 1957) and Bion 
(1967, 1962) look to the infant's splitting of the good and bad self and 
object representation and the projection of the 'bad' into the breast, 
together with the role of envy of the goodness of the breast, to account 
for the persecutory fear and the need to maintain merger. Bion discusses 
how, as a consequence of the projection, the breast comes to be feared as a 
persecutor . Its reintrojection consists of the introjection of a 
destructive object bent on attempts to destroy and arouse guilt, and forms 
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the psychotic personality (Waldo) . Fear is thus seen to be based upon the 
paranoid fears of retaliation of the damaged breast. In similar vein, 
Kernberg's (1974) formulation stresses the overriding influence of prenatal 
aggress ion, particularly oral aggression . He postulates the projection of 
th i s aggress i on and the subsequent parano i d di stort ions of the materna 1 
figure, who comes to be feared as potentially dangerous. Green (1986b) 
discusses how the need for the maternal object is characterized by absence. 
Presence of the object is experienced as intrusion and therefore feared, 
(Waldo's pole of experience) while separateness is experienced as non-
ex i stence (Arthur's po le of exper ience) , hence there is no cho i ce but the 
absence of choice of the existence of the object. Such a dilemma results 
in an immobilizing amb i valence and confusion. Concomitant with this 
absence, Green (1986c) postulates the existence of a "profoundly internal" 
object which is shaped upon the chi ld's wounded narcissism . This object 
must be maintained as a bad object at all costs to provide a security - that 
"hatred is always sure". These theorists stress the emergence of a 
pathological structure which is engaged in intrapsychic destruction of 
the libidinal strivings of the individual. 
Theorists such as Mahler (1975a, 1975b), Khan (1963), and Winnicott(1956, 
1960b) postulate the reality of the interaction between mother and child, 
and the damaging nature of these relationships. Mrs Brown's relations with 
her son appear to demonstrate the reality of a damaging relationship. The 
researcher postulates however that the subsequent complexity and envious 
hatred which became characteristic of the conflictual existence of the son, 
speaks to an inner experience which is not fully addressed by observation of 
external dynamics . It is therefore postu lated by the researcher that the 
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experience between mother and son occurs within the context of an innate 
potential for splitting, which is facilitated by unempathic mothering. 
It is therefore those theories which attempt to address both the 
intrapsychic and the interrelational dimensions which offer a more holistic 
understanding. To this end the writings of Robbins (1981a, 1981b, 1982) 
provide a valuable attempt to understand the intrapsychic conflicts of the 
possessed configuration and the realities of the limited mothering abilities 
of the mothers of narcissists and borderl ines-to-be. In line with an 
understanding of the importance of the mother's unconscious fantasies of the 
meaning of the child, Robbins postulates that the mothering received by the 
narcissist-to-be is essentially similar to that of the borderline-to-be 
except that there is a more realistic response to the needs of the child, 
which is still nevertheless characterized by a lack of responsiveness to the 
ch i 1 d's signa 1 s. Both mothers impose an agenda of comp 1 i ance, wi th 
specialness accorded to compliance to her needs for perfectionistic 
grand ios i ty, and deva 1 uat i on to pers i stence of dependent, needy states. 
It is postulated by the researcher that a mothering style is not a static 
interactional characteristic, but that rather the mothering style presents 
the child with the "identity themes" (Lichtenstein 1964) within which the 
individuality of the child finds reflection and interaction with the mother. 
Mrs Brown's interactions suggest that her mothering style varied according 
to the compliance of the child. Arthur's continuing libidinal needs and 
inability to fulfil her needs for his genius, interacting with her inability 
to contain and reflect his exhibitionistic and omnipotent needs, provided 
the matr i x for cumu 1 at ive trauma, and the resu ltant sp 1 it in the son's 
persona 1 ity. Mother IS devaluation and co ldness co-existed, however, 
with a specialness accorded to Arthur for his identification with her, 
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maintaining the symbiotic fusion and the maintenance of libidinal strivings. 
There was also a specialness accorded to the adaptations of Waldo in his 
attempts to be independent and perfect. Thus it is suggested that the 
child's resultant intrapsychic conflict, following narcissistic wounding, 
is experienced as a duality of identity which is further exacerbated by the 
mother's differential mothering style toward the split manifestations of 
this duality and that this differential style compounds an already confused 
and fused identity and dependence upon the mother. 
3 Relations with husband. 
Further unconscious meanings of the child are suggested by Green (1986d) in 
his postulation that such a mother derives benefit from the development of 
an idealized maternal image in that it is her wish to bear the child without 
the aid of the penis . With such an unconscious wish it is inevitable that 
the ch ild wou 1 d be subsequent ly deva 1 ued. Mrs Brown appeared to have 
suffered from an unresolved oedipal conflict which manifest itself in her 
insecurity with the sexuality of other women, in her fear and suspicion of 
men and her attempts to emascu late the men of her family. Her issues with 
masculinity, i.e . her penis envy may have contributed to an unconscious wish 
to bear a child without the contribution of the penis. Such a wish would 
be in accord wi th her deva 1 uat i on of Arthur's mascu 1 i nity and his damaged 
sexuality. Her envy was revealed through her attempts to emasculate and 
thwart his attempts at independence and moves toward manhood. She on ly 
reinforced those behaviours which maintained the symbiosis. 
Klein (1957), Kernberg (1974) and Green . (1986d) discuss hate and envy of a 
combi ned mother-father image and the resu ltant exper ience of anx i ety over 
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its dangerous, persecutory retaliation. Green suggests that hatred of the 
mother may extend to the father. Such an occurrence wou 1 d prec 1 ude 
identification with the father and block the dis-identification of the boy 
with his mother (Greenson 1968). As a consequence, all later 
conceptualizations of sexual relations become characterized by danger and 
aggression. 
Within the Brown family Waldo felt excluded by the unit of his parents and 
he came to envy and hate the strength of the unit. The relationship 
between Mr and Mrs Brown may wel l have constituted a relationship based upon 
what Balint (1960) termed "the split-off doublet". The sense of 
superiority of Mrs Brown was reflected and maintained by Mr Brown. Mrs 
Brown was held together by her need for Mr Brown and she was able to 
maintain her self-esteem by maintaining an image of her husband as strong 
and superior to the hypocrisy of the world. 
Wa ldo came to fear the devouring nature of the mother image, fearing her 
power to "i ncubate and possess". Wa 1 do turned to his father but the 
inability of his father to provide a model of manhood and his own 
vulnerability and need for healing precluded an identification. In 
contrast to Kernberg's (1974) and Green's (1986d) postulation, it does not 
appear that hate of the mother contaminated the father but that rather there 
was a deve 1 op i ng hatred cond it i ona 1 upon the fa i 1 ure of the father, an 
idealized image . Mr Brown was more vulnerable to despair over the 
sterility of their lives. Green's (l986c) conception of the "logic of 
despair" speaks to Mr Brown's di lemma, that the only constant is 
disappointment. His intellectual, pacifist attitude denies an anger and 
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d i sappo i ntment wh i ch becomes somatos i zed as asthma. He rat iona 1 i zes that 
"nothing is nothing", i.e. that there is nothing to believe in except the 
hatred of mankind from which one must withdraw. Hatred conditonal upon the 
failure of the father would follow more closely Kohut's (1968) formulation 
of disappointment in the idealized parent and the subsequent incorporation 
of the idealized image to maintain narcissistic homoeostasis. Waldo 
introjected his father's ideological framework, the logic of despair, as 
the rigid basis from which he maintained his identity and security as a man 
in the world. In this respect the dynamic follows exactly Kohut's 
formulation, with the incorporated idealized object (the father's ideology) 
performing the functions which should have been performed by the father. 
Summary. 
It would seem theoretically generally accepted that failure of the mother to 
reflect and contain the child's omnipotent fears and aspirations are generic 
determinants for the development of narcissistic wounding and a subsequent 
splitting of the child's personality in attempts to cope with the wound. 
Within this context, focus upon Mrs Brown suggests that a number of maternal 
factors appear to coalesce to constitute the maternal failure. These 
include the differential mothering style toward the dependency and 
adaptational responses of the child, the nature of the parental bond, and 
the unconscious meanings of the child for the mother which are of special 
significance, relating, as these meanings do, to the mother's unresolved 
infantile issues. These issues appear to revolve around the mother's own 
narcissistic wounding, which leaves her unable to engage in empathic object 
relating, unable to process the child's experience into a benign reality, 
and insecure in her femininity. 
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6.2. Dua lity of experience . 
6.2.1 . Formulation of the duality of narcissism. 
Grotstein (1981) with his understanding of the function of projection, 
offers further val idation for the orientation adopted in this thesis of 
viewing the experiences of Waldo and Arthur as representative of the 
experience of one individual. He suggests that project i on can occur 
within the psyche . Grotstein suggests 
"intrapsychic projection can be into 
separate psychic organizations, that is, 
split-off personalities within the psyche 
(split object representations). This is 
particularly true in psychotic, borderline, 
manic, and depressed patients who seem to 
utilize dissociated twin selves as targets 
for projection" (p.136). 
This formulation is in accord with those of Bion (1950, 1957, 1959) and 
Rosenfe 1 d (1964) who both draw attent i on to the destruct i ve aspects of a 
psychotic part of the personality, with Winnicott (1960b) who describes 
the relations between the True and False Self, Robbins (1982) who 
postulates an intrapsychic relationship of possession and Sohn (1985) who 
discusses the operations of the identificate. Lichtenstein (1964) has 
maintained that the concept of the mirror is inherent to the experience of 
narcissism, by this he points to the fundamental need for the other, in 
the explication of the thesis, the internal other, to reflect and 
incorporate. Lichtenstein fails, however, to delineate the differing poles 
of experience of the other and the subject. 
The basis for the theoretical development of a delineation of the differ i ng 
po 1 es of experi ence i s gi ven by K lei n' s (1957) concept of the parano i d-
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schizoid phase of development. Her concept of splitting remains definitive 
to the present understand ing of the experi ence of narc i ss i st i c wound i ng. 
In 1 i ne with her formu 1 at ions around the unbearab 1 e nature of envy to the 
early ego, Klein postulates that the envy becomes split off and becomes 
unconscious. The individual develops defences, particularly projective 
identification, to guard against awareness of envy, yet the envy may still 
act to attack, spoil and deplete the ego's internal and external resources. 
Theorists such as Bion (1957), Kernberg (1966, 1967), Rosenfeld (1971), 
and Sohn (1985) propose that the experience of envy, either through 
constitutional factors, or through unempathic mothering, ca 11 s into 
existence a pathologica l structuring which is driven by destructive 
impulses. Theorists such as Kohut (1977) and Stolorow et al (1980) 
postulate developmental arrest at a phase of narcissistic vulnerability . 
This thesis proposes that both orientations are addressed by emphasizing the 
duality of narcissism. Such an orientation , which elaborates both poles 
of experi ence, suggests that the crisis of libidinal fixation (Kohut's 
fixation upon an archaic 'normal' self) and the defens i ve funct i on of 
narcissism (Kernberg) are not exclusive but interact in a dialectic of 
experience (Grunberger 1971). It is this dialectic which is addressed 
through the explication of the twin's experience. 
(To facilitate understanding, henceforth Arthur will be used to denote 
that personality constellation which has been variously termed, in the 
literature review, the libidinous, the non-psychotic part, the 
possessed, the sane aspects. Whereas Waldo will refer to the 
defensive, psychotic part, the possessor. Differences and 
variations will be discussed where appropriate. Clinical examples, 
from the researcher's pract i ce, wi 11 be cited to illustrate various 
experiential phenomena. Case histories will not be given as it is felt 
the examples are illustrative in themselves of the phenomena under 
discussion.) 
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In examining the emergence of the duality or twin experience of Arthur, the 
nature of his earliest memories are in themselves significant. Access to 
early memories of merger lead one to postulate a fixation upon an infantile 
mother-infant fusion . It is significant that subsequent Oedipal anxieties 
have not repressed these infantile memories. This is in line with 
theoretical understanding which suggests that pre-genital conflicts, 
aetiologically significant for the experience of narcissistic wounding, 
interfere with subsequent Oed ipa 1 stri v i ngs and prec 1 ude the i r reso 1 ut i on 
into full genitality (Grunberger 1971, Reich 1953) . That the Oedipal 
conflicts have not been negotiated is well evidenced by the lack of genital 
strivings, the lack of a stable masculine identity and fixation upon the 
maternal object, ev i denced in dependence upon maternal figures for 
fulfilment of infantile needs of acceptance and reflection, rather than 
genital desires. 
From the content of these ear ly memori es one may a 1 so postu late ear ly 
spl itting of the infantile ego, suggested in Arthur's awareness of the 
existence of Waldo merged with him in sleep. This awareness coincided with 
the awareness of the "danger of the icebergs". Arthur never realized this 
fear, never seei ng the icebergs, find i ng safety in the awareness of his 
twin. The icebergs are postulated as symbolic representations of the 
co 1 dness of the materna 1 image wh i ch ho 1 ds the son bound and to wh i ch he 
continually seeks merger. This is evidenced by the aggrandizement of the 
image by both poles of the child's split existence. Arthur seeks merger 
with the benign (good) symbol of totality, the mandala, and Waldo 
experiences the devouring (bad) Goddess of a Thousand Breasts, to which 
he gives himself in "encasement in ice". The son remains incapable of 
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integrating the split nature of this image. 
At an early age Arthur already saw himself as the protector, holding the 
splintered glass of the crushed iceberg in his unhurt hands. The memories 
suggest an intimate connection between the early splitting and the coldness 
(i ce) of the mother. The split serves a defensive function in that it 
allows Arthur to deny any fear or hate of the danger and to remain 
omnipotently merged. He retains the good, while Waldo is given the bad. 
Arthur retains libidinal connection and seeks to protect the mother. The 
motivation for protection appears to arise from two sources; to protect her 
from her own pain (Searles 1975) or from attack (Green 1986c , Bion 1959, 
Kernberg 1970). At this early stage, where Waldo still retains libidinal 
connection to Arthur, (their split is more a potential *) Arthur den ies 
the aggression, but still suf fers from the attacks upon the mother. The 
power of the mother is "splintered", suggesting the existence of attacks by 
the infantile ego. 
function of envy.) 
(Consistent with postulations around the 
Guilt for these attacks, for having destroyed and 
robbed the mother of her power, provide one of the motivational forces for 
Arthur's reparative attempts to heal the empt iness of others, especi a lly 
Waldo, thereby healing his mother and hence himself. This understanding 
* Bion (1962), Kernberg (1970) and Rosenfeld (1978) are influenced by 
the Kleinian paranoid-schizoid concept. As such they postulate that 
the inevitabilities of oral frustration result in residues of splitting 
remaining within each individual. By the 'potentiality' of the split, 
it is suggested that the mothering style of Mrs Brown entrenched the 
division. Continuance of her unempathic mothering precluded the 
regulation of development through negotiation of later stages of 
development (Grunberger 1971, Jacobson 1965). Kernberg stresses 
the intensity of oral aggression which characterizes the 
destructiveness of the grandiose self . 
204 
is consistent with Green's (19S6c) formulation of the desires for both 
revenge against, and protection of, the object, resultant upon narcissistic 
wounding. 
Arthur reta i ns ali bid i na 1 character wi th no sense of envy or hate. The 
libidinal connection is fostered by the love and recognition his mother was 
able to give him, for adaptation to her unconscious needs. This resulted 
in his ability to engage in empathic object relating and the maintenance of 
benign internal object relationships, 
to help fill the emptiness of others. 
together with a characteristic need 
This formulation is consistent with 
Rosenfeld's concept of the libidinal aspects of narcissism, which is 
characterized by idealization of the omnipotent idealized self. This 
idealization characterizes Arthur's relations with Waldo and allows a 
libi~inal attachment to others. 
Through adaptation to the demands of the mother, and significantly, 
through fear of the emot iona 1 experi ence of his own hatefu 1 ness bei ng 
revealed i.e. his envy, the split identity of Waldo began to find 
definition . The 'potential split' gained definition through the process of 
polarizing the positive libidinal from negative libidinal aspects. The 
negat i ve (bad) aspects come to be hidden, especi a lly the fee 1 i ngs of 
hatefulness. The "real" self was experienced as disguised by his clothing 
and the image of i nte llectua 1 ism seduced both Wa 1 do and the other into a 
be 1 ief of its rea 1 ness. The seduct ion was not comp lete, however, wi th 
despair emerging at the feelings of unrealness. There is thus a 
polarization, a splitting of good and bad, 
projective identification with the other. 
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with each pole retaining 
A rigidity of boundaries, 
characterized by Waldo's minimal introjection (Sohn 1985) and the rigid i ty 
of the projections, precludes modification of projective identifications 
through an ab i lity to process beta elements into more benign alpha elements. 
This ability is confounded by the mother's inability to process the beta 
elements of the infant (Bion 1957). It is only in old age that a 
deve loping permeabi 1 ity, due to Arthur's reparat i ve efforts, a llows the 
awar eness of envy and hate to break the pathological projections, and the 
pathological structure of Waldo. 
Wa 1 do is characteri zed by a den i a 1 of awareness of 1 i bi dina 1 needs and 
hatefulness . This denial is achieved within the context of the split and 
through Arthur's abdication of 'knowledge', words, and consciousness . 
Waldo uses words to control experience, not to illuminate the potential of 
1 iving. As such words become empty and lead to an emptying of the 
possibility of experience. On ly at the end is awareness ab le to break 
through and, as mentioned, the projective identification destroyed . 
Arthur is left to integrate the good and the bad. Introjection of the bad 
allows Arthur to start the process of fusion of the life and death instincts 
(Klein 1934, 1958) . 
6.2.2. Experientia I characteristics; Wa Ido. 
The functions of envy. 
It is postulated that Waldo ' s distinct i ve experient i al characteristic was 
his envy of both Arthur and the 'goodness' of others. Waldo was aware of 
envying certain aspects of Arthur . These were princ i pally related to 
Arth ur 's l i bidinal relations with the mother . Waldo was unaware of envy of 
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others due to his devaluation of them. The extent and destructiveness of 
his envy was an unconscious experience and manifested itself in the rigidity 
with which he maintained the split between good and bad, and his 
destruct i on of any attempt to integrate the sp 1 its. Based upon Klein i an 
formulations of the function of envy, Bion (1959) discusses the destruction 
of all links which integrate reality. 'Reality' implies the awareness of 
dependency and hence the experience of inevitable frustration due to 
unfulfilled libidinal needs (Rosenfeld 1964). Destruction, according to 
Bion, may be taken to the most sophisticated level, that of destruction of 
verbal communication. While Waldo does not demonstrate psychotic thought 
disorder, there is evidence of delusional appropriation of the goodness of 
others, and concretization of experience, which act toward destroying the 
symbolization of verbal communication. Rosenfeld (1964) stressed the 
omnipotence of envy, which acts to deny dependence and frustration. 
Through omn i potent possess ion, a 11 good is conta i ned and the other is 
devalued . He discusses how intellectualization can lead to possession and 
idealization of the words of the therapist. Waldo delusionally 
appropriates the good of others, gaining a sense of superiority, while the 
other is devalued. The appropriation of words to define himself and 
control his experience is distinctly chacteristic. His appropriation of 
Goethe and the subsequent extreme devaluation are illustrative of the 
workings of envy . 
A clinical example from the researcher's private practice demonstrates the 
experi ent i a 1 consequences of envy. The experient i a 1 consequences are 
illustrated in the therapeutic interactions which occurred with Adam. 
Sessions were characterized by almost complete silence, which were 
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experienced by the therapist as having a destructi ve intent. It became 
apparent that Adam was intense ly envious of the goodness possessed by the 
therapist and envious of her separateness. Silence was an attempt to both 
destroy the therapist and to merge with her, i . e . an experience of libidinal 
str i vings co-existing with destructive urges. Adam attempted to destroy 
the therapist's words by refusing to engage with her, while omnipotently 
appropri at ing words as his doma in . The omn i potent appropri at i on and 
concretization of experience was manifest in three distinct ways. He would 
not say certain things for fear of their destructive potential i.e. the 
saying would confirm their realness. Secondly, he kept a voluminous diary 
detailing every aspect of the sessions and his life. There was also an 
appropri at ion of the therapi st 's words wh i ch were distorted to defi ne a 
wor 1 d of dangerous consequences . These activities became intensified 
whenever there was to be a separation from the therapist. 
Rosenfeld (1971) notes that envy is intensified by perceived separateness 
and the consequent awareness of dependence, there is thus a resu ltant 
increase in destructive impulses. Green (19S6c) discusses the "logic of 
despa ir" , whereby there is a constant effort to prove that the object is 
really bad. This desire stems from what Green suggests as a confusion 
between the des ire for revenge and the des i re to protect the object from 
these impulses. This dynamic characterized Adam's intrapsychic confl ict. 
Any effort toward libidinal striving, such as awareness of his longing for 
nurturance, which would have facilitated awareness of his resentment, 
resulted instead in an increased awareness of his mother's vulnerability and 
her unhappy 1 ife. Thus moves toward awareness of hate and envy became 
confused wi th moves to rep 1 ace the father and to 'hea l' the mother. The 
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resu 1 t was an immobil i zat i on and an increase in efforts to appease the 
demands of Death . It came to be understood that Death constituted an image 
of possession which demanded his destructive attacks upon libidinal 
strivings. Robbins (1982) discusses the Possessor as being characterized 
by projection of dependent libidinal strivings, while itself remaining 
perfect, omnipotent and self sufficient. These were the characteristics 
which Adam embodied when the psychotic part of his personality was dominant. 
They are also characteristic of Waldo and the grandiosity of his self image. 
Fear of libidina I strivings. 
Further to the workings of envy was Waldo's fear of emotions. Bion (1957) 
draws attention to the development of minus K with the mother's inability to 
process the beta elements of the infant. Beta elements are then 
experienced as having the quality of things which are capable of assault, 
and torture upon re-entry. Waldo's experience was that emotions punctured 
and revealed. It was against the linking potential of emotions which Waldo 
had to defend himself. Following the Kleinian formulation, splitting and 
project ion of de va 1 ued aspects and the unconsc ious, hidden nature of envy 
(Rosenfeld 1964), allowed Waldo to split off awareness of his "hatefulness", 
he had "seduced" himself out of awareness. Yet given the split and 
project i on of the bad, Wa 1 do deve loped an intense paranoi d fear of the 
libidinal strivings of Arthur. These were experienced as intent upon 
"revea 1 i ng" him. Wa 1 do attempted to destroy any 1 i nk between the mean i ngs 
of libidinal str iv ings and experience. Thus everything was devalued and 
reduced to noth i ngness . He b locked a 11 Arthur's attempts to atta i n 
integration, using knowledge to block and destroy meaning. Using minus K 
to attack K. Even Arthur's anger gave rise to feeling of shame in Waldo. 
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The researcher's understanding is informed by Rosenfeld (1971) who suggests 
that there is experience of humiliation at separateness. Arthur's anger 
would constitute a positive transformation and expression of the aggression 
wh i ch Wa 1 do strove to project. As such the anger served to high 1 i ght 
Arthur's separateness. Kohut (1972) suggests that shame is the result of 
failure to mirror exhibitionistic libido which produces an imbalance of 
cathexis with which the ego cannot cope. The subsequent blockage and the 
press for discharge result in a disorganized mixture which Kohut postulates 
is experienced as shame. While the energic concepts remain hypothetical, 
Waldo's experience had been an experience were his omnipotence had been 
shattered . Arthur's rescue served to underline Waldo's dependence, hence 
the experience of shame. 
Focusing upon the defenses against awareness used by Adam, words were not 
to be used which constituted a link. They would provide the meaningfulness 
from which he so fiercely defended himself - his longing to be loved, for 
himself, by his mother who offered only conditional and erratic recognition 
of his needs . Adam held a catastrophic expectation that were he to speak 
his words of longing and hate, their meaning would be made real. By this 
he meant real in a most concrete way, that he would then have had to die to 
appease Death. 
Another clinical example illuminates defenses against awareness of envy 
which were also characteristic in therapeutic work with Cal. Cal 
experienced increasing envy of the therapist's knowledge. The therapist's 
understanding was experienced as increas ingly persecutory, and Ca 1 felt 
driven to intensify his own attacks upon the therapist's understanding. A 
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crisis was precipitated by his growing awareness of his hate and envy of the 
therapist . Hith this increase in awareness of his hate, Cal began to 
suffer from a sense that he was unab 1 e to th i nk, and a conv i ct i on that he 
was going mad. Concomitantly there was a growing awareness of his 
libidinal needs and he gradually moved into a depressive phase . Hhat is 
suggested is that Cal's ability to survive the formation of a link between 
reality and his emotional world, constituted an experience of 
meaningfulness (Bion 1967). This was a link which integrated the split, 
projected nature of his envy. The integration led initially to an 
intensification of attacks by the psychotic parts of his personality. 
These attacks were aimed at re-establishing the split and avoiding the pain 
and frustration of libidinal needs (Rosenfeld 1971). Hithin the holding 
of the therapeutic environment, Cal was able to begin to experience guilt 
for his attacks and to move into the working through of the depressive 
position (Klein 1946). 
Ha 1 do experi enced a fear of pun i shment and other's de va 1 uat i on for any 
libidinal strivings. This fear may well have reflected the realities of 
his re 1 at ions wi th his mother, and her deva 1 uat ion of dependency needs. 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that concomitantly, Haldo's fear 
was reflective of a persecutory fear. His omnipotent appropriation of 
other's goodness would lead, following Klein (1946) and Kernberg (1975), 
to a fear of persecutory retaliation. Bion suggests fear of the "env ious 
breast" . The image of the breast distorted through projection of envy and 
appropr i at i on of goodness, as such Wa 1 do was unab le to be fed by others, 
particularly Arthur. He became increasingly withdrawn and self sufficient . 
These experiences are in accord with Kernberg's (1974) concept of the 
predominance of oral aggression and Rosenfeld's (1978) understanding of the 
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vulnerability to interpretive penetration in cases of ego weakness. 
Again with Adam, Death demanded that to need was punishable by death, and 
it would appear that intrapsychically this was indeed the consequence. 
Awareness of neediness resu lted in an extreme sense of being "bad" and of 
deserving to die. Further Death dictated that 'feeding' was "bad", 
precluding the possibility of taking in (introjection) and thriving 
(processing). As a consequence Adam was initially unable to be fed, 
either by his saner aspects or by the therapist. 
self sufficient and devaluative of others. 
Destructive ifilpulses. 
He felt strongest when 
Bion (1957) gives as a characteristic for the development of the psychotic 
part of the personality, a predominance of destructive impulses which 
suffuse the impulses to love, turning them into sadism. 
He also draws attention to the characteristic hatred of reality, the dread 
of annihilation and the thinness, yet tenacity of the object relations. 
Love for Waldo was a pretence, marked by cynical devaluation of the other 
and denial of its meaning. His relations to others were marked by 
devaluation and an inability to retain alive, loving internal objects. 
Following Green (1986c) there was a continual need to demonstrate the 
badness of the other. Re 1 at ions with Arthur were characteri zed by a 
sad i st i c den i a 1 of Arthur's needs and worth, yet there was a 1 so a marked 
dependency upon Arthur, both to reflect his superiority, and also to keep 
him from the terrifying consequences of aloneness. His sadism was related 
to his fear of the real ity which Arthur could reveal and his fear of 
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subsequent fragmentation. 
Focus on the psychic conflict of Dan, another client from the researcher's 
private practice, provides similar illumination of the experiential nature 
of sadism. Dan maintained a rigid, controlled intellectual orientation 
toward his life. His psychic organization is reflected by the 
understanding of Sohn (1985) where the identificate is seen to act as is it 
were the tota 1 persona 1 i ty, or Kernberg' s grandiose se 7f, which 
demonstrates a pathological structuring. There was a total denial of 
libidinal needs to the point of delusion, while the libidinal needs of 
others were regarded with a condescending tolerance demonstrating the split 
off devaluatin . With progress in therapy, the importance of therapy, not 
the therapist, became apparent, and this only tenuously. This 
demonstrates the th i nness of the object re 1 at ions. What a 1 so became 
apparent was the terror of the internal world. Initially there had been an 
experiential sense of emptiness . Therapeutic progress revealed an intense 
inner world, peopled by mad and destructive images. Access to these 
images appeared to facilitate access to minimal awareness of libidinal 
needs. These, however, could only be couched in terms of the frustrating 
other's (Green's logic of despair). This growing awareness was accompanied 
by sudden withdrawals into self sufficiency, marked by evidence of 
unconscious grandiosity. 
Grandiose se 7f. 
Grandiosity of his self image was a significant aspect of Waldo's 
functioning. It co-existed in intimate relation to the devaluation of 
others. Their goodness was either denied or appropriated, filling his 
213 
sense of superior i ty. Th i s sense was, however, a fi erce ly guarded, 
secretive sense of his genius and superiority (Fairbairn 1940), 
particularly moral superiority. Sohn (1985) draws attention to projective 
identification whereby by becoming the object one is able to achieve its 
goodness. B ion (1962), however, poi nts out that the i nterna 1 i zed object 
is characterized by destructive impulses. The projected envy now acts to 
enviously assert moral superiority and arouse guilt in the non-psychotic 
parts. The goodness is thus characteri zed by grand i os ity, based upon 
distortion of the idealized image. This is the destructive aspect of 
narcissism (Rosenfeld 1971). Kernberg (1974) stresses that pathological 
(Rosenfe 1 d's destructive narcissism does not merely reflect libidinal 
investment in the self. Rather there is libidinal investment in a 
patholological self. Kohut (1972, 1977) argues that aggression is a 
secondary derivative dependent upon the failure of the maternal environment. 
The researcher proposes, however, that rather than reflecting a lack of 
development, the organization, rigidity and dominance of these destructive 
impulses over libidinal strivings, suggest a pathological structure 
organized around destruction of libidinal strivings and self aggrandizement, 
Kernberg's grandiose self. 
Further to this organization, a striking experiential characteristic was 
Wa ldo' s experi ence of the fragi 1 ity and concreteness of his boundaries. 
There was a continual vigilance and sensitivity to the impingements or 
collision of others. Offers of friendship and interest in his welfare were 
experienced as impinging upon him. There was an experiential sense of 
be i ng he 1 d together by his sk in, or mou 1 d, and a fear of fragment i ng. 
Arthur, too, posed a threat to his boundaries, threatening to reveal him. 
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Emotions punctured him and reveal him. The role of the body is somewhat 
neg 1 ected in psychoana lyt i c formu 1 at ions. Deve lopments with i n Bodywork 
theory, following the foundational thinking of Reich (1933), offer an 
understanding of the defensive function performed by Waldo's body. Lowen 
(1967) and Cassius (1975, 1980) postulate the body as the containing armour 
to the individual's emotions. Emotions are experienced as breaches of the 
armour and produce anxi ety. Wa 1 do experi enced emot ions as concrete ly 
puncturing the containment of his skin. The sensuality of the life 
within was distorted in its expression and used to seduce and destroy the 
integrity and meaningfulness of interaction with others . 
Referring to Cal, he suffered from a sense that "there was no inside ". As 
such there was an experience that he watched himself from outside and that 
he was not rea 1. There was a conviction that neither he nor 1 ife had 
meaning and as such "possibility" was merely a theoretical construct. 
Similarly Waldo felt despair at his inability to feel real. He used his 
father ' s framework to defend himself from the impingements of life but also 
to give shape to his existence. He became the words and manuscripts which 
defined this shape. The framework which defined Waldo 's shape was 
constituted by his father's ideals and those social attitudes which his 
mother admired. Mention has been made of Kohut's (1972, 1977) concept of 
internalization of the unaltered idealized imago in cases of disappointment. 
Internalizations of the idealized images acted to both define and possess 
Waldo. This accounts for his sense of not being loved but rather 
possessed, and his fears of intimacy with others. Intimacy would lead to 
adaptation i.e. penetration-impingements, and he would thus be possessed . 
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Dan maintained rigid intellectual boundaries in the fear of intimacy. The 
possibility of himself making demands or feeling attachment to others was 
not a conceptua 1 poss i bi 1 ity for Dan, but in his experience of these 
characteristics in others, he ceased to exist. This was an experience of 
being so totally adapted to their expectations that he ceased to have an 
awareness of himself. 
intimacy. 
As a consequence he was reinforced in his fear of 
Winn i cott (1960b) postu 1 ates the experi ence of the Fa 1 se Se lf as be ing 
characterized by its function to protect the inner reality, the True Self. 
As such it is unable to feel real. 
precludes spontaneity or creativity. 
There is an inherent rigidity which 
Winnicott also suggests that the 
sense of the se lf of the Fa 1 se Se lf may be seated in the mi nd, hence the 
use of intellectual defences. Waldo defines himself in terms of his 
thoughts and the words which will give life to his existence. 
The grandiose self of Dan was characterized by his use of words to maintain 
a super i ority and distance between h imse lf and others. Understand ing 
others and himself through words allowed an objectification and distance. 
This formulation is similar to Adam who feared the power of words to define 
him, and Ca 1 who fe 1 t the words of the therap i st as attacks upon h imse lf . 
Following Rey (1986), in these experiences, the symbolic function of words 
has not been deve loped. Words have the characteri st i cs of th i ngs or 
objects which are able to both destroy and contain projections. Winnicott 
(1960b) suggests that what is essentially lacking in False Self functioning 
is the ability to symbolize. The False Self is unable to play and is thus 
unable to experience the ability of the object to survive and hence the 
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deve lopment of the symbo 1 and of rea 1 i ty, wh i ch is ach ieved through the 
destruction of the object in potential space (1951). 
While needing Arthur for those moments of rest, where he felt understood at 
the most fundamental level, Waldo remained intent upon destroying Arthur. 
Theorists have given much attention to the destructive intent of the 
psychotic part of the personality. While one cannot postulate evidence for 
an innate destruct i ve potent i a 1 from the nove 1, the content of Arthur's 
early memories and Waldo's fantasies of murderous intent do suggest the 
potent i a 1 for destruct ion. It wou 1 d appear that th i s potent i alga i ned 
definition and structure with the development of the chi ld, with Waldo 
developing the definitive characteristics detailed by Sohn (1985). Bion 
(1957, 1959), Rosenfeld (1971). Kernberg (1970) Grotstein (1981), Robbins 
(1982). These are the splitting off of dependent, libidinal strivings, 
the attacks upon 1 ink ing, the deva luat i on of others with a concomitant 
aggrandizement of the self , and attempts to control and destroy the 
libidinal aspects of the personality. 
Integration. 
Bion's (1959, 1962, 1967) formulation of the interaction between 
disintegration and integration, and the defensive function of attacks upon 
linking, are suggestive for a possible understanding of Waldo's death. 
Bion suggests that through this interaction, a synthesis is achieved which 
constitutes an emotional experience of meaningfulness. Klein (1946) has 
suggested that the integration of the depressive position is conditional 
upon the ambivalent experience of love and hate toward the whole object, 
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and efforts to rega i n the destroyed object in order to make reparat i on. 
This integration results in the formation of what Klein terms the first 
symbo 1. The researcher's understanding suggests that the awareness of the 
destructiveness of Waldo's hate and Arthur's suffering, which was revealed 
in the poem, constituted the emotional experience of meaningfulness, the 
first symbol for which Arthur had striven - the symbol of integration. 
Th i s moment of integration transcended the split, 
disintegration of Waldo . 
providing for the 
Fear of a similar fate constituted the catastrophic fantasies of Adam, i.e . 
that he would die were he to allow certain awareness to consciousness. The 
crisis of Cal's integration also resulted in a transitory symbolic psychic 
death. 
Notwithstanding the polemical position of Klein's formulation of the Life 
and Death instincts, this thesis suggests that, while unable to validate 
the existence of a Death instinct from birth, there is evidence to suggest 
the workings of a destructive force which acts at times in an ego syntonic 
way. Such an observat ion, in itse If, clear ly does not refute the 
validity of the postulation, by Ego and Self theorists, that the 
destructive forces are secondary manifestations resulting from frustration. 
What is postu 1 ated by the researcher is that, as in the case with the 
grandiose self, the highly organized nature of the functioning suggests an 
independent motivational force opposed to libidinal strivings. Waldo's 
destructive impulses were totally ego syntonic with no experience of guilt. 
Adam's possession by Death was experienced as a split yet totally accepted 
way of being . Cal was able to articulate a sense of death as offering an 
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unarticulated, but welcome sense of identity. The image of Death, in 
these experiential examples, offers an alternative means of merger with the 
maternal image. Thus integration appears to require the overcoming of the 
destructive psychotic parts, with health only being obtained after a period 
of fragmentat i on. The i ntegrat i on may, however, be too traumat i c and 
result in death or psychic death i . e . chronic psychosis. 
Summary. 
A brief summary of the experiential nature of Waldo's life reveals that the 
destructive functioning of envy resulted in the splitting and projection of 
libidina l needs. There was a developing need to hide his 'hatefulness' 
which resulted in a vigilant and fearful interaction with the world, 
characterized by the fear of being revealed. Arthur came to be feared for 
his ability to reveal Waldo. The 'hiding' image was characterized by 
adaptation to the social expectations of others . The image seduced Waldo 
out of himself with a resultant sense of being unreal and attempts to define 
a shape, to give realness, to his existence. This experience was 
compounded by the adaptations which resulted in Waldo losing himself, 
becoming the possession of the other . 
The lack of a libidinal life left Waldo with a sense of emptiness and a fear 
of fragmentat ion. Exper ience was concret i zed, as was the sense of se If, 
characterized by an inab i lity to symbolize. His stabi l ity and shape were 
maintained by a rigidly held framework of beliefs. 
His appropriation of the goodness of others led to a fear of their 
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persecutory retaliation and an inability to integrate introjections. 
Introjection were experienced as impinging. The destruction of libidinal 
strivings precluded Waldo from engaging in empathic object relations. He 
destroyed and was left with only rejecting, fearful objects. 
The pull toward death and other images of withdrawal, 
experience of an alternative merger with a destructive, 
maternal image . 
6.2.3. Experientia I characteristics; Arthur. 
suggest the 
internalized 
Little detailed theoretical attention has been given to the experiential 
nature of the saner aspects of the personality. The thesis suggests that a 
more complete understanding of this pole of experience provides valuable 
insights into the factors which impotize the libidinal strivings . 
Experiential consequences of destruction. 
Both Grotstein (1981) and Robbins (1982) look to the damage which is 
effected to the saner aspects of the personality by the excessive use of 
schizoid defences in borderline and narcissistic functioning. Grotstein 
maintains that the spl it is not between the good and the bad, but rather 
between the psychot i c and the norma 1 parts of the persona 1 ity. His 
theorizing is particularly influenced by Sion. As a consequence of the 
influence of the psychotic aspects there is merely a veneer of cohesion, 
with the normal aspects suffering damage to various degrees and unable to 
contain the chaos of the psychotic world . In similar vein, Robbins 
focusing upon narcissistic functioning, suggests that there is the 
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experience of an internal, crippling disruption which interferes with the 
individuals recognition of object related needs . 
What is perhaps most distinctive of Arthur is his need to reflect Waldo's 
grandeur. Given Grotstein ' s formulation, it would appear that the 
integr ity of Arthur's identity was damaged by the splitting and subsequent 
infiltration of the psychotic aspects. Theoret i ca lly he then became the 
container of the psychotic aspects, but significantly, he also became the 
possessed of the psychotic parts (Robbins). This would explain the 
interaction whereby both Arthur and Waldo felt compelled to protect, and 
were in fact possessed, by the other. Wa 1 do is, however, the on ly one 
able to articulate his experience of feeling possessed. 
The split to the infantile ego resu lts in a split to consciousness. Arthur 
experiences himself as not angry enough to find the words to express his 
understanding. He becomes gagged. Articulation becomes too difficult and 
he is too lazy . The inability to symbolize and express his understanding 
is taken as damage to the saner aspects. Winnicott (1950b) suggests that 
due to the protection of the False Self, the True Self is impoverished 
from lack of experience . Its inherent ability for symbol formation becomes 
deficient. This formulation speaks to Arthur's situation, his i nability 
to articulate the meaning of his experience. It is held, however, that 
Winnicott's conceptualization of the False Self fails to address the 
experiential nature of its destruction. Theoretically one may postulate 
that the development of the False Self results from failure of the 
environment and therefor serves a defensive function i.e. to protect the 
inner experience as suggested by Winnicott. The researcher suggests, 
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however, that experientially, there is not an experience of protection but 
rather active destruction of the inner experience. Clinical material 
offered in this thesis suggests the self destructive nature of the psychotic 
parts which act, not to protect the saner parts, but to destroy them. 
Green's (1986c) idea that the self hate and destruction reflect a confusion 
between the desire to destroy the self and the desire to destroy the object, 
speak more clear ly to th i s d i 1 emma. The sp 1 it off and hidden nature of 
Waldo's envy and hate toward the maternal image become internally directed, 
resulting in efforts to destroy the libidinal self, not to protect it . 
Bion (1957) in discussing envy, conceptualizes the psychotic part as bent 
upon destroying the infant. Destruction is sought through enviously 
assert i ng its mora 1 superi ori ty and arous i ng gu i It . Re 1 at ions between 
Arthur and Wa 1 do were marked, as ment i oned, by the need to ma i nta in 
Waldo's superiority. Waldo's superiority rested upon his conviction that 
his assertions of the aesthetics of the classical ideal afforded him moral 
superiority over others, particularly Arthur. 
Within this context Arthur submitted to the will of Waldo, becoming 
whatever was required, be it stupid or female , in order to reflect Waldo's 
superiority. What is perhaps most significant is Arthur's lack of 
awareness of Waldo's destructive intent toward him. It was only at the end 
of Waldo's life that Arthur became aware of this hatred. Theoretical 
understanding is given in the nature of the split . Following Bion's (1957) 
conceptua 1 i zat i on, Arthur's envy and hatred were sp 1 it off and projected 
onto the breast. With the reintrojection of the persecuting object 
(Waldo), Arthur became the victim of the silent, hidden workings of envy 
(Klein 1957) . 
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Clinical material demonstrates the clients' inability to conceptualize the 
destructive nature of their grandiose functioning . Libidinal strivings, 
when acknowledged, are experienced as debilitating and undesirable. 
Arthur feared that others would scorn his attempts to attain understanding, 
his libidinal strivings toward K. This fear was particularly experienced 
with Waldo and his power to destroy . He was left with a sense of himself 
as inferior and abnormal but unaware of Waldo's hatred toward him. 
Clinical experience with Dan reveals most clearly the lack of awareness of 
the the split off and destructive nature of his envy Dan was initially 
almost totally identified with his psychotic parts . (Sohn 1985, Bion 1957). 
There was destruction of libidinal strivings to the point where, as 
mentioned, he had the experience that he ceased to exist. There was an 
unreal quality to his functioning which was maintained by strong 
identification with intellectual strivings. Within this framework, 
libidinal strivings were devalued. Therapeutic progress allowed an 
articulation of his fear of dependency, but he - was not able to 
conceptualize the destructive nature of his relations with himself. It 
was with Cal and Ben that this articulation arose after much intensive work. 
It was with Cal's crisis of integration that he was able to perceive the 
destruct ive nature of his grandiosity, an experience which is reminiscent 
of Arthur and Waldo's crisis of integration. Ben approached the 
articulation through the holding capacity of therapy. He was able to 
discover the value of libidinal attachment through his work within the 
t herapeut i c s ituat ion and to overcome the power of the grand i ose se If . 
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What was clear, however, was the initial lack of awareness of the 
destructiveness of his grandiosity and yet a fear that he was made 
vulnerable due to his libidinal needs. The fear, arising from the saner 
parts, suggests a fear of the reta 1 i atory persecut ion of the psychot i c 
part, but a fear wh i ch is without a rea 1 i ty based understand ing, due to 
the attacks upon 1 ink i ng by the psychot i c part, and thus unaware of the 
real nature of his self destructiveness. 
A further indicator for the destructive workings of envy is manifest in 
Arthur's guilt. As discussed Bion (1957) sees destruction and arousal of 
guilt as the principal aims of the psychotic part. With Arthur's attempts 
to find integration, Waldo increases his attempts to destroy Arthur. 
These attempts reach such an intensity that Arthur suffers guilt for being 
alive. 
All the clients experienced an unconscious intensification of destructive 
impulses as therapy progressed toward "revealing" their libidinal needs and 
envy i.e. as therapy moved toward giving them the words (the words which 
Arthur sought and Waldo attempted to control). Adam's therapeutic progress 
saw an increase in the attempts of Death to maintain possession of him . As 
his libidinal needs emerged to awareness, suicide and psychic death became 
the dangerous consequences of progress. The power of Death was such that 
there were attempts at suicide. Cal experienced an inability to think and 
a sense that he was going mad, Ben was pu 11 ed toward los i ng h imse If in 
protecting of his mother from his destruction, 
of the power of his internal images. 
224 
while Dan remains fearful 
Experient ia 1 consequences of the sp 1 it. 
Bion (1962) has proposed the importance of the mother's reverie for the 
child's attainment of a sense of reality. Winnicott (1956) forwards a 
similar concept with the formulation of the containing ego of the mother 
allowing the child to move toward an experience of his omnipotence and 
disillusionment and subsequent reality formation. Given the maternal 
failure and the splitting due to envy, Arthur is left with an immature 
ability for reality formation. This is manifest by the struggle which 
character i zes his attempts to understand the wor 1 d. His boundari es are 
permeable and he comes to understanding, K, through merger with others, 
he comes to know h imse If through the needs of others. Green's (1977) 
concept of absence provides a useful framework for understanding Arthur's 
ab il i ty to merge with others . Green suggests that in formulating the 
reality principal, the borderline is faced with a negative refusa l of 
choice - the internal object neither is nor is not there. Hence an 
essential ambivalence between absence and presence occurs . Absence i.e. 
separation from the object (Waldo's withdrawa 1), is experienced as loss, 
as a non existence. There is thus a desire to merge with the object which 
comes to be experienced as death, resulting in a move back to absence . 
This conceptualization captures the interaction and the modus operandi for 
the swing between absence (Waldo) and merger (Arthur) which can be said to 
characterize a conceptualization of Waldo and Arthur constituting the 
intrapsychic conflicts of one individual. 
Characterized by merger, Arthur is able to avoid personal pain, for 
experience of reality is either with or through the other . It is left to 
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Waldo to articulate their reality . Consistent with Bion's understanding of 
attacks upon linking, Arthur suffers from an inability to bridge the broken 
links. It becomes too difficult and having split the aggressive component, 
Arthur cannot make appropriate use of anger to disengage himself from being 
merged with the other. Thus without words, without K, Arthur seeks to 
find the words, the understanding, the wholeness, through others. He 
seeks to recapture the experience of reverie of the omnipotent other, of 
which his mother was not capable. He seeks to recapture this experience in 
an idealized image of Waldo, which is delusionally maintained, resulting 
in his denial of Waldo's hatred toward him. 
There remains a persistence of libidinal strivings. He is symbiotically 
fused and identified with the ma t ernal image and persists in attempts to 
gain her recognition. It is suggested that Arthur pers i sts in his 
attempts to return to omnipotent merger with her in order that his 
exhibitionistic strivings may be reflected (Kohut 1966) . This is evidenced 
by his oceanic experiences . His is, however , thwarted by his inability 
to articulate the experience and thus overcome the omnipotent strivings and 
move toward an integration. Libidinal strivings do, however, allow the 
existence of alive, loving internal objects, as opposed to the fearsome, 
dangerous objects of Waldo's world. 
Clinical experience with Cal's libidinal pole of experience, revealed a 
merged image of mother and son which produced major disruption to his sense 
of identity. Following the theoretical understanding of Bion (1957) and 
Kernberg (1970), the mother image was understood as the introjected 
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idea 1 i zed image wh i ch forms the bas i s of the format i on of the grand i ose 
self or the envious breast. The consequences to Cal of this identification 
were that he could envision no separate identity for himself . Thoughts of 
separateness induced terror and engendered a feeling of possible destruction 
to both h imse 1 f and the mother. (Arthur fe It that he cou 1 d not lose Wa 1 do 
who constituted "more than half of himself"). An image of Siamese twins 
came to symbolize the fear that separateness would result in death. This 
clinical example highlights the extent to which merger with the intrapsychic 
image precludes reality testing and appropriate libidinal strivings. 
A characteristic of reparation. 
Kohut (1968) is the on ly theori st to address the reparat i ve aspects of 
Arthur's experience. Kohut postulates that there is either the development 
of a defensive structure to counteract a feel ing of deadness (which could 
apply to Waldo's functioning) or the development of a compensatory structure 
which attempts to make up for weakness of one of the poles by strengthening 
the other pole. Arthur was aware of Waldo's lack of an inner experience. 
There is a wish to share his experiences, in efforts to give to Waldo and 
to heal the split. In addition one may postulate that his attempts to 
reflect the grandiosity of Waldo, while indicative of his possession by 
Wa 1 do, a 1 so revea 1 attempts to restore narc i ss i st i c refl ect ion and hea 1 
the narcissistic wound. There is the delusional belief, indicative of 
possession, that the psychotic part could function as the total 
persona 1 ity. Arthur was intent upon mak i ng Wa 1 do strong in order that 
Wa 1 do mi ght rep 1 ace the mi ss i ng omn i potence and grand i os ity . Arthur, and 
the clinical material presented suggest that there is a powerful pull toward 
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the promises of invulnerability and self sufficiency of the psychotic parts 
(Rosenfeld 1971). 
Summary. 
Arthur is characterized by his submission to the destructive will of Waldo. 
There is a lack of awareness of the destructive nature of this wi 11 which 
resu lts in spec if i c damage to Ar'thur, name ly his 1 ack of object re 1 ated 
needs, the immaturity of his symbol formation (cognitive process), and the 
delusional reliance upon the psychotic parts for cohesion. Relations are 
characterized by merger, libidinal strivings towards the other and attempts 
at reparation. 
6.3. Concluding comments. 
Elements of experience not addressed by theory. 
The novel illuminates some tentative additions to theory which appear to be 
validated by the clinical practice of the researcher. Focusing on the 
experience of Waldo, theory does not articulate the dependence which 
characterizes his relationship with Arthur. Current theory does not stress 
the dependence, wh i ch is of course imp 1 i cit, of the psychot i c part upon 
the saner aspects to keep it alive. Current theory sees dependence to lie 
in the need for an object to destroy. While destruction of Arthur provided 
a major motivation for Waldo's existence, he also demonstrated a libidinal 
need for Arthur in his intense fear of aloneness and separateness, in his 
sense that Arthur was the only one to understand him, and in those moments 
of spiritual union in bread making. Arthur kept him alive, induced him to 
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tears, remained as a reminder of his human frailty. While hating Arthur, 
there was an awareness of thus being held together by these characteristics 
and his own lack of aliveness. 
Dan swung between awareness of a need to come to terms with his dependency 
needs and devaluation of them. There was a growing awareness that he was 
alive when needing and separate, yet this was accompanied by pain and fear. 
As therapy progressed he looked more and more to the libidinal, sane parts 
to assess his sense of self. 
A further addition is the experience, in the psychotic part, of a 
subjective experience of distress at the sense of unrealness to his 
existence and his attempts to define a sense of self. In this respect the 
goals of both poles converge except that the attempt is thwarted for Waldo 
by the lack of trusting, empathic object relations and the pathological 
destruction which characterizes his interactions (Kernberg) . It appears 
important to distinguish between the distress of the libidinal pole and that 
of the destructive pole. The experience in the latter pole merely serves 
to intensify the grandiosity and destruction, suggestive of the value of 
the interpretation of the pathology of the grandiose self functioning 
advocated by Kernberg. Distress in the libidinal pole is perhaps better 
addressed by a Kohutian approach of containment and reflection which allows 
a more gradual integration of awareness . 
Of further interest is that envy is the sole experience of Waldo and totally 
sp 1 it off for Arthur . The imp 1 i cat i on for therapeut i c progress is that 
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awareness of the destructive intent must occur to the grandiose self, but 
within certain prognostic considerations . Rosenfeld (1978) cautions for a 
clear distinction to be made between the confusional anxieties of the 
borderline and the destruction of the narcissist. What is postulated by 
the researcher is that clear delineation is not possible, which is 
compounded by the fact that theoretically different conceptualizations 
actually reflect overlapping symptomatology. See for example Robbins 
(1982) and Grotstein' s (1981) conceptual izations of damage to the saner 
aspects due to excess ive sch i zoi d defenses. The conceptua 1 i zat ions are 
virtually the same, yet Robbins di scusses narcissistic patients, while 
Grotstein discusses border 1 ine . A compari son of the categori zat ions of 
Kohut and Kernberg and their criteria for prognosis, suggests that they are 
essentially discussing different kinds of patients, yet using similar 
terminology . Kohut (1971) postulates that borderline functioning is not 
analysable, while Kernberg (1970) maintains a far more positive view . It 
is in manifestations of ego weakness in narcissistic functioning that he 
sees the poor prognos is. What is postu 1 ated by the researcher is that 
i ntervent i on shou 1 d be focused upon the destruct i ve strength and power of 
the grand i ose se lf to possess the saner aspects. It wou 1 d seem that the 
greater the ego weakness, the stronger the possession of the grandiose 
self, and the poorer the prognosis. It is postulated that awareness of 
pain without the holding of the saner aspects of the self will merely result 
i n the intensification of hate and destruction of the grandiose self . 
Recognition (Kohut's mirroring transference) of the poles of experience, 
and the facilitation of idealization (Kohut's idealizing transference) 
facilitates the demystification of the dangers of the hate and envy, while 
a 11 owing the deve 1 opment of a be 1 ief in the worth of the deva 1 ued aspects 
230 
through the development of a benign idealized object. Thus it would appear 
that, while Kernberg offers to the researcher a more articulate delineation 
of the grand i ose se lf, it is to Kohut that one looks for a therapeut i c 
orientation. 
Focus i ng upon Arthur a number of aspects are revea 1 ed. Arthur, together 
with a number of the clients, experienced a feminine identification of this 
particular pole of experience. Empathic object relating is experienced 
within a feminine orientation and manifests in the search for an idealized 
male object, which is felt to complement the incomplete sense of self. 
What is postulated as significant is the progress of this orientation. 
Dan's identification initially manifested as a homosexual orientation and 
fear of women. With progress there was a move toward searching for the 
father, rather than the lover, and a lessening of the fear of women. 
All the clients demonstrated some degree of disturbance of sexuality, 
either in gender identity, or in infantile strivings, with no genital 
strivings, or with the genital strivings overlaid by the infantile 
strivings . In this respect there are indications of pre-genital fixations 
of development. It may be that Kohut's focus is to the undeveloped 
libidinal pole of experience, while Kernberg's is to the pathological 
defensive structures. 
Arthur maintains the independent effort to attain wholeness through 
spiritua 1 ity. While these strivings suggest a continuance of a quest for 
omnipotence and merger with an idealized image, it is suggested that they 
provide valuable energies for therapeutic progress. It is through the 
strengthening of these strivings that the ego will be able to overcome its 
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destructive orientation. Hence the need to develop a firm therapeutic 
alliance with the libidinal aspects, through the mirroring and idealizing 
transferences . 
The theories of ego theori sts such as Hartmann, Jacobson, Mah 1 er and 
independent theorists such as Fairbairn, Balint, and Khan, have not 
addressed the experiential phenomena explicated from the novel - the dual 
nature of the experi ence of narc i ss i st i c wound i ng. Their contribut ion 
lies in articulation of the importance of the maternal environment and the 
manifestations of defenses against the failure of such an environment. It 
is postulated that the lack of focus on intrapsychic conflict and the 
vicissitudes of aggression, fail to address the experience of duality as 
explicated in the theories of Bion, Grotstein, Robbins and Sohn, amoung 
others i . e. the theorists who have focused upon the experience of internal 
conflictual relations. 
The thesis draws attention to the relationship which exists between the two 
po 1 es of exper i ence. Wh i le the amp 1 if i cat i on of the nove 1 suggests an 
embodiment of seperate parts, it has been the stress of this thesis to 
suggest that significance lies in the relationship between the libidinal and 
aggressive components. There is a co-existence which constitutes an entity 
of experience between the two poles. It is this between, the transitional 
space (Winnicott 1951), which embodies the duality to which this thesis 
points. 
Within this understanding it is postualted that the individual theories of 
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Kohut and Kernberg fail to address both poles of experience. Kernberg's 
focus on the destruct i ve components fa i 1 s to incorporate the experi ent i a 1 
nature and function of libidinal strivings, in that he misses the tensions 
between the strivings of the grandiose self and the libidinal aspects. 
Kohut fails to address the genesis of aggression and similarly the tensions 
between the aggressive and libidinal strivings . 
The thesis suggests that narcissistic wounding represents both a 
developmental fixation (Kohut) and a pathological structuring (Kernberg). 
These aspects become articulated by attention to the experiential nature of 
the intrapsychic conflict which finds it expression in the transitional 
space of the duality, i . e . in an articulation of an entity between the two 
poles. This articulation rests upon a synthesis between the aggressive and 
libidinal strivings, where Waldo may be said to symbolize Kernberg's 
grandiose self, and Arthur, Kohut's fixation of libidinal development. 
Thus attention is drawn to a relationship of co-existence between libidinal 
and aggressive components i.e. the dual nature of narcissism and the 
interactive nature of its experience (Grunberger 1981) . 
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APPENDIX. 
Hermeneutic dialogue. 
p.23. 
1 Waldo and the dogs revolve around Arthur. Waldo puts on Arthur's coat 
roughly. The action is dictated by duty and common sense. Duty is seen as 
honest, while sentiments are mistrusted. 
Wa ldo 's actions towards Arthur are those of love and affection, yet the fe It 
sense is a denial of such feelings. It is not a personal involvement. 
'Duty' sets him free, it is an action within a frame of prescription, 
without confusion or feeling. Waldo, by identifying with the norms of his 
parents finds a framework for him to 'be', experience himself, and yet to 
avo id h imse If. 
2 Waldo believes that there is too much giving in to illness and 
imagination . 
This speaks of a controlling attitude towards himself. Wa ldo gains a 
'strength' by den ia 1 of an experience of vu lnerab il ity in illness and 
significant ly, by denia 1 of an inner experience of imagination. He does 
not allow the inner experience to have value, but rather views it in the 
same vein as an illness. It is an experience viewed as debilitating and 
not to be trusted. 
3 In response to Arthur's hair, Waldo catches at the poetry of the visual 
image but he rejects it. He searches for 'rea lity' which denies the sou 1 
of the image. He wi 11 not a llow the image to speak to him, to engage him, 
rather he maintains a distanced, objective view of the image e.g. 'doubtful 
white' rather than 'silvery'. 
Poetry, which is the use of imagination involves a response . He has to 
draw from what he embodies and Wa ldo cannot do th is, for there is not a 
fe It sense of a se If to draw from. His experience of himse If is lived 
through and against Arthur, yet whom he wishes to kill. (There are thus 
interna 1 images of destruction.) 
Maintaining an objective, controlled view of the poetry of his world also 
has imp lication for his se If- image. His bodi liness is perce ived as an 
objective fact, a fact of be ing over which he be lieves he has contro 1. He 
can control his physical fate, yet his body betrays him. His body 
character istica lly shudders whenever the sensua 1, the beautifu 1, enter his 
world. Waldo's control keeps him outside of his experience, precludes a 
fe lt sense of aliveness. 
p.24. 
4 In Waldo's philosophy, pain is the result of indigestion , swallowing too 
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quickly in cold weather, punishment for greed. 
Chest-pa in, wMch constrict breath, is thought of as punishment for greed, 
one will be punished for wanting. This archaic understanding suggest a 
pre-verbal level of experience where understanding of suffering comes at a 
phys ica 7, ora I 7eve 7. 
Indigestion problems suggests that Waldo cannot thrive on what he is fed and 
there remains a hunger and greed, for which he feels punished. 
6 Waldo physically leads Arthur - in the forms of habit. 
Waldo relies on habit to give meaning to his and Arthur's life, while also 
rigidifying the relationship between them. Habit and duty become the 
substitutes for the 7ack of meaning, lack of substance in their lives. By 
re 7ying on hab it Wa Ida can protect both h imse If and Arthur, (and the 
situation) aga inst awareness of emptiness, and aga inst encroachments. Even 
while protecting Arthur he resent the tie between them and experiences his 
twinship as a harness. 
7 Life is reduced to habit and reason is driven inwards yet the two stumble 
on. 
To avoid stumbling, falling, hurting Waldo has reduced life to predictable 
inevitab i I it ies. Reason has become a se If dia logue wh ich feeds off itse If. 
Waldo hopes to control and avoid vulnerability by feeding only on himself, 
yet the se If feeding weakens and he stumb les. 
8 In the face of Arthur's breathing difficulties Waldo becomes more rigid . 
He needs to defend himself from Arthur's vulnerability, (his need for 
Arthur), his wish for Arthur's death. 
9 Waldo is guided by the thought that 'there is only one direction'. 
He is not open to possibilities, to possibility of choice. Possibility 
implies choice, confusion, ambivalence. Waldo must rigidly maintain an 
understanding of the world as good or bad. He must defend himself from a 
known sense of his own confusion and emotions. What is seen as possible is 
that dictated by convention, 'the road', the good, acknowledged by all. 
p.25. 
10 For Waldo the main road leads to life, which he wants to see. He does 
not feel himself to be in his life, yet there is desperate wanting. 
11 Waldo implies that Arthur denies him a full life . 
Arthur is blamed for Waldo's sense of not being in his life. Waldo 
experiences Arthur as persecutory and attributes a II the 'badness' to him. 
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12 The burst of emotion punctures Waldo. 
He has revea led his inner experience, that is his need to be in his life . 
He has revea led a need and hence revea led himse If. Wa ldo 's anger and 
vulnerability, his feelings have been revealed. It is the revealing of 
these emotions which puncture Waldo. He would rather have maintained an 
'image', rather have done the 'right thing ' and implied a goodness he did 
not feel. In this way he would have concealed the need and the resentment 
at its lack of fu lfilment. 
He becomes depressed when he fai l s to maintain the 'image'. 
He is angry at revealing his neediness rather than maintaining an image of 
the caring brother, and the anger is experienced as depression. 
l3 There is no meaning for Waldo in 'meandering' in 'side issues'. He cannot 
play. 
14 Wa ldo 's oilskin is a metaphor for his bodiliness. He is stiff, holding 
in all his hurt, with a constant expectation of hurt. His vulnerability 
I ies in a brittle, unyie lding qua lity. 
15 Waldo cannot express concern in a selfless way. He allows Arthur to know 
that asking of others is an impingement, both to himself and to others . 
Wa ldo is neither capable of giving concern nor of receiving it. The other 
is then experienced as having power over him. 
16 He is unab Ie to see the effect he has on Arthur. 
understand Arthur's life from h is own perspective, he 
into Arthur's world and be empathetic. 
Wa Ido can on Iy 
is unab Ie to enter 
17 In Waldo's experience only he experiences hurt. Waldo is envious of 
Arthur who he sees as not experi enc i ng the ug 1 y and abras i ve qua 1 ity of 
l ife, 'though he should have'. 
Wa ldo believes that life smiles favourably upon Arthur and that Arthur 
unfairly escapes the hurts of life. Waldo's experience is against a 
backdrop of an unp leasant life, devo id of beauty, softness and tenderness. 
p.26 . 
18 Wa 1 do seduces h imse If by adopt i ng the 
brother where he aims to impress rather than 
To impress others is to gain recognition . 
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role of 
please. 
It is, 
the indulgent, elder 
however, a se lective 
showing of himself. A recognition, by another, of an aspect of himself 
which remains within his control and involves -an advantage to himself. 
To please another is to give pleasure through some aspect of himself. 
Waldo cannot give pleasure, for giving involves a giving away, as it were, 
of an aspect of h imse If. Wa Ida's unconsc ious anx iety is that he wi II not 
survive the loss of loosing a part of himself. 
He is envious of Arthur, that he is their Mother's first born. In 
striving to impress he adopts those attitudes of which his Mother would 
approve and hence attains the vis ible place of acclaim where he can be seen 
and admired by her and yet not show or give of himself. 
19 Waldo's voice contains a life unknown to himself. He uses it to impress 
without acknowledging or being aware what else the voice reveals. 
The voice revea Is one, both by what is spoken and how it is spoken. Despite 
himself Wa ldo reveals himself in such a way that insensitive men recoiled . 
There is a sensuousness, a seduction, of which Wa Ida is not aware, or 
which he denies. 
He exalts the position of his mind, rejecting the sensuous and the sensuous 
connection with his Mother. 
The mind wh ich th inks and ana lyses, and does not fee I, is embraced ra ther 
than the voice which revea Is too much. The voice gratifies Mother by what is 
both sensuous and feminine in her son. Wa Ida denies what is sensuous and 
feminine in himself and deva lues those aspects seen in Arthur . 
20 The sensuous, ri ch abundance of Arthur's ha i r both fasc i nates and 
repulses Waldo. There is a suggestion of a moment of holding the richness, a 
tender moment in contrast to the impulse to hack away the hair. This 
conflict is captured by the involuntary shivering of Waldo's body, while 
hating the smell of his own mucus . 
Waldo's responsiveness to the sensuous feel of Arthur's hair is in 
contradiction to a conscious revulsion for what is soft, feminine and 
vulnerable. Waldo attempts to destroy the image, yet his body betrays the 
conflict. The hatred becomes a revulsion to his own body - a hatred of his 
own body fluids . 
21 Waldo cannot accept that objects in his world fall to bits. 
There is a denial of the anxiety of fragmenting and of dying. There is the 
sense that his life is held together by mould . 
There is an image of fragmentation he Id together by paras itic life. (Wa Ida 
character is tica lIy experiences his life as fragmenting when he is confronted 
by an outer rea lity wh ich undermines h is rea lity). He is he Id together by 
Arthur, but by what he experiences as Arthur feeding off him. His inner 
life, the substance of his life, is felt as stagnant, dark, hidden from 
light. 
p.27. 
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22 Mother assumes traditional male roles because the inability of father to 
fill them is so apparent. There is a sense of no man in the family being man 
enough for Mother. 
She assumes the ro Ie of strength but is resentfu I and strugg les. Dad 
cannot help her and she wi II a lIow neither Wa Ido nor Arthur to attempt to 
fill the male role. 
23 Memory stirs a yearning which Waldo does not identify. He is only aware 
of a faint desire to touch Arthur. 
He is unaware of a sadness or a need for closeness. Rather he devalues the 
need to touch, and the source of his need, Arthur. 
p.28. 
24 Words belie the hate mother feels for Mrs. Poulter. 
Mother's words imp Iy a rea I ity wh ich is fa Ise to the rea I ity of her actions. 
His mother presents publicly what is socially acceptable and denies how she 
rea Ily fee Is - superior, contemptuous, and scared. She wants to keep Mrs 
Poulter out, and passively withdraws into the centre of the house, the 
dining room. 
Symbo lica lIy the room where contact, feeding, nour ishment takes place. 
She negates the truth of her words and the va lue of giving. Wa Ido attempts 
to embody or identify with his mother's values. Attributes such as 
narrowness, rigidity, a I ienation from others characterize Wa Ido in his 
identity with his mother. 
p.29. 
27 Waldo maintains there is nothing to write about in Mr Saporta. There are 
closed re la tions to others. He does not experience the dimens ions wh ich 
are open to Arthur. He can only experience others in terms of himself. 
Wa Ido is confronted by his inab il ity to see into that part of h imse If wh ich 
matters. He cannot move beyond his own avoidance of himself to be able to 
see the substance or truth of another. He has nothing to believe in. The 
parents believe neither in themselves nor in anything else. There is no 
truth, no other, in which to believe. He cannot accept Arthur's wisdom, 
Arthur is too much himse If. 
p.30 . 
28 The more Arthur shows that he has good things or thoughts that are his 
alone and highlights this discrepancy, the more Waldo must strike out, walk 
fast in a frantic effort to leave Arthur. 
Wa Ido cannot a lIow Arthur a separate existence, it is too threatening to 
Waldo's own existence. Waldo is also envious of Arthur. 
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29 Waldo sees Mr Dunn within his own personal frame of relating and which is 
a projection of his own inner world of experience . People are feared for 
their sma II, mean, contemptuous, ordinary lives, which is a denia I of 
awareness of his own limited life . 
30 Waldo hates Arthur in the context of his transparent simplicity. There is 
a part of his being which matters to Arthur, a part he can be lieve in. 
Waldo is envious of this aspect. 
31 Waldo feels that he has not experienced half of what is in him to 
express. His longing for the brick houses has become a hate, which he 
must contra 1. 
There is anxiety as to the nature of the se If he longs to express. He has 
yearned too much that there is hate and envy. Hate and envy for the 
conta ined I ives of others. Wa Ido does not fee I conta ined and he must 
therefore control his feelings, and control others who may evoke feelings. 
Contro I then becomes very important for fear of the dangerous consequences 
of his hate . He must stifle his spontaneity. 
p. 31. 
32 \~a1do wonders whether Arthur is impressed by reason, and notices that 
Arthur is at times anxious. 
Waldo is only able to catch at the meanings and implications of Arthur's 
life, understanding is however always closed by devaluing Arthur's 
experiences. 
33 Waldo is held rigid by the images which arise at the prospect of Arthur 
keeping the family. 
There may have been hope, evocations of life and being contained in life, 
in br ick boxes, where peop Ie I ive open, pub I ic lives. These images 
revea I the scars of his boyhood which was not lived. 
34 Waldo is the smaller, second born of the boys and also the initially sick 
child. 
Mastery, omnipotence, specia lness is thwarted from the first. 
35 Mother's insists that Waldo, after his illness i s now strong. 
Needing Waldo to be strong denies , rejects the neediness of the little boy. 
It also comes in the context that mother is not true, she does not offer a 
substance which he can be I ieve in. 
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p.32. 
36 There are no other children . Mother is grunting, vague, etc; there is 
an ambiguity in her relations to children. They are experienced as a burden. 
(Later Waldo senses that mother and father are a unit which excludes him). 
Waldo has a belief that there will be no more children. 
He knows what he cannot articu late - that mother does not love them, and 
that they destroy her. 
37. Each of the rna 1 es in mother's fami ly has a 'defect', Wa 1 do's innards, 
Arthur's 'stupidity' and dad's clubbed foot. 
The phys ica I defects act as the conta in ing metaphors of the ir respective 
psychic battles. Waldo to express and find his inner self, Arthur to find 
a way to allow h is inner I ife to be understood, and dad to be ab Ie to be in 
the world, walk in the world. (The halves of the twins attempt to heal 
the emptiness in the father?) The men do not succeed in healing, and 
mother continues to 'ho Id' . It is dad's weakness wh ich mother converts 
into his strength, it allows her superiority. 
38 Waldo grew delicately and stayed with mother. 
Wa Ida's identity becomes enmeshed with being weak, sad, feminine, 
identified with mother. 
39 Waldo felt lost without Arthur. It was something he couldn't explain, 
although he knew that Arthur knew. 
As a ch i Id Wa Ida is aware of and accept ing of h is need for Arthur and the ir 
shared existence. 
40 As children Waldo was able to admit the sensuous enjoyment in looking at 
Arthur. Arthur almost seemed edible. Waldo liked to smell and touch him. 
Wa Ida's sensuous enjoyment kept a I ive, fed by Arthur. Later Wa Ido becomes 
identified with the conscious, rationa I, va lues of his parents in order to 
ga in a sense of substance, to deny the lack of substance. As children, 
Wa Ido is sti 1/ ab Ie to accept and need Arthur to fi 1/ out his sense of se If. 
In loving Arthur he can love himself. 
41 Waldo loved to be kissed, and then buried the moment. He kisses his 
own image in the mirror. 
Waldo longed for love, but denied the need. In uniting with both himself 
and an image of himself, he is able to find a fulfilment of his need. 
Se If-fu Ifilment becomes a grandiose compensation for lack of love. There 
evolves an idealized image of himself in a sensuous self-involvement. As 
chi Idren part of his response to Arthur is a fused se If -love. 
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p.33. 
42 The twins were inextricably intertwined. Arthur and Waldo are 
intertwined in their breathing, breathing the same life. 
There is a confus ion and fus ion of the ir emotiona I life. 
43 Father idealizes Arthur's strength. 
These are fantasy images which compensate dad for being a spectator to life. 
44 Dad believes that ideals, 'God' would be spoilt by interaction with the 
vicissitudes of humanness. 
The "gods", the idea Is, are images removed from interaction and contact or 
engagement with the living. They are images which offer no hope, no 
comfort . Yet to be human is to be reduced. To struggle and strive is seen 
as diminishing, to be reduced to sweating lumps. There is no glory or 
meaning to striving or engaging in one's life because there is nothing to 
believe in. 
There is also no parental model for belief in life, in spirituality, in 
'something' to believe in, not even in oneself, as human. 
46 Wa 1 do remembers the myths as be i ng for Arthur, wh i 1 e he on ly ha If-
1 istened. 
Arthur remembers Waldo pestering for the myths. Waldo must deny this 
reality for it speaks of his search, his need to find something to believe 
in . He cannot a /low others, or even himse If, to know the importance of 
things, for that would reveal the pain Initially Arthur was dad's 
favourite . 
Dad wanted Arthur to be his god, beautiful and strong, something he could 
believe in. Waldo is too much like himself. 
47 Dad shows his 'affection' for Arthur in ways which show the 
disappointment, the crippled, bitter man, bound by duty. Love for Waldo 
is justified by a sense that his father is just in his dealings with 
everyone. 
Arthur fa i Is the ir father, how much less can Wa Ido do who is the weaker, 
less handsome of the twins. 
In his physical and emotional identification with his dad, Waldo too is 
bitter and suffering. Arthur fails him too. 
p.34. 
48 Waldo's relationship with his father is strained. He sees his father as 
yellow and horrid looking . He senses that his father is not at ease in his 
body with his club foot and that he seeks to hide this discomfort. 
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In his identification with his dad, Waldo hates not only his father but 
a Iso h imse If, and like dad seeks to h ide from the wor Id the inner wor Id of 
emptiness and hate. 
His father feels caught in Waldo seeing his suffering and is immediately 
reminded of Arthur, reaching for something denied him. On having his 
vu Inerabil ity exposed dad seeks comfort through Arthur but the need is 
truncated. There is a negation of Waldo in father's response to him. 
There is no recogn ition of h imse If for h imse If but ra ther a confus ion of 
identity which reminds Waldo of his inability to gratify his father. 
49 Waldo wants to make amends. 
Amends for not being what father wants and for not being Arthur, for being 
unab Ie to make dad who Ie. Wa Ida's attempts are doomed. 
Dad's limp is a crippling which conveys itself to Waldo and they limp and 
struggle as if in one body. 
Waldo loses himself in his father's pain. Waldo cannot give to his father 
and fa ils by be ing overwhe Imed by the cripp ling. There is not enough of 
Waldo to withstand the crippling. 
Arthur is ab Ie to carry the cripp ling. He is the one to attempt 
understanding, and wi II brave the confusion and stupidity in the hope of 
knowing, of saving. Wa Ida cannot and he becomes a watcher and not a 
partic ipant. 
p. 35. 
50 Waldo maintains there can only be one genius in the family. 
He is resentful that mother looks to Arthur to fulfil some aspect which he 
feels should be his, his special place which defines him. Waldo is not 
given a reflection of himself which he can recognize. He can only know 
himself through or against Arthur. 
p.36. 
51 Waldo collects words which offer a sensuous pleasure of which he is 
unaware. He is upset by what is experienced as Arthur's impingement by 
finding a new word. He rejects Dad's offer of contact, pointing out, 
cuttingly, that the area is Arthur's vocation. 
Words are used to define himself, to give himself a sense of outline and 
substance. In this way words feed him, but it is spoilt by Arthur's felt 
impingement, and Wa Ido begins to destroy, in this instance his contact 
with dad. There is a compulsive quality which speaks to the fragility of 
Wa Ida's sense of se If. 
52 Yet he goes out of his way to protect Arthur's activities, 'rites', for 
fear of the opinion of ·others. Waldo would suffer from their oplnlon. 
Wa Ida is dr iven to protect Arthur in order to protect h imse If from others, 
from other's thoughts about h imse If and Arthur. As if the thoughts 
themselves might harm, destroy his sense of self. 
53 When Arthur baked bread, in the lampl ight, these were the times when 
love for Arthur, was experienced, mixed with guilt. 
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Wa Ida fee Is capab Ie of lov ing Arthur when they are a lone. And 
sign ificant Iy, when he can share a moment wh ich evokes a sense of 
spiritua lity. 
p.38 . 
54 Waldo decides that his family is hopeless, yet they would be there 
inevitably . 
The family is a disappointment to Waldo. It was the reality that his 
parents failed to provide models which he could believe in . At some point, 
however, the fami Iy's inferiority acts to promote Wa Ida's own sense of 
superiority. Yet it provides comfort that they are inevitab Ie, he wil I 
not have to be alone. 
55 He feels as if he is disturbing the peace by informing the family of his 
plans to write a Greek tragedy. Dad response is to point out that he has 
neither seen, nor read one, he must learn to live first. Waldo finds it 
difficult to discern whether there is pleasure or displeasure in dad's 
response to him. 
Wa Ida's chi Idhood attempts to be creative, grandiose, are met with 
ambiva lence and de fens iveness from dad. 
p.39. 
56 Given encouragement from his mother and the possibility of attention 
Waldo sidles. 
He does not a I low others to see how he fee Is or to witness the wanting in 
his heart. He contro Is so that he cannot be caught off-guard, and hence 
he is not ab Ie to be enthra lied by anything or anyone. Wa Ido impresses 
rather than pleases, watches rather than participates. 
57 Wa 1 do fee 1 s the play to be someth i ng he does not want to share with 
Arthur. Arthur already is felt to look right inside him. But Walda's 
rejection does not sway Arthur, who meets everything wi th a good-tempered 
equilibrium. 
Wa Ido wants an existence separate from the sense of a shared life with 
Arthur, in wh ich Arthur can see into h is innermost core Yet Arthur 
remains, he cannot be hurt. (To define himself, to have a sense of himself 
as separate, he must kill off Arthur, but Arthur wont be killed.) Arthur 
absorbs everything, even aggression. 
The family shift attention to Arthur's play about the cow and the still born 
calf. 
p.40. 
58 Arthur's tragedy grips each member. Mother does not want to hear more 
for she understands enough. Arthur tries to show that there is hope, 
there are other calves st i ll to be born, yet this does not convey hope to 
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mother. She has not left behind her family, and clings to the 
disappointed remnants of her former life. 
Arthur attempts to share his pa in at the sti II born hope of his fami Iy, at 
the disappointments in their lives, especia Ily the twins , who are not what 
mother hoped for. But mother cannot be comforted. 
59 Waldo experiences Arthur's playas frightening, yet devalues it as 
ridiculous, consoling himself that he will write a play when he has thought 
of one. 
At some level Arthur's play speaks to Waldo, yet he is afraid of the 
emotion, of the pain and hope. He copes by making it meaningless and 
bolstering his own sense of importance, (by dreams of finding the words to 
say what becomes a desperate search to find the words to define himself) . 
This response becomes characteristic and less and less flexible. 
60 Dad remains tired and patient. 
Dad is defeated. 
p.4l. 
61 Mother pretends nothing has happened. 
Mother does not provide a mirror to the reality of the experience. Nothing 
happens in their lives. They are defeated and passively resistant to life. 
62 Waldo's boyhood is experienced as endless and suffocating with the fear 
of being caught. The other boys are remembered for their brutality which 
reminds Waldo that Arthur acquired a ferret, yet his hopes of loving it 
were unfulfilled as it disappeared. 
An unhappy childhood, dominated by fear of others, and associated with 
split off sadistic feelings towards Arthur. That Arthur should not have 
the object of his love is satisfying to Wa Ida, yet it a Iso reinforces the 
hopelessness of Waldo's own quest to be loved. 
63 Waldo is oppressed by the presence of 
he cannot bear . 
Arthur's presence is fe It as oppress ive, 
which he can neither lay down nor endure. 
his twin, and consumed by the fear 
something which he wil I revea I. 
p.42. 
Arthur, who is a responsibility, 
predatory, yet a respons ib il ity 
Wa Ida is agonized by the life of 
that Arthur wi 11 destroy him by 
64 Wa 1 do detested the morn ing wa 1 k with his dad and was g lad when he was 
away at work. 
There is contempt and hate for h is dad and Wa Ido is happier when he is away 
65 Alone in the school room he calls Arthur a fat, helpless, female . 
These are the times when he loves Arthur the most . The times he can just 
sit and not have to think, but he denies that they are propping each other 
up. 
Waldo experiences the femaleness of Arthur as helpless, devalued, yet it 
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is this qua lity which a llows him to rest, to stop his vigilance and just 
be, but he still denies their mutua I need for each other. 
66 Waldo felt that others, like himself, tried not to show how impressed 
they were with Arthur's mathematical ability. 
Waldo, while he depreciates Arthur's gift, still catches at the 
specialness of the moment, yet he is unable to be moved by the moment. 
The genuineness, the rea Iness, of the moment does not convince him. 
p.43. 
67 Waldo feels that something seems to strengthen Arthur against the evils 
which Waldo senses. 
It is this strength that Waldo both needs, for his own protection against 
the frightening world, and which he hates for it being Arthur's. 
68 Waldo hated the schoolmate Johnny (who was good at most subjects) and 
would be physically affected by Johnny's presence. Waldo reads his essay 
to the class imitating his dad's prim voice. 
He fears what Johnny has, is envious of his ability and protects himself by 
imitating his dad. His dad whom he has not yet learned to hate for his 
weakness and his inability to allay Wa Ida's fears of people. 
69 The essay details botanical names of weeds and a fantasy of a deserted 
house where a number of murders have been committed. To continue reading 
aloud is d iff i cu It for fear of expos i ng thoughts too pri vate, except to 
Arthur. The fantasy is of a man carrying a basin of blood of the children 
he has lured and murdered. 
Wa Ida attempts to contra I his fantasy through sterile cata loguing ( his 
future career in the library). He is able to impress himself and deny the 
fear yet the fantasy seeps out, a ta Ie of murderous terror I iving in the 
neg lected aspects of Wa Ida's experience. The murder of ch ildren to satisfy 
blood lust. The twins become the sacrifice for the parents, they take 
away the life of the boys to feed the ir lives. 
p.44. 
70 Waldo is terrorized by his playmates, yet his experiences is that while 
it is real, none of it is. He felt aware that even his mother could not 
soothe him. Not even when she herself was covered with his blood. 
Waldo cannot experience his life as real for terror of losing his blood. 
His mother could not help when she needs his blood to save herself. 
p.45. 
71 In his rescuing of Waldo, Arthur appears to Waldo to be a flaming angel. 
Arthur is is prepared to fi ght to protect Wa 1 do, yet his appearance and 
passion frightens Waldo . 
Waldo experiences Arthur's actions as designed to make a fool of him. 
Wa Ida is afra id of emotion, of pass ion, of what is ins ide him. He cannot 
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then accept Arthur's love, experiencing it as an impingement which 
threatens and is therefor persecutory. 
Waldo experiences Arthur's anger as shameful and revealing. Shame is the 
emotion which becomes associated with any feelings which imply a commitment 
or need for anything other than the Classica I Idea I espoused by dad. 
p.46. 
72 The image of a flaming angel speaks of spirituality. Waldo experiences 
Arthur's rescue as spiritual, yet within the context of dad's injunction 
that everything supernatura I (spiritua I) is non-existent, Wa Ido cannot 
believe in the motives of the rescue and must depreciate it. 
73 Wa 1 do is proud to be en 1 i ghtened, and wou 1 d 1 ike to be permanent ly 
'immaculate', yet Waldo feels that his knowledge is not enough to protect 
him against Arthur who drags him down. 
Wa Ida is identified with the fear of h is dad, and wou Id like to withdraw 
from the 'sweating lumps' of humanity into grandiose isolation, to withdraw 
and deny his own vulnerability. Arthur however, acts as a mirror, 
continua 11y reminding him of h is human ity, compe 11 ing him into response. 
p.47. 
75 Arthur's integrity is called into question over his protection of Waldo. 
Dad appears to never recover from the shock, wh i 1 e mother, who knows, 
finds the telling painful. 
Parents unable to know their son, they accept his destruction and bow to 
pub lic sanction. 
76 Waldo is left feeling all the more runtish, longing desperately to be 
touched in a place he despairs will ever be touched. 
Waldo betrays and watches the helplessness of his parents to defend and 
believe in their child. 
77 Arthur comforts by emphasizing their unity . 
Arthur rescues by merging 
p. 48. 
78 There is a part of Waldo which is willing to be dragged back into merger 
with Arthur, for it is a place which he knows best. 
What Arthur offers is what Wa Ido knows but he fights it, fights the merger 
and identity with Arthur. 
79 Waldo tolerates his dad, yet despises that while dad clings to his 
principles he is unable to impress himself, unable to believe the image he 
conjures up. 
Wa 1 do exper iences mother and dad mak ing a un it wh i ch exc 1 udes h imse If and 
Arthur. 
There is no special place for Waldo, and in desperation he must cling to 
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Arthur, who is a I I he has left. 
p.53. 
80 Dad stops the visits to the bank, fearing Arthur's emotions. 
Dad shows how fearfu I emotions are when he fears h is own son. 
81 Waldo feels deflated in importance, the bank is so permanent and 
reliable . 
Wa Ida is given reassurance and importance by imput ing to the bank the human 
qua lities he cannot find in his parents, something permanent to believe in. 
p.54. 
82 Waldo sees his dad crushed by the cage of his life, looking for a hope 
beyond reach. Mother probes, (her blood lust) and Waldo can only relieve 
his own despair by destroying a slug . 
Wa Ida is confronted by dad's defeat by I ife . He cannot turn to mother for 
she needs to feel the pain, through the other. He must bury his despair 
in destruction, which becomes the destruction of everyth ing wh ich cou Id 
have meaning for him. 
p.55. 
83 The twins look at themselves in the plate glass windows, each seeing an 
image of h imse 1 f. A sense of thei r strength in stubbornness, Arthur 
strengthened by the conviction that only his body would topple and Waldo by 
his sense of moral conviction. 
Arthur has an inner sense of himself which is not dependent upon his body, 
and Waldo is strengthened by his sense of moral superiority. 
The paucity of spirit of the parents has become a virtue, it is the only 
thing his parents gave Waldo to believe in; nothing can only be nothing. 
That in the end a77 one has is nothing (not even belief in oneself) . 
p.56. 
84 Love leads to servility. 
Wa Ida cannot love for fear of the other, fear of los ing h is sense of 
super iority and becoming aware of his vulnerability, his longing to be 
loved and to love, to believe and have someone to believe in. Instead he 
adopts a grandiose position, he elevates himself to compensate for his 
unmet needs. 
85 The myths are felt as evil and obscene, the morning is evil , and he for 
a while, no longer smells the mucus in his nostrils . 
The myths wh ich former Iy offered hope are now deva lued and destroyed, Wa Ida 
destroys that wh ich offers hope, the hope he longs for but cannot accept . 
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(He a Iso destroys the hope possible in relation to Dulcie.) 
his own sense of evi I and feels purified. 
He projects 
86 Hates Dulcie's judgement, rather than his own lack of it and he is left 
feeling that resentment is easier to bear than an imitation of love . 
The pain of Dulcie's rejection is lessened by his own sense of superiority 
and objectivity. He holds himself above such emotions as love. Yet the 
pain makes itself fe7t but Waldo must deny it and control it. 
p.57. 
87 Arthur wants Waldo to ~ that words are not what make you see. 
Waldo staggers with his blind faith in words, he cannot accept that words 
have no life outside of the life given them. He must deny the emptiness of 
the words, clinging to what he has been taught, turning it into dogma to 
compensate for the emptiness. 
Arthur is open to another experience, what experience itse If can teach. 
p.58. 
88 Arthur wonders about the cruelty in man and the crucifixion. Waldo 
cannot listen, and looks to the houses to provide proof of man's 
rationality. He cannot look full on though for fear of seeing perversity. 
The cruc ifix ion embodies mank ind' s ha tred and sadism. Wh ile Arthur gropes 
towards understanding these emotions, Waldo closes his mind to 
acknowledging them as his. His purity has been settled by dogma, and he 
avoids anything which challenges his tenuous sense of self. The ideal is to 
contro I a 77 emotions, to show and see on Iy the facades, to present an 
impress ion. It is, however life itse If which cha 77enges/threatens his 
image of h imse If and others. Life wh ich revea Is itse If to him cont inua 77y 
through Arthur. He progressively narrows his contact with the world to 
protect himself from the fragmentation of shattered beliefs, but Arthur 
remains (to keep him alive). 
89 Waldo takes refuge behind the grandiose images evoked by his illusions of 
his mother's superiority. The desperation of his fear is given in the 
grandiose de Ius ions wh ich accompany h is identification with h is mother, 
others are seen as inferior or disgusted and embarrassed by Arthur. Wa Ido 
projects his own feelings of inferiority on to others, while Arthur becomes 
the possessor of Wa Ido 's own denied 'badness '. The disgust and 
embarrassment Waldo feels for himself is denied and projected onto Arthur. 
90 Arthur is able to have trusting relations with others. 
p.60 
91 Life is infinitely boring, there is no real reality. Wa Ido uses 
experiences to substantiate his superiority. 
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His self accusations against his desire to kill Arthur are not only 
projected, but the receiver of his projections is devalued. This is 
characteristic of Wa Ido, that a I I his 'badness' is projected onto the other 
and the other becomes de va lued. As a consequence of Wa Ido inability to 
hold anv badness, others in his world become recipients and hence all 
de va lued. 
p.61. 
92 Waldo is attracted by Mrs Poulter's sensuality, but his response is 
truncated and converted into a compu Is ive voyeuristic experience. Guilt at 
his des ire is converted into contempt for the object of h is des ire. 
Waldo is unable to look directly at life, he looks obliquely through 
windows. Those times of looking direct Iy in, confirm for him the danger of 
life. He is confronted by his desire with Mrs Poulter and by the death of 
his father. 
p.62. 
93 Wa Ido experiences Arthur as continua I Iy present, 
mind. To escape he must withdraw h is mind, he must 
in plastic ways which will not reveal him. 
p.63. 
as a mirror to his 
not th ink, on Iy act 
94 Waldo's accident is experienced as humiliating and his intactness only 
maintained by his skin. There is only a fragile sense of boundedness when 
events or people are experienced as 'colliding' with his life. 
p.66. 
95 Waldo's relations are reactive . His responses to meeting Dulcie 
demonstrate the fluctuations of inflation and de va luation which occur, 
contingent upon the degree to which he feels himself reflected positively. 
Waldo does not feel loved, it is rather that those who have 'loved' him are 
exper ienced as possess ing him wh i Ie not see ing him. 
p.69. 
96 Waldo views death in terms of will. There is comfort in his philosophy 
for he can deny his finiteness and ultimate vulnerability by believing that 
to die is either an act of will over which one has control, or that one is 
removed aga inst one's wi II and therefor not respons ib Ie . 
97 Waldo does "not want to think" about anything which challenges his 
beliefs . Wa Ido cannot accept that his father was finite and defeated, and 
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that dad's protest was ineffectual. 
emptiness of his father's life, 
meaningless. 
Rather than face the grieving and the 
Wa Ida makes everyth ing empty and 
p.10. 
98 Wa Ida views his rea lity from an omnipotent stance, which 
either investing rea lity with some grandiose aspect of 
appropriating the greatness of others in a delusional way. 
entails him 
himself or 
Th is stance 
prec ludes him from see ing th ings for the ir own worth, for 
them of their goodness, and projected his own emptiness, 
deva lued and spa i It, unab Ie to offer hope. 
he has emptied 
thus they are 
99 He goes away emotiona lly and phys ica lly on discovering h is father dead. 
The little boy is called out against his will and Waldo is terrified that he 
will rejected for the pain of the grieving child. He is afraid of 
possession by the child inside him, afraid of possession by feelings. 
Instead he resists and clings to old habits of control. 
p.12. 
100 Waldo can only sense that mother is in possession of something denied 
him, a substance and interiority which a I lows to love and grieve. He can 
give no space to her grief, experiencing it as a cruel deprivation and 
abandonment. 
101 Wa Ido is aware of the barrier around mother, he copes through imitation 
and adaptation. He assumes a role and his words create such an impression 
that they seduce him out of himself. 
p.13. 
102 In Wa Ido' s fantasy, words become at last unnecessary, for he has his 
desire, his mother to himself - he is at last fed. 
103 Yet mother looks to Arthur to ho Id her and Wa Ido is left grasp ing I ike a 
ch i Id to understand the mean ing of the need and the hope of its 
fulfilment. The desperate yearning of the empty child in Waldo trembles with 
the hope of possibility, that mother will find in Arthur what she seeks, 
tha t he too cou Id find that wh ich he seeks, that love may be an exper ience 
of living, rather than one of dying. But the need is too great, the 
desperation too strong, and he falls back on his rationality, is blinded 
by his rationa lity. 
None of the family understand the significance of Arthur's feeding, 
spiritua I Iy and physica Ily, and the effort continues to be truncated. 
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p.74. 
104 With his father dead Waldo attempts to recreate his boyhood. This is 
done through the deva luation characteristic of his adu It perspective. An 
inflated image of himself emerges as one who is handicapped by Arthur. Yet 
Arthur is not enough to ho Id Wa Ida's projections of badness (pus). He 
retains a sense of his hatefulness being revealed through his skin, and he 
learns to hide, and eventually to seduce himself into denial of this sense, 
by creating the impress ion which adapts to what peop Ie want. Wa Ida 
continues to impress himself, yet he remains unconvinced of his realness. 
p.76 
105 Waldo has totally devalued his father, he merely the price you pay for 
life, it is a way to deny the disappointment, and loss suffered through 
the nature of his father. Waldo is unaware of the awful irony of his 
statement, that he pays most dearly for the life his father gave him. 
It is Arthur who is felt to be the "twin consciousness", the hindrance to 
his life, and yet a Iso the conso lat ion , the one to whom he can commun ica te 
at the most fundamental level. Because he needs Arthur, he hates him for 
his ability to be in the world, which is experienced as absent and free. 
Wa Ida, however, (p.79) is terrified to be free. He cannot 'leave' his 
family, both literally and symbolically because he would be alone, 
separate , thus he must deny his pain and disappointment in his parents and 
project h is wishes to destroy onto Arthur, who is then increas ing Iy 
experienced as persecutory. 
p.B2. 
106 Arthur helps Waldo avoid the emptiness and absence to his life, but he 
cannot admit th is need of Arthur and therefor experiences h is needs as 
devalued; he has projected his own devaluation and denial of his needs. 
In his parents, Wa Ido sees that one may be a live yet not exist, there is a 
death in existence embodied in the meaninglessness of their lives and their 
fear to love. 
In his desperation to prove that he exists, Waldo becomes exquisitely 
sensitive to the responses of others, the world is persecutory and 
untrustworthy. 
p.B3. 
107 He experiences his blurred inner world reflected in a blurred external 
world. Inner and outer blur together and there is no reality, nothing 
distinct, to ho Id onto. He needs something to be lieve in so that he may 
believe in himself. He cannot believe in his parents. 
p.B5. 
lOB In the search for the "distinct for", which both Wa Ido and Arthur seek 
251 
Mrs Musto introduces the pass ib il ity of God. She is the first to offer the 
idea that one can live in the flesh, that one need not feed off the flesh. 
She offers that life and fu lfilment (feeding) are idea Is to be embraced. A 
seed is planted for Arthur (p . 87 God is a rock crystal - something that 
always.ll) yet Waldo remains caught in the web of his mother's lack of 
belie f. He attains a sense of elite superiority in his identification with 
the idea ls of intellectua I purity and spiritua I abstinence. 
p. 98. 
109 As an ado lescent, 
would have been lost. 
unknown to himself for 
p.112. 
Wa ldo rea I ized that but for the peop Ie he created he 
Peop Ie rema ined unknown to him, as he rema ined 
fear of un leas ing the pass ions he feared. 
110 While still a youngster, Waldo is envious of the riches of the thoughts 
of others, while he feels superficial. He consoles himself with illusions 
of grandeur in time to come. There is a pass iv ity in the face of his 
belief that time will solve his problems. He cannot risk action, nor 
showing h imse If as a distinct form for fear of h is emptiness. Yet, un I ike 
Arthur he wi II not a Ilow anyone to fi II him, he fears be ing fi Iled up by 
others, be lieving in the danger of the other . 
When Waldo's hope (as in Dulcie) is shattered, his world is literally felt 
to shatter. There is a characteristic projecting of his felt sense on to 
the concrete objects of his world. (e .g. Dulcie's house which appears 
dead, reflecting the deadness he felt at her leaving) 
p.1l3 . 
III Waldo's relations to others is illuminated in their visit to the 
Feinstein's home . When Waldo can feel special, then the other is inflated 
and feeds Wa Ida 's grandiose sense through reflection of their specia Iness. 
Yet this occurs only briefly, as Waldo is vigilant to any sign of perceived 
rejection. Those moments when he cannot maintain his sense of being 
special, then the other is immediately devalued and his own omnipotence 
inflated. 
112 Wa Ida cannot acknowledge genuine sorrow in the other. This wou Id face 
him with the rea Iness of emotion, the rea Iness of the other. Wa Ida sees 
others only as projections of his world. To see the other is to acknowledge 
their existence, their separateness, their complexity, and the void 
between himself and the other . Thus while appear ing to fight off Arthur, 
Waldo also keeps them continually joined to guard against his world 
fragmenting. 
p. 1l5. 
113 Wa Ida has two secret vices, naming cars and fantas izing about when 
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Arthur dies. They both revea I h is des ire to be other than the way he finds 
himself to be. He fantasizes about being in the world, contained {the 
is land}, about abandon ing h imse If to sensua I ity, and most of a II of be ing 
spiritually celibate. Waldo cannot have what he wants {i.e. to be in the 
world, sensual, experiencing - to be} because he fears that he does not 
exist {there is no felt substance, no distinct shape to his existence}. 
Thus Waldo devalues life, the very things which would save him, and Arthur 
for h is lack. 
PP . 117. 
114 There is massive denia I of vulnerability and lack of a sense of self, 
seen in Wa Ido 's fear and denia I of death, his terror of being emptied of 
his thoughts {p.1l8.} and the intensity with which he clings to the little 
he has - Arthur and his manuscripts (p.1l9.). Arthur is needed to hold 
his negative projections, which he cannot acknowledge in himself for fear 
of fragment ing the I itt Ie good he does possess, wh ile the manuscr ipts embody 
his grandiosity and allow him a sense of there being something which he can 
believe in, something which shows him that he exists. The belief is 
however blurred and tenuous, it is not distinct. While a part of him knows 
that he might find the distinctness out in the world, he is too fearful of 
extinction, of the nothingness inside, to leave and he remains locked to 
the known {p.126}. 
p.127. 
115 As a young man Wa ldo is aware that his life is without a sense of 
a Ii veness, he cannot transform his paper moon into throbbing flesh. There 
is despair that his very nature denies him hope, that even dying {his or 
Wa lly's} does not give meaning and passion to his existence. His 
desperation is to be, to have a known sense of his existence. 
p.142. 
116 There is an awkward homosexual approach to Mr Poulter. It occurs as a 
displacement of his denied sexuality towards Mrs Poulter, and in the face 
of his deva luation of her. Wa ldo experiences his sexua lity as 
'boyishness', a potential for spontaneity, yet Waldo is only able to see 
the other as mirrors of and to himself. He is unable to accept the 
differences, and hence confus ions and vic iss itudes of human re lations . 
Waldo projects his unconscious intent and the incident becomes a sickeningly 
phys ica I, indecent propos ition. 
p. 145. 
117 Wa ldo b lames both parents. He is jea lous and wishes to catch mother 
out in her mistake. He longs to have her acknowledge him. The hope he 
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sought from father was disappo inted, and Wa ldo cannot forgive. Dad had 
looked to Wa ldo to save them (after Arthur had fa iled dad), but Wa ldo 
cannot. He distrusts both himself and the other, and accuses dad of 
wishing to keep him captured. Without a belief, without a model, Waldo 
cannot break away. He does pick up the load (as does Arthur) which his dad 
gives to them, and merely perpetuates his father's struggle, grandiosely 
denying th is fact. De luding h imse If with h is freedom, h is substance, his 
perfect ion. 
p.156. 
118 Waldo's inability to see and empathise with the world of the other is 
given in his 'marriage proposal' to Dulcie. The reality of her life he 
experiences as designed to hurt him, yet he converts his pain into a 
condescension of the other. He denies his own state, seeing it rather in 
the lives of others. Waldo ends up pitying in others what is himself, 
living under an "illusion of strength which makes their (his) dependence 
pitiable". 
p.157. 
119 Rejecting Du lcie becomes to embody the feared aspects of mother, the 
Goddess of a Thousand Breasts, incorporating, sucking in, incubating his 
life, (the blood lust) from which he must escape, but to which he remains 
drawn to the end, despite his devaluation and denial. 
p.158. 
12D Dad only listened to his own thoughts, destined to suffer, devoid of 
passion. Even his love for Mrs Poulter is obscured by contempt, to hide his 
"weakness" (p.159). 
p.161. 
121 With the death of dad, (who had fa iled to save Wa Ido from mother and 
life) Wa ldo attempts to take h is father's p lace, and fu Ifi 1 a fantasy of 
grandeur and superiority. He looks to mother to fi 11 the empty spaces with 
grandeur, and be joined together, exc luding a 11, even dad. It is on Iy 
Arthur who rema ins to remind him of h is heritage, and mother who does not 
live up to the illusions he has created. She is afraid of the dark 
interiors of her mind and past. Wa Ido however feeds himself with visions 
of splendid interiors, which belie the poverty of reality (p.164). Waldo 
is lost however, for mother rema ins out of reach, linked to dad even after 
his death. Wa Ida hates the bond between mother and dad (p . 165). And in 
the end he needs mother to protect him from Arthur, whom he dreads most of 
a 77, for fear of what Arthur knows (p.167) that he is empty because of 
hate (?). Thus he denies his mother's dying, and is unable to grieve. 
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Instead he becomes more aware of the persecution of the world; Dulcie's 
devouring nature, and what he experiences as the 'sadism' of Crankshaw. 
The latter is deva lued/spoilt by the projection of Wa Ido 's sadism while 
Wa Ido is ab Ie to see himse If as pure and gu ilt7ess. As with Mr Pou Iter 
there is an homosexua I element. 
p.162. 
122 Mother's interest in his book is experienced as an indecent intrusion. 
It is an invasion of his life, for 'the book' has become his life. He 
sees his life as his book, and within this process the book becomes the 
sym:Jol of va lidation of his existence. The notes, the manuscripts are the 
tangible evidence that he is . 
p.174. 
123 Waldo is unable to contemplate the atrocities of war, defending himself 
from involvement and denying the sadism within. To feel accused of all 
atrocities, speaks of the return of the projection of hate and destructive 
impulses. Waldo compensates for the fear of the persecutor by withdrawing 
to his grandiose il Ius ions of creation. Wa Ido can not a llow any primitive 
processes to occur for fear of be ing devoured by them, by the unconsc ious. 
Thus it is not a block in the transformation of the experience into a 
creative statement, but rather that Wa Ido cannot access the content, his 
internal world remains too fearful . Like mother, "they yawned too dark in 
her (his) mind" (p.164). 
p.177. 
124 Wa Ido deve loped persona I detachment to avo id the hurts and confus ions 
of people. this way of being becomes inflated to the point of being for 
him a religion, something to believe in. Nothing is only nothing, and no 
hurt is experienced. 
p.184-
125 The poss ib il ities of the Peace offer Wa Ido hope, that there is perhaps 
hope, that there is 1 ife after destruction, that there can be love and 
forgiveness . The doll given to Mrs Pou Iter is the truncated offering of 
this hope , it is the possibility of love and unexpressed desire. His 
gesture is not met and as with a II his perceived rejections, the confusion 
and the hurt become the reason for a further retreat from peop Ie and an 
increase in his hate, especia I Iy of Arthur, Arthur whom he needs for his 
sense of continuity but for whom, for this very reason, he has the 
greatest fear (experienced as hate). There is an enduring fear that 
Arthur's "other truth" (p.195) will viciously ferret out the comfor t he 
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ga ins from abandon ing h imse If to Memory. He wi II even deny h is brotherhood 
with Arthur (in the library) to avoid hearing Arthur's truth (p.199). 
p.192. 
126 The fe It intrus ion of Johnny and the suppressed sexua I ity of the 
experience, leaves Waldo most vulnerable to fears of assault. To fears of 
impingements into his inner most, virginal being. Closeness is 
experienced as 'rape' of his being, and he seeks security through 
identification with the primal rapist, his mother. 
He sees her as being two, containing him inside her. He is identified and 
merged with her in "ice", impenetrable and superior. She lives on in him, 
while he continues the superiority of their existence. By throwing off his 
clothes, he abandons his disguise and is revealed in his true brilliance, 
not Waldo but "Memory herself" (p.193). He has become merged with his 
image of the Great Mother, and can now I ive, breathe indu 1gently. 
p.207 
127 Arthur's other truth begins to be spoken, that love might help one 
forget hate, and that Arthur is pained by his inability to help Waldo from 
be ing what he is. Wa Ida must reject Arthur as mad. Arthur is too close 
to his fear of non-existence, of his emptiness. Arthur's words reach him, 
and despite his suspicion, release him to tears (p.208). But Waldo is 
caught, not by Arthur, as he suspects, but by his own "illusion of love 
and a greyed-up grass-ha 1m" (p. 209). He must prevent h imse If giv ing room, 
not only to Arthur's thoughts but to his own as well. 
p.212. 
128 In wr iting the poem, Arthur has appropr ia ted some of the consc iousness 
which is Waldo's. This is experienced as a cataclysmic loss. Arthur's 
"other truth" begins to take shape in the words which Wa Ida has appropriated 
and denied to Arthur . The other truth is experienced as 'ferreting' Wa Ida 
out, a truth wh ich hunts him, rather than be ing hunted, yet it is a truth 
which Waldo desperately seeks but just as desperately avoids. (The hope of 
pass ib il ity, wh ich becomes blinded by the sun.) 
129 Arthur's poem speaks of an understanding of Waldo which the latter 
cannot accept. Arthur experiences the inevitability of pain in loving 
another, he sees the giving of ones blood, in compassion for the other, as 
the sacrifice of love . It is the sacrifice he has given to Wa Ida, to 
offer himself for dissection, to be for the other, for Waldo to be able to 
find their sa Ivation. 
130 Arthur's passion is felt as a disease which infects Waldo, and which he 
must destroy. By destroying h is papers he has begun a process of 
purification, Through symbolic burning, he destroys that symbol of his 
life which was his last vestige of hope. Wa Ida is consumed by fear of the 
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touch of another's life. The touch is yearned for with such a desperate 
passion that it becomes dreaded to the point of terror . He must rid 
himself of Arthur for terror of his touch, (Arthur who knows through 
touch). 131 In his despa ir and terror, Wa Ido must ensure that Arthur 
dies, that he no longer lives for Waldo and therefor Waldo must die. Even 
as he dies, it is Arthur he sees as dying. He is safe at last from the 
terror of needing. 
p.215. 
1 Arthur has memories far earlier than Wa Ido. His first memories are 
symbo I ic of the unconscious, the blue sea, floating ice-bergs, sleepy, 
ocean ic, safe - expans ive. Arthur ass imi lates and carries the fragments 
of the mother image (Memory in the blue dress), which Waldo is only able to 
I ive and appropriate once the ho Id of the phys ica I mother has passed. It 
is only then that Waldo embarks on the symbolic, rather than concrete, 
journey of discovering himself (only to be encased in ice, unable to 
escape, the icy deadness of his enmeshment with his mother). 
(p.1l8 It is given to Arthur to protect the splintering glass of the 
family, he fails and the glass becomes the ice which encases.) 
2 Arthur is aware of danger; the imagery of the icebergs, Waldo's sickness, 
but there is spontaneous delight in his world. He longs to grasp what is 
beyond his reach - that is, understanding, the sun, the illumination of 
consciousness. But when he grasps, struggles to know and understand, to 
experience the consciousness of Waldo, his mother is afraid, afraid she 
wi II lose him. Arthur becomes afraid too, to fa II and be lost for ever. 
Arthur appropriates the rites and mysteries of the mother, becomes immersed 
in intuitive knowing, while the rationa I, conscious knowing is left to 
Wa Ido. 
In later years Arthur is no longer afra id to topp Ie, for he knows it is 
only his body which falls, he has a larger sense of himself. It is a sense 
in which he is connected with a II who are dear to him. It is his quest to 
gain the unity of the solid mandala, to gain a sense of wholeness with 
others - to rega in who leness through merger with Wa Ido, who is the 
complement to his wholeness . 
3 Arthur cannot be for himself, even his sea sickness becomes empathy for 
the sea gulls. And he must deny an aspect of his being for Waldo to live -
he must be strong because Waldo is sick. 
4 As very young boys, Arthur is specia Ily bonded to mother, while Wa Ido 
is identified with Dad. 
p.216. 
5 Dad and Wa Ido are in a quest for manhood, be lieving they wi II find it in 
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the manly things which men do, even though dad then denies his nature. 
p.216. 
6 Mother is on ly ha If present to Arthur. She requires that Arthur not 
"showoff", she deprecates the desire to show off, i . e. to be admired and 
app lauded, whi Ie she herse If batt les with the des ire. Arthur adapts, 
while knowing that there is more of himself which he longs to show and which 
he longs to see in others. Arthur has a sensuous enjoyment to life wh ich 
is feared by the family, yet they require him to hold it and be punished 
for holding it for them. (The family require that Arthur be the saviour 
and the lamb to the slaughter). 
7 The family is a family of consciousness, cynical, rational. Arthur 
exper iences through a sense of be ing undifferent ia ted, through fee lings, 
through being submerged in the experience. Already feeling his inferiority, 
his foolishness in comparison to their articulateness. 
p.217. 
8 Mother is harassed and upset by ( the ch ildren) Wa ldo' s illness. Arthur 
remembers the bruta lity (and the blood lust) of Mother's family, 
they are revived by mother's troubles and hardship. 
9 Arthur is given the sense that men are more bruta I and comp I icated than 
women. It is women he is able to love and understand (p.221). But it is 
to men that he looks to find what is distinct, what is 'true', that which 
he can be lieve in. The two such men were Mr A llwright and Mr Saporta, men 
who did not require Arthur to look after them. 
10 Sensations of the moment flood Arthur - he has a sense of the gods . He 
wants to share his richness, his flooding with Wa ldo, and needs Wa ldo to 
give it 'meaning', conscious shape. The need is rationalized as Waldo 
being exc luded. 
Arthur has a sense of substance within, something to believe in, yet he 
cannot believe in himself for he is flawed without the consciousness of 
Wa ldo, he has not the words with wh ich to express and make externa I the 
reality of his world. 
Arthur is feared by Waldo for his belief. 
p.218. 
11 In the wor ld of potentia I danger (the icebergs in the sea of the 
unconscious) Arthur inflates his twinship to feel that he is protected 
because he has a twin. It is thus vita lly important to protect the bond. 
The danger of the ice I ies in the den ia I of emotion, in the death of 
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passion; the death which takes his father; the fear of both the death and 
the pass ion ki lis Wa Ido; and mother manages to survive by feeding on the 
blood of her sons and husband. 
12 Arthur leaves Wa Ido to speak, to word the consciousness of their 
experience. Arthur is not angry enough to be moved from his laziness. 
Anger is needed for Arthur to be moved to define h is shape in consc iousness. 
He has given the anger to Wa Ido, an excess thereof. The inevitab Ie out 
come is for Wa Ido to become the victim of his anger as it grows without the 
conta inment of the compass ion of human identification, wh ile Arthur must 
strugg Ie aga inst the pu II of the unconscious, he must strugg Ie to find the 
words to define himself as separate and distinct, and not be lost to merger 
with the unconscious, to identification with a II through merger across 
their boundaries. 
13 It is Arthur's need to be understood, so as to understand. Whereas 
Waldo uses his understanding to defend against understanding. 
p.219. 
14 It is through Arthur that Wa Ido 's needs to be seen, made a fuss of and 
spoilt attain life. It is Arthur who looks beyond the facade, into the 
private spaces of peop Ie, and sees the need. Arthur sees and keeps Wa Ido 
'alive' by being the continual reminder of the 'other truth' of Waldo's 
being, yet Wa Ido becomes terrified of what Arthur sees. 
15 Mother is also afraid of Arthur seeing, she needs to keep him merged, 
'without words'. Arthur, in his adaptation, cannot find the words, he 
gags on the words while desperately struggling to know. 
16 To be 
silenced. 
about life . 
p.220. 
for others, mother and dad, especia Ily Wa Ido, 
Silenced about Mrs Poulter, about God, cruelty, 
Arthur is 
love, hate, 
17 Arthur collects people, he seeks his knowing through people, while 
Wa Ido co Ilects words . 
18 Arthur wou Id do more without Wa Ido, but he cannot be a II for fear of 
destroying both himse If and Wa Ido. 
p. 223. 
18 The house is the hope of dad, h is temp Ie . The men seek t o find 
something to fill the emptiness of their lives. Dad in a truncated 
aesthetic ism, and Wa Ido , the myths. Oad in h is quest to find the 
'distinct' shape, destroys to find what is solid. A II that is left him is 
that nothing is nothing, spoiling the hope of belief for h is sons - the 
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myths (like religion) are not real or true. Arthur is still able to love 
and be lieve in the 'sacrosanct', desp ite it be ing insuffic ient for dad. 
19 Dad quest ions Arthur's th ink ing, dad is unab Ie to accept the 
reflection of a flawed being in his son. 
p.224. 
20 Arthur can not exp la in h is inner wor Id, it is experienced as too 
difficult, too long; he blames himself, that he is too lazy. 
Characteristically Arthur devalues himself in order not to highlight the 
defects of h is family. 
Arthur has been denied/ has given up the words to Waldo. He is thus left 
inarticulate in his world, and ridiculed by the other who requires the 
sacrifice. He feels that he wouldn't be understood and that he would be 
laughed at. Principa lly the family wou Id laugh at his mora I outrage at the 
Father who takes away the sight of a child who speaks the truth - his own 
father who is afraid of life and can not show him the way, not protect him 
against the mother. Instead in hopelessness dad devalues Arthur's efforts. 
21 Arthur is identified with women, he knows that he holds the feminine 
within, but cannot give it expression except in love of women. 
p.227. 
22 Through Mr A Ilwright, Arthur is introduced to the persona lized concept 
of God, someone beyond one, someone in whom to be lieve. Arthur is 
looking for what is' truest', something 'distinct' . Hera who devotes 
herself, like Arthur, is not distinct, not someone to believe in. 
Arthur is able to discern and believe in the distinct shape of others . He 
can believe in their realness, where as Waldo cannot . 
p.228. 
23 Arthur 'absorbs', merges with the boundaries of the other (his quest is 
for a distinct shape) and is thus able to deny the experience of hurt. 
Rather it is Wa Ido, onto whom the burden of consciousness has been 
projected, and whose shape is rigid and infinitely brittle, who is 
vu Inerab Ie to hurt. 
24 Arthur experiences himse If as different, but un like Wa Ido, who must 
defend h imse If from the knowledge by grandiose i llus ions about himse If, 
Arthur is able to remain stable because he has a belief in the meanings of 
his marbles - his 'permanencies' . 
25 Arthur has striven to see the core, the centre of truth of the other. 
Waldo is perceived as flawed or knotted in his depths. Arthur is able to 
understand the extent to which Wa Ido is unable to be due to his centra I 
convo lution where he can on Iy turn back upon h imse If in se If feeding and 
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self love. He can only be the receiver, to give is to be depleted by the 
insatiability of the other (the projection of his own unfulfi lled needs) . 
Waldo is his own crystal core (p.l83). 
Whereas Arthur's own core is experienced as coils of circlets, 
understandings within understandings, being within being. 
p.229 . 
26 In the dark of night, in the call of the unconscious, they are able to 
unite, to be shut off from the world. Arthur seeks 'conjunction' with 
Wa Ido. It is when he fee Is merged with Wa Ido, that he is ab Ie to fee I 
that his understanding gives light, that there is light in his world. 
Waldo's darkness is able to be overcome. 
27 But Arthur's light is fragile, it cannot withstand the darkness of 
Waldo's consciousness. 'Darkness', for Waldo breaks their union, 
destroys what Arthur requ ires, Wa Ida's words of consc iousness . To ha ve 
Waldo's words, Arthur must merge, but Waldo fears Arthur for the knowledge 
which would emerge if Arthur were to speak with the words. 
28 Arthur is not able to feel his own need of Waldo to help him be in the 
world, to keep Arthur protected (p.21B). He is unable to experience his 
envy of Wa Ido, rather the envy and fra ilty are projected on to Wa Ido wh ile 
Arthur denies his need for protection and his own fra ilty. Arthur cannot 
allow Wa Ido to separate from h imse If, he needs Wa Ido to carry the 'bad' 
feelings, to allow him to explore the 'oceanic' without fear of the 'bad' 
interna I wor Id, yet the price he pays is the lack of consc iousness wh ich 
would transform his experience into the world of 'rationality ' (transform 
primary process into secondary process?). 
29 Arthur must be for the other, he must devote his time to protecting 
Wa Ido. His own life is denied in the pursuit of being strong for others, 
in identifying with the bleeding cow (p.23D). This is a truncated Christ 
image, Arthur as the sacrifice, in the hope of finding sa Ivation, 
meaning, faith for the family. While Arthur sacrifices himself in the hope 
that they may become "distinct" in themselves, people in whom to believe. 
30 A II the family is experienced as fra il- Mother unab Ie to be in the 
world, Waldo bound by his thoughts, and Dad afraid. 
p.230. 
31 There is no room for Arthur to be frail, the family is immobilized by 
its frailty and fear. 
32 Arthur is identified with the interminab Ie bleeding of the breeding cow 
(earth mother?) . 
33 In the merger which occurs between the young boys, 
without words, Wa Ido defines Arthur as a helpless fema Ie. 
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at those times 
Arthur submits 
to Waldo's reality, he will be what Waldo needs him to be, through his 
guilt at taking Waldo's life. 
p. 231. 
34 Arthur is a genius with numbers, numbers are solid, logica I and can be 
understood with out ambiguity. It is an understanding with out emotion. 
Both Wa Ido and Arthur cannot comprehend the ir lives for both are unab Ie to 
integrate the vicissitudes and complexity of emotions. 
p.232. 
35 Mothers will not acknowledge Arthur as he is, she attempts to hold him 
to her, first through music and then the feminine rites of the hearth. 
Arthur is able to merge with the music but he is unable to give it external 
form and structure, i. e. he is ab Ie to merge with expans ive fee lings yet 
unable to give them structure . He cannot control what he is sensuously open 
to where hearing and seeing overlapped in a wholeness/totality of 
experience. 
The rites/vocation of the hearth offer Arthur a sense of comp leteness, 
who leness in h is merger with the other, the comp leteness of the manda la -
the closed eirc Ie. 
Arthur seeks the manda la to impose "order on psychic chaos" {p.238}. He 
sense that if he could find the totality of his being there would be order, 
there wou ld be sp iritua lity, there wou Id be something to be lieve in. Thus 
he seeks to heal the split within his own nature, by attempts to merge with 
Wa ldo. {To hea I Wa Ido so that he may be one?} 
36 Even his experience of nature enhances his sense of oneness . 
p.233. 
37 Arthur is afra id of scorn, scorn of his marb les. The ridicu Ie of others 
would illuminate the fragility of his beliefs, his permanencies. 
p .237. 
38 Arthur is guilty for taking what is Waldo's i.e. the know7edge from 
books . He a Iso betrays Wa Ido for by seeking the distinct shape in books, 
he has 70st fa ith in Wa ldo. 
39 Where as Wa Ido looks through the windows of/at l i fe, Arthur both looks 
in and goes into the I ives of others . 
p.239. 
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40 Arthur attempts to define a world without Wa Ida, and begins to 
experience a need for possession and privacy. Yet he is pulled back by the 
irritation of others at the existence of his secret life (p.242) and the 
image of Waldo in need - that only he can save Waldo, only he can "jerk" 
open the closed cupboard of Waldo's relations to others (p.243). 
p.240. 
41 Arthur is led to believe that there is no one in the family who could 
prov ide for the ir sa Iva t ion except for h imse If. He has accepted the 
projection of the fami ly and dedicates his life to finding the words which 
might release the secret of "totality", of life. He dedicates his life in 
grand sacrifice to compensate for the meaninglessness and emptiness of his 
existence. 
42 Arthur's has the ability to be merged with, or submerged by, the other, 
to the extent of living the life of the other, be it Waldo's thoughts or 
the life of the music. He is thus accepted into the lives and minds of 
those who remain open to their existence, who question their 'shape' in 
the world, and have not become rigid as Waldo has. 
p.245. 
43 Arthur is only partly aware of how others perceive him. What others 
see as his "dill", retarded, clumsy nature, Arthur experiences as his 
"aggressive personality" - that part which desperately strives to know, to 
make sense, to be in the war ld. It is the neediness, the demandingness 
of his need which gives it the experiential feel of aggression, he will 
destroy by his need. 
p.246 - 247. 
44 Arthur is able to love and able to keep his objects alive in 
absence, his internal world is peopled by alive, loving others. 
able to grieve and empathize with the grief of another (p.252). 
p.249. 
their 
He is 
45 The war ld is he ld stab Ie by on ly a few peop Ie, the "una lterab Ie ones ", 
Saporta and A llwright, those with a dist inct shape . The rest of the 
war ld, like h imse If, is experienced as fluctuating, dividing. Arthur 
merges with the need of the other (e .g. Waldo, and Dulcie p.253) believing 
that he fills their drought and emptiness, unaware of the mutual feeding 
which also fills his own drought and emptiness. The real feeding comes 
from the "una lterab les", where the ir boundar ies prec lude Arthur from 
merging with them, and what is given is not recouped. The other is whole 
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enough to give, and whole without him. Arthur however seeks merger for 
fear of a loneness, fear of his own lack of wholeness and he seeks others 
who need merger for a mutua I sense of a I iveness. When he is merged 
however, then ident ity is confused and Arthur cannot be , he is left 
without a sense of his personal boundaries. 
p.256. 
46 Arthur accepts with fatalism, the situation between himself and Waldo. 
Waldo had wanted it that way - (rationalizes his "backwardness" as an 
adaptation to the demands of Wa Ido? Or does he carry the projection, while 
sti 77 look ing for the so lution?) 
47 While Arthur would like to understand femininity, and the "theoretical 
generosity" of the breast, mother maintains impermeable boundaries . Arthur 
is left with the mystery of the breast, its barrenness and its loss. 
p.260. 
47 Mrs Pou Iter offers Arthur a connect ion with a sensua I, feeding, 
curing, Great-mother image, the loss of which is devastating to Arthur. 
p.261. 
48 Arthur / s search for a fa ith is based, not on a sa v iour from whom he can 
expect to be given existence, but rather a saviour who has his own 
existence - (a saviour who is existence?) 
p.266. 
49 The dance a 770ws Arthur to express his understanding and emotiona I 
identification with the significant others in his life. The dance however, 
provides Arthur with a mode of expression. Words are Waldo/s, and Arthur 
is unable to find a mode of expression which would not only release him but 
also join him with others in an articulated communication, rather than an 
intu itive, unconscious mode. The dance becomes the first, archa ic steps 
towards such a communication. 
50 Centra I to Arthur is his identification with the pass ions of suffering 
in life, and his identification with the redemptive blood of Christ . 
Arthur who understands the need for a saviour, must be the saviour - (To 
see Arthur/s identification as grandiose, as a defense against his despair 
negates the integrity of the quest.) 
p.268. 
51 Arthur denies his hurt, through admiration of Wa Ido . The adm ira tion 
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is itse If a den ia I of the rea I ity of his situation, and a den ia I of the 
destructiveness of Wa Ida. He cannot afford to see and respond to Wa Ida's 
destruct iveness for fear of the disso lution of the ir un ity. 
p.269. 
52 Arthur is stoical in the face of dad's death, he is accustomed to the 
rejection of his dad, and there is no room for him to be other, for Waldo 
cannot face the death, the world. Arthur must be strong for Wa Ida, and 
he pities Waldo, although it is difficult to admit the fact. 
53 Arthur cannot pity his mother for the inflation of his image of her. 
Yet he suffers from her withdrawa I into herse If and his yearning for her 
love. He experiences love in the context of being needed. She does not 
need him (except when dad dies) and Arthur seeks out others to need him 
(love him) giving that which he most needs i . e. someone to be there for 
him, for him to love without having to give up a part of himself (to be 
able to love like a free, spontaneous child). 
p.270. 
54 The fami Iy live in their thoughts, which they keep secret and hidden. 
They have no need for the other, for they have become se If-sufficient in 
the ir withdrawn inner war Ids. Mother looks to Arthur, but on Iy to find 
another - dad or an image, but she does not look to find Arthur. 
p.271. 
55 Mother denies her need, and there is sadism in her denia I. 
p.273. 
56 Arthur protects Waldo from the pain of their mother's death, while 
experiencing it as an amputation of himself. He no longer had a 
respons ib il ity towards mother after her death and transferred it to the 
Saportas ' . He cant inues to love au Ic ie and enjoy a sensua I aesthet ic 
fulfilment with her. Yet he remains fearful that it may be spoilt . 
p.278. 
57 Dulcie articulates Arthur's quest in her understanding that a surrender 
to love might let in God. For Wa Ida and the parents , to be spiritua lly 
feed, to love and be loved, have become so desperate Iy wanted that the 
prospect of its fu Ifi Iment becomes the most feared event and fierce Iy 
defended aga inst . Arthur fee Is he must even distort h is love to make it 
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more acceptable to Waldo (p.279). Arthur feels that by showing Waldo that 
he needs him, he is showing Waldo love. There is a denial of Arthur's own 
fear of Wa ldo 's death and his need of him. 
p.280. 
58 Arthur's two preoccupation belie h·is quest for wholeness. Spiritua lity 
has attained an integrity in Arthur's life and he feels it vitally important 
for Wa Ido not to shatter his belief, but to accept and a llow the tota lity 
of their lives to emerge. Arthur's totality is inextricably entwined with 
Wa Ido . 
59 Arthur has turned to books, Wa Ido 's "vocation", to search for his 
answers to life's emotions. 
p.283. 
59 For Arthur, the importance of their relationship is primary. He 
understands that they needed something reliable, 'distinct' to love for they 
did not trust the distinctness of the other, they are too flawed - abnorma I 
and narcfss is tic . Wa Ido is beyond the reach of Arthur and he is 
overwhe Imed by the loss of Wa ldo to the ca II of co ldness, his encapsu la t ion 
in ice. Even with Waldo's final betrayal in the library Arthur still 
carries Waldo inside him, he is caught by the inevitability of their union, 
which "only the knife could sever" (p.256) . 
p.286. 
60 Arthur fears the remonstration of his move away from mother's ideals, 
he rema ins fearfu 1 of the power of the mother image and in h is efforts to 
break away he becomes destructive of the mother image, "barging in" in on 
Mrs Poulter and her maternal ritual with the doll, destroying the 
'sacredness' of her space (p.288). 
p.290. 
61 In writing the poems Arthur is most gui Ity . He attempts to rega in the 
gods, the life, which his fami ly had destroyed, his attempt is a 
betrayal of Waldo and Waldo's 'permanencies' . 
p.291. 
62 Arthur is open to receIving his brother's transference, taking and 
carrying aspects of Wa ldo, experiencing, merging with him. 
63 While Wa ldo identifies with the grandeur of his fantasy, Arthur is 
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aware of another dimension of the experience. The family needing the 
victim, the sacrifice, for their own salvation. The blood of life, of 
passIon, must be spilt for them to be redeemed, for them to be brought to 
life. They wi II be redeemed through identification with the sacrifice. 
64 Arthur denies the pain of his sacrifice, of recognizing himself as the 
victim to feed the lives of the others. 
65 Arthur finds the meaning for his life in dedication to Wa Ido, in being 
for Wa Ida in such a way that Wa Ida may experience his grandeur. 
p.292. 
66 Arthur is tota Ily unaware of the hate behind Wa Ida's proposa I for the 
walks, and that the extent to which Waldo shrivels is due to the life which 
Wa Ida feels is taken from him by Arthur. 
p.293. 
67 The discovery of the poem highlights, for Arthur, his blasphemy against 
life. That in the face of beauty and acceptance, his despa ir and pa in are 
blasphemous. In bleeding for the life of Waldo, Arthur betrays his 
personal god, Waldo. He has touched Waldo's flaw, has spoken the 'other 
truth' which Waldo has always dreaded. Arthur has shown his emptiness, 
and Waldo's hate becomes lived. 
p.294. 
68 Arthur assumes the guilt for Wa Ida's hate. He takes respons ibility 
because he is the "getter of pain". Arthur's life has been an unconscious 
reparation for the harm he has done. He is /has always been overwhelmed at 
the shame he causes, "For being the cause of everybody's shame" (p.307). 
He had been incapable of experiencing shame (pain?) because he feels himself 
to be the cause of everyone's shame. 
p.3iO. 
69 Arthur is guilty for being alive . 8y being born Waldo's twin, he 
spa ilt Wa Ida's I ife . He had thus continua lly to make reparation to Wa Ida 
for his own life. He could take nothing, it was all for Waldo. Only at 
the end is Arthur able to articulate his understanding, the need for his 
sacrifice. When he understands that Waldo's hate of him has caused his 
death - h is has killed Wa Ida. Rather than be the cause of hurt to Wa ldo, 
he should have given up his life, by not doing so he is guilty of murder. 
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